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1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
The expanding capacity of computers has produced an increasing 
demand for microdata. Government agencies like the Census Bureau and 
the National Center for Health Statistics receive data requests from 
economic, business and medical researchers. These government agencies, 
as well as other data providers, are faced with the problem of supplying 
statistically useful data that will not reveal the identity, or any 
confidential attribute, of a respondent. 
For example, suppose an agency releases tables of annual income 
cross-classified by sex and occupation for residents of Boone, Iowa. 
Furthermore, suppose Joseph Average is the only male statistician living 
in Boone, Iowa. Any user of the table, who knows that Joseph Average is 
the only male statistician in Boone, Iowa, can obtain confidential 
information, such as annual income, about Joseph Average. Such an 
occurrence is called a case of attribute disclosure. As another 
example, suppose an agency releases a data set containing individual 
records. The records have been stripped of identifiers, such as names 
and addresses. Identity disclosure occurs if a user is able to 
positively link a respondent to the record of that respondent. 
Data agencies must devise methods to prevent such disclosures in 
order to satisfy the pledges of confidentiality given to respondents. 
The methods employed to protect the anonymity of respondents are known 
as disclosure avoidance techniques. 
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1.2 Literature Review 
The statistical community became concerned about maintaining 
respondent confidentiality in the late 1960s when files of linked 
records, data banks, and statistical file systems were initially 
requested by researchers. Steinberg and Pritzker (1967) suggested that 
files of linked records be created in a manner that would maintain 
confidentiality. They advised record linkers to "expunge all individual 
identifiers at the instant of creation." Bachi and Baron (1969) give a 
summary of the confidentiality problems faced in setting up data banks 
or linking records between data files. 
Although these were two of the first articles to address the 
general problem from a statistical standpoint, the issue of data 
collection and dissemination has a long legal and historical 
background. Duncan and Lambert (1986) provide a good review of the 
federal statutes dealing with confidentiality. The earliest legislation 
allowing government use of private information was the Internal Revenue 
Act of 1864. The 1948 Trade Secrets Act protected statistical data of 
business establishments under the Criminal Code. More recent 
legislation regarding data dissemination and respondent confidentiality 
is the Freedom of Information Act (1966) which attempted to extend 
public access to government information with certain limitations. In 
1970, a federal law (Title 20 USC 1232g) required that schools at all 
levels obtain the consent of students or parents before releasing 
student data for non-academic studies. In 1974, the Privacy Act 
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required the federal government to formulate confidentiality guidelines 
under which they would disseminate data. The key legislation concerning 
the collection and protection of data is Title 13 of the U.S. Code, 
under which the Census Bureau operates. Title 13 states that "collected 
data can be used for statistical purposes only and cannot be published 
in a manner whereby the data furnished by any particular establishment 
or individual can be identified." Abiding by the laws of confiden­
tiality and still providing statistically useful data is not a simple 
task. As Mugge (1983) states, "there are so many different items of 
information about any subject individual or establishment in our typical 
surveys that the set of information could serve as a unique identifier 
for each subject." 
Data collected by government agencies plays an important role in 
government policy making, as well as in the private sector. However, 
data collection is threatened if individuals are reluctant to respond 
because they feel their confidentiality rights are threatened. Duncan 
and Lambert (1986) list two cases where such reluctance was critical. 
The first is a proposed study of draft evaders that could not be 
conducted because the respondents did not feel convinced their anonymity 
could be assured. Duncan and Lambert also mention the decision of the 
Constitutional Court of West Germany to postpone the census after over 
one thousand lawsuits were filed against the census. The government 
agencies collecting data must assure potential respondents that their 
confidentiality rights are not being violated; hence, the need for 
research in the areas of disclosure avoidance. 
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Although research in the area of confidentiality is in its early 
stages, some standard techniques for various forms of released data are 
practiced by the releasing agencies. Mugge (1983) discusses confiden­
tiality measures taken at the National Center for Health Statistics. 
Cox et al. (1985) provide a good discussion of Census Bureau data 
products and the techniques used to mask them before release. Â summary 
of this discussion and other related articles is now given. 
The Census Bureau releases data in three forms. These are sets of 
frequency count tables, sets of tables of aggregate magnitude data, and 
microdata files. Frequency count tables are two way tables of counts, 
which can be combined to form three or higher dimensional tables. For 
example, table counts for sex by income group may be released for an 
exhaustive set of k age groups. These k two-way tables form a 
single three-way table of sex by income group by age group. Hence, 
disclosure avoidance techniques are applied within and between sets of 
two-way tables, because disclosure of a respondent's attributes can 
occur if an intruder carefully examines relationships within and between 
tables. Four methods have been listed as possibilities to mask 
frequency count tables constructed from 1990 census data. These are 
cell suppression, random data perturbation, random rounding and 
controlled rounding. Descriptions and examples of these techniques are 
presented in the Cox et al. (1985) article. Also, see Fellegi (1975), 
Cox (1980), and Cox et al. (1986). 
The Census Bureau also releases aggregate data for business 
establishments in the form of statistical tables. Sales of a certain 
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product or expenditures on a service are examples of the types of 
aggregate data compiled and released by the Census Bureau. With 
aggregate data, the confidentiality concern is related to the 
contribution of a single business to the total for a data cell. For 
example, suppose a table is constructed which contains the total 
dishwasher sales of all businesses in Story County, Iowa. If only one 
store sold dishwashers, a knowledgeable person would know this and a 
disclosure would result. If three businesses contribute to a cell, a 
coalition of two businesses could share their sales information to 
expose the sales of the remaining company. To avoid such a problem, the 
Census Bureau employs the (n, k) cell concentration rule. The rule 
states that if n or fewer respondents contribute more than k percent 
to a cell value, the cell is deemed a disclosure cell. If such a 
situation arises, the cell can be suppressed or collapsed with another 
cell. As an additional protective measure, the Census Bureau treats the 
values of n and k as confidential information. Cell suppression and 
replacement of cell values by value ranges are two other disclosure 
avoidance methods for aggregate data which are described in the Cox et 
al. (1985) article. 
The Census Bureau also releases data in the form of microdata 
records. A microdata record contains detailed information about an 
individual respondent. A sample of records, or microdata file, is a 
valuable asset in economic modeling, statistical analysis and general 
research. Unfortunately, public access to raw microdata records poses a 
direct threat to confidentiality. Even after identifiers such as name 
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and address are stripped from the records, an indirect threat may still 
exist if the remaining information is abundant. Additional confiden­
tiality measures must then be taken. 
The Census Bureau follows a practice of suppressing geographic 
detail of a record drawn from a population of 100,000 persons or 
fewer. In addition, all released files are scrambled with respect to 
geographic sort order. Other disclosure control techniques for 
microdata records include collapsing, top coding, replacing tail 
observations, rounding, and adding random error. The technique of 
adding random error will be discussed at length later in this chapter. 
Collapsing is the operation of representing continuous data in a 
categorical form. For example, a respondent's income may be recorded to 
the nearest one hundred dollars. However, before a record is released, 
the actual income value may be replaced by a categorical value 
representing an income in a range of 5,000 dollars. Topcoding is a 
special form of collapsing, whereby large response values are grouped in 
a single category. In the income example, very large incomes pose a 
clear threat to confidentiality. Hence, all incomes exceeding $100,000 
may be coded into an "Over $100,000" category. Replacing tail 
observations is another approach to the problem of small or large 
values. Under this method, the small (or large) values are not grouped 
into a category, but are replaced by the mean of the smallest (or 
largest) k percent of all values. 
Rounding is a technique which can provide protection for non-
categorical variables. Cox et al. (1985) suggest that a controlled 
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rounding method should be employed. Controlled rounding is a procedure 
that preserves the unbiasedness of estimates such as means and 
regression coefficients. Spruill (1982) presents a random rounding 
technique in which each value is rounded to either the smallest or 
largest closest multiple based on a probability, p . The probability 
is usually equal to 0.5. Zero values may also be set to non-zero values 
with a small probability. 
Spruill (1982) also discusses a data swapping procedure. Under 
this method, each of N records is divided into three sub-records 
having approximately one-third of the total variables of each record. 
Each sub-record based on the first one-third of the variables is matched 
with two others which have similar variable values. The remaining two-
thirds of each record corresponding to these three subrecords is carried 
along to form a group of three full records. Three new records are 
formed by combining a subrecord from each of the three full records. 
For example, the first new record may consist of the first subrecord 
from record one, the third subrecord from record two and the second 
subrecord from record three. Two other new records are formed similarly 
from what is left. 
Another form of disclosure control which has been researched is the 
technique of multiplying values of microdata records by random error. 
Spruill (1982) suggests multiplying data values by a non-normal error, 
6 , where c is a value between 0 and T (T - (o + 1) ^(ct + 2), 
a > -1) . Then each data value X is replaced by Xe or 0 , 
depending on the distribution of the variable (i.e., whether or not zero 
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is a common response). McGuckin and Nguyen (1988) suggest a 
deterministic transformation which disguises the data element X as 
X* using 
X* - ® X® 
where $ > 0 and 6 > 0 . Choosing 8-1 results in a multiplicative 
transformation similar to that discussed by Spruill. In fitting log-
linear regression models, the deterministic transformation provides the 
same parameter estimates as the original data. 
Microaggregation is another disclosure control method used to 
create microdata files for business establishment data. Microaggre­
gation consists of creating synthetic records from suitable subsets of 
original microdata records. The synthetic records are then released as 
a microdata file. Different methods of microaggregation are created by 
the choice of the method of defining subsets of original records. Also, 
there are variations in the manner in which the synthetic records are 
formed. Govoni and Waite (1985) suggest ranking the N establishments 
based on a single criterion variable. In their example, this variable 
is values of shipments. Groups of establishment records of size m are 
created from the ranked list. A synthetic record is created from each 
group of m by taking an average of the m data vectors. The 
resulting file contains approximately [N/m] synthetic records. 
Wolf (1988) proposes several methods of creating synthetic records 
using general microaggregation ideas. Wolf's general method is as 
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follows: First, define a proximity measure for any two records based on 
a subset of the variables in each record. Select a target establishment 
record and define a cluster of the k records closest to the target 
record based on the proximity measure. The cluster could also be formed 
by choosing records within a given distance of the target establishment. 
Then, form a surrogate record by taking a weighted average of the 
records in the cluster. The k records are then removed from the data 
file, a new target establishment is selected, and the process is 
repeated until the file is exhausted. 
Because establishment data usually include highly correlated 
subsets of variables, Wolf suggests avoiding redundancies through a 
principal components approach to the microaggregation technique. In 
addition, because business data are often longitudinal (i.e., 
measurements are recorded for the same establishments at specific time 
periods), the principal component analysis could be performed at a 
number of levels. For example, the principal components for each 
establishment can be constructed using the sample covariance matrix of 
all establishment data for the year. Because clusters of records can be 
formed using any one of many proximity measures, different synthetic 
records will result if different measures are used. For example, using 
average Euclidean distance over time will produce different aggregate 
clusters and different synthetic records than would be obtained using 
average Mahalanobis distance over time as the proximity measure. 
In addition. Wolf also discusses tests which can be used to compare 
the original file to the microaggregate file. These include the 
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of two univariate distribution functions and a 
likelihood ratio test for the homogeneity of original and microaggregate 
correlation matrices. Finally, Wolf points out that microaggregation is 
a linear transformation of the data matrix, and provides a brief 
discussion of the matrix algebra theory. 
With regard to disclosure controls for microdata records, McGuckin 
and Nguyen (1988) provide a good discussion of the advantages and 
disadvantages of some of the techniques presented here. In addition, 
the authors list several characteristics which they feel every public 
use data file should possess. First, the released data file should 
provide the same parameter estimates of a model as are obtained from 
analyzing the original data records. Also, it is important that a 
microdata file is capable of being linked with surrogate data records 
available from other sources. Furthermore, a microdata file should 
allow users the capability of working with relevant subsets of the 
file. Finally, a public use file should have the capability of being 
expanded easily to include data on new respondents or data for new time 
periods. These are valuable guidelines for a data provider to follow 
when preparing a file for public use. 
Other alternatives to releasing masked microdata records or 
synthetic records have been suggested. One possibility discussed by 
McGuckin and Nguyen (1988) is the release of the variance covariance 
matrix and mean vector of the data. This would insure little risk of 
disclosure and would allow researchers to obtain correct model parameter 
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estimates. However, a release restricted to these sample statistics 
allows no opportunity to study subsets of the data. 
Another alternative to microdata file releases is a public access 
database. Gates (1988) discusses the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
database which could be accessed worldwide through a telecommunications 
network. Users of the database did not have direct access, but could 
submit program jobs to be run by the LIS staff. Users were provided 
with a technical description of the data set, a description of the 
variables, a codebook, a small sample file of the LIS database and 
information on software packages that could be used to analyze the 
data. With the database and other information, the potential user could 
design a study and perform necessary data analysis by accessing the 
database with submitted programs. The mode of research is little 
different than if the user had direct access to the data, except that 
analysis is less convenient because of the time it takes to get results. 
The providers of the public access database must be wary of users 
designing output requests to compromise the database. Palley and 
Simonoff (1986) detail how such a database could be compromised through 
regression methodology. Palley and Simonoff first assume a regression 
model can be fit to a confidential variable based on several 
nonconfidential variables. An example is an individual's salary as a 
function of position in the company, age, education and years with the 
company. Even if users of the database are not permitted to submit 
regression runs due to confidentiality concerns, the database can still 
be compromised because the users can build a synthetic database by 
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submitting appropriate program runs. By requesting histograms of 
explanatory variables, the user can categorize continuous or non-
classification variables. The user can then submit job runs for 
frequency counts of combinations of the categorized explanatory 
variables, along with means and standard deviations of the confidential 
variable for such combinations. Based on the counts of various 
combinations, and the mean and standard deviation of the confidential 
variable for these combinations, the user can create synthetic records 
comprised of the explanatory variables and the confidential variable. 
The result is a synthetic database from which a regression model can be 
fit. 
Palley and Simonoff also state that this regression-based 
compromise approach was validated using actual census data. Synthetic 
records were created and a regression model was fit. The multiple R-
squared values obtained from the synthetic database were quite close to 
those obtained from the regression on the original database. 
Gates (1988) discusses additional concerns should the public access 
database method be adopted at the Census Bureau. These include concerns 
over access to data through the Census Bureau's telephone lines to its 
mainframe computer and fear that records from sample files may be linked 
to records in a public use file. 
Basically, the confidentiality problem can be defined as an 
intruder attempting to pinpoint a respondent's identity or attributes. 
In a general approach to this problem, Duncan and Lambert (1986, 1989) 
attempt to quantify the intruder's beliefs about the target in the form 
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of an uncertainty function, U(«) . The uncertainty function is then 
used to formulate disclosure measures and disclosure control techniques. 
The uncertainty function was first proposed by DeGroot (1962). 
DeGroot posed the problem of investigating the value of an unknown 
parameter, 0 , through a sequence of experiments. In the context of 
the confidentiality problem, 0 could be a target identity or 
characteristic value. After each experiment the knowledge or belief of 
the true value of S can be expressed as a probability distribution, 
 ^. Associated with each i is an amount of uncertainty in the mind of 
the experimenter. The uncertainty at each step is quantified by 
evaluating U(«) , a non-negative concave function, at the current 
estimate of the probability distribution, $ . As experimentation 
continued, the natural progression would be for the uncertainty to 
decrease toward zero. 
In their first paper, Duncan and Lambert (1986) research disclosure 
limiting procedures using general uncertainty function ideas. Assume an 
intruder has beliefs about a target value or individual in the form of a 
probability distribution. When a statistic, S , is released, the 
intruder updates the probability distribution, called the predictive 
distribution by Duncan and Lambert. Three disclosure measures are 
proposed by Duncan and Lambert. These measures are used to formulate 
disclosure control techniques. The measures are called knowledge, 
knowledge gain and relative knowledge gain. In order to explain these 
terms, some notation must be defined. First, define to be the 
Intruder's predictive distribution of the target value prior to the 
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release of the statistic, S . Similarly, define to be the 
intruder's predictive distribution of the target value after the release 
of the statistic, S . Finally, the intruder's uncertainty about the 
target is summarized by applying U(') , a concave nonnegative 
uncertainty function, to the intruder's predictive distribution. 
The knowledge measure of disclosure is . The knowledge 
gain is the difference in the uncertainty functions evaluated at the 
prior and posterior distributions, namely, knowledge gain is 
U(^ pr) - . The relative knowledge gain is a scale invariant form 
of the knowledge gain and is . Given these 
disclosure measures, disclosure limiting rules can be formulated for the 
release of a statistic, S . For example, only permit the release of a 
file if the knowledge gain from that file, , is less 
than some positive real number, r . The value of T depends on the 
level of protection desired, although the need of information to perform 
valid inference is an additional consideration in setting r . 
In a second article, Duncan and Lambert (1989) take a more detailed 
approach to the confidentiality problem, using loss functions in 
conjunction with DeGroot's ideas on quantifying uncertainty. The 
research considers the case where the intruder's objective is identity 
disclosure and the case where the objective is attribute disclosure. 
Assume a data matrix of all records is denoted by an N x K matrix 
X . A microdata file, Y (n x k) is constructed by taking a subset of 
the rows and columns of X . (i.e., some variables and records are 
excluded from X Co form Y ,) Suppose the intruder's target is tg , 
15 
which is an identifier x^ Q » the intruder's objective is identity 
disclosure. Assume the target is the characteristic x^ j if the 
objective is attribute disclosure. Also, given that Y - y , assume 
p(s) is a predictive distribution describing the intruder's current 
beliefs about possible values s of the target, and let L(t, s) be 
the loss incurred by the intruder when the target is said to be t but 
is s . Then, the intruder's uncertainty function about the target is 
U(y) - inf / L(t, s)p(s)ds . 
t 
Given a possible loss function, the releasing agency can influence the 
expected loss for the intruder by controlling Y . In the case of 
identity disclosure, suppose 
0 , if link - y^ Q^ and y^  ^- x^  ^
S.^  , if link - ^  , x^ Q e YQ 
2^ , if link - y^ g^ and y^  ^^  x^ q (1 < i < n) 
where Yq contains n records. If no record in the release is linked 
to the target, the link is null (link - <f>) and the intruder's expected 
loss is .g^ Z?_^ p(yj^ Q) . If a link is made, the intruder expects to 
incur a loss of g^tl-pCy^ g)] . Hence, the uncertainty about the target 
is 
L(link, x^ g) - { 
n 
U(y) - min{i- S pCy,.), -«oil - max pCy,.)]) 
i-1 l>i<n 
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The goal of the agency is to control Y so 
n 
igEl - max pCy^ g)] > Z (y^ g) . 
i—1 
Duncan and Lambert consider the problem for cases of releasing the data 
to a naive intruder, an informed intruder and an intruder with some 
knowledge. 
In the case of an intruder attempting attribute disclosure, the 
approach is similar. The difference is that the loss function becomes 
more complicated because a correct link requires a correct record 
identification and a correct attribute determination. 
Spruill (1982) proposes a measure of confidentiality to evaluate 
the effectiveness of various disclosure avoidance techniques applied to 
microdata files. These are grouping (or microaggregation), random 
rounding, data swapping, multiplying by random error and adding random 
error. To insure confidentiality for a microdata release, it would be 
desirable if no record in the release could be matched successfully to a 
record in a public use file. There is no way to keep track of all 
public use files, and, hence, a check for matching is impossible. 
However, by attempting to match the masked records of the microdata 
release with the unmasked originals, a conservative check can be made. 
In performing this check, Spruill proposes the following strategy. 
Compare each data record in the released file with each record from the 
original file. (Assume common records exist in these files.) The 
comparison is based on the distances between each masked record and 
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every original record. Each distance is computed as the sum of absolute 
deviations or the sum of squared deviations for all standardized data 
elements forming the records. Each masked record is then associated 
with the original record which corresponds to the smallest sum of 
deviations. A link is said to be made if a masked record is associated 
with its original counterpart. The proposed confidentiality criteria is 
the percentage of records for which a link is not made. This criteria 
can be redefined to be the percentage of records for which their 
unmasked counterpart is not among the three closest records. 
With the exception of adding random error, all masking methods 
evaluated by Spruill have been discussed previously in this chapter. 
There are many ways of adding random error to mask data records, some of 
which will be discussed in this research. One strategy is to add to 
each data element a normal error, u , with mean zero and variance 
kCTj^  , where k is a fixed number and is the variance of the 
underlying X variable. Spruill's method is to replace any nonzero 
data element x with x + u or 0 and any zero data element with 0 
or X* + u , where x* is a value generated from the true underlying 
distribution of X . 
Population files with 1,000 records and 36 variables were generated 
based on means and coefficients of variation of variables from an actual 
file. The confidentiality criteria was evaluated for records having 
anywhere from one to 32 variables. The results are based on ten 1% data 
releases for each of two generated populations. Spruill's results 
indicate that, for this size of sample, random rounding and data 
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swapping provide very little protection from disclosure. Grouping and 
multiplying by random error provide adequate confidentiality for up to 
nine common variables. Adding random error also provides good 
protection as long as the variance of the error is at least half the 
variance of the underlying X variable. Since confidentiality problems 
occur more frequently as the number of variables increases, Spruill 
suggests releasing data sets containing subsets of variables. 
In another paper, Spruill (1983) examines the analytic usefulness 
of business microdata masked by each of the previous five disclosure 
avoidance techniques. Spruill Investigates the effect of each masking 
method on the estimation of sample statistics and regression 
coefficients. Two data sets were used to evaluate masking effects. The 
first data set was test data generated from sample statistics of an 1RS 
data file, consisting of 36 variables and 1,000 records. The second 
data set consisted of 1,000 records of actual tax return data (1979) 
having 27 economic variables. Spruill concluded that the random 
rounding technique provided the most analytically useful data among 
procedures that afforded adequate confidentiality. Data masked by 
adding random error provided reasonable estimates for the sample mean, 
but such data provided inaccurate standard deviations, correlations, and 
regression coefficients. 
Paass (1985) investigates the case of an intruder attempting to 
determine the identity of a record in a microdata release by matching to 
a record in a public use file. Paass does not assume the records of the 
microdata release to be masked by adding error. However, Paass believes 
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the intruder's biggest problem in attempting to disclose identity is 
caused by measurement error in that the records in the microdata release 
will differ from those in the public use file. The problem defined by 
Faass is similar to matching records masked with added error to the 
unmasked originals. 
Faass first discusses an identification method for known 
distributions. Assume U - (u^ , ..., u^ ) is the set of all persons in 
the population. Let MD^  - y^ ) define the set of all records 
in the microdata file, and let AK^  - (x^  3^ ) define the set of 
records containing known data. For example, MD^  is the file from 
which the microdata release is generated, and AK^  is a public file 
having a corresponding data record for each record in the microdata 
file. The differences between the records are described completely by 
the error distribution, f(x|y^ ) , which is discussed below. Finally, 
assume the microdata release file is defined by MD - (y^ , ..., y^ ) , 
where n < N . Assume the intruder's additional knowledge is one data 
record x e AK^  and the intruder's objective is to find the microdata 
record corresponding to x . Identifying the target, x , can be posed 
as a problem of discriminant analysis. 
Faass defines 0 to consist of m+1 disjoint classes, 0^ , Og, 
..., n ., . The classes OL, 0_, ..., 0 correspond to the data 
m+i X / m 
records y^ , y^  y^  in the microdata release file. The class 
n - is the residual class and contains all records not released. 
m+1 
Bayesian methods can be used to estimate the posterior probabilities 
of X belonging to each class, 0^  (k-1, 2, ... , m) . First, define 
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p(k) as the prior probability that the record x belongs to class 
. Then 
p(k) - N ^  for k - 1, 2 m 
- N ^ (N-m) for k - m+1 . 
The conditional distribution of x for a given class k is given by 
f(x|k) - f(x|y^ ) for k - 1, 2 m 
.1 N 
- (N-m) S f(x|y. ) for k - m+1 . 
i-m+1 
It follows that the distribution of x is 
m+1 
f(x) - S p(k)f(x|y. ) . 
k-1 
Then, by Bayes formula, the posterior probability, p(k|x) , that the 
observed x belongs to class k is 
p(k|x) - [f(x)]'^ p(k)f(x|k) . 
A decision rule can be formed by choosing a cutoff pq and assigning 
X to class k if p(k|x) > p^ . 
21 
Paass also considers the problem of Identification when neither 
f(x|k) , k-1, 2 m+1 , nor f(x) is known. The approach is to 
estimate the distribution on the basis of what is known and then to 
insert the estimates into Bayes' formula. Assume the intruder has some 
knowledge of the observational error structures of MD^  and AK^  . 
Through simulations, the Intruder can generate a sample 
S(yj^ ) - {Xj^  . . . , n(k) ^ for each c MD , and, hence estimate 
parameters of the error distribution f(x|k) - f(x|y^ ) . Similarly, a 
set of records containing additional knowledge, - (x^ , ..., x^ ) 
can be generated according to f(x|y^ ) . 
The Identification of a target record, x , is broken up into two 
steps. First, linear discriminant analysis is used to search for the 
target record k , providing the univariate components of f(x|k) are 
A 
symmetric. After k is determined, all remaining classes or records 
are combined to form an alternative class Og , where Og is the union 
of all classes 0^  , k M k . Under weak distributional assumptions, 
f(x|k) and f(x|k) can then be estimated for small regions Ç e S , 
where S is the sample space of the data records. Substituting 
f((|k) and f(Ç|k) into the Bayes formula gives 
p(k|x) - [f((|k) + (N.l)f((|k)]'l[f((|k)] . 
Then, p(k|x) can be used to estimate the probability of correct 
association for the presumed data record k . 
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To investigate the dependency of disclosure risk on factors such as 
type of common variables and structure of observational errors, Paass 
carried out disclosure experiments using two concrete Federal Republic 
of Germany data files - the 1978 income and consumption sample and the 
1978 microcensus. Six realistic situations involving from seven to 68 
variables were studied. To simulate a target search, an element of 
additional knowledge, , was created for each in the microdata 
file using an error distribution model. Different error fractions were 
assumed for different types of variables. For example, year of birth 
was assumed to have a 1% error rate while income was assumed to have a 
90% error rate. 
The results indicated that the threat to respondent confidentiality 
is dependent upon the number of common variables and the frequency and 
distribution of the respective variable values. Paass also discovered 
that the intruder's knowledge about the observational error structure 
played a minor role in the success of the identification process. This 
led Paass to conclude that adding error alone is insufficient to guard 
against identity disclosure. 
Paass further concludes that microdata files containing few 
variables can be released if standard disclosure measures are taken 
(e.g., removing identifiers and censoring outliers in the data). With 
regard to data files with many variables, Paass believes "the conflict 
between data demand of science and data protection requirements cannot 
be solved completely by disclosure avoidance techniques." Therefore, 
23 
Paass suggests special legal regulations which would bring sanctions 
against Intruders who identify data records. 
In response to Paass' findings, Kim (1986) proposed a masking 
scheme which combines the addition of error with a linear transformation 
that adds an additional layer of protection. As Paass noted, the more 
data points cluster in a given space, the more difficult identity 
disclosure becomes. Kim's objective is to compact the data points 
around the mean without disturbing the underlying correlation 
structure. A brief description of Kim's scheme is now given. 
Define as the variable to be masked and e^  as the random 
noise added to . Assume x^  ^- a|) and ~ (0, ca|) , 
where c > 0 and x^  is independent of e^  . Also, assume 
Cov(e^ , e^ ) - c Cov(x^ , x^ ) . 
Hence, define 
y ^ J i^j 2, ..., p , J *1, . . . , n . 
Furthermore, transform y^ j by 
z^ j " ay ^ j "I* bj^  , i"l, 2, ..., p , j™l, . . . , n , 
where a and b^  satisfy E(x^ ) - E(Z^ ) and V(x^ ) - V(Z^ ) for 1=1, 
2 p . That is, the first and second moments of the transformed 
variables are identical to the first and second moments of the original 
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variables. The constraint E(x^ ) - E(Z^ ) Implies 
a/^ l + ' 
Estimating by gives 
Z.J - ay^ j^ + (l-a)x^  . 
Restricting V(Z^ ) - V(x^ ) yields 
a - [(n-l)(c+l)]" ^  (n-l-c) ^  
_ 
For n large, this reduces to a - (c+1)  ^
For <7? known, estimated by , and large n , Kim shows 
that 
E(Z.) - E(x^ ) , 
Corr(z^ , Zj) - Corr(x., Xj) , 
V(Z.) - V(x.) . 
For cr? unknown, estimated by x^  ^ , and large n , Kim 
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demonstrates that 
E(Zj_) - E(Xj^ ) . 
V(Z^ ) - V(x^ ) . 
Other properties concerning correlations and variances are also given. 
Kim also investigates the effects of this masking technique on 
regression analyses for cases where is both known and unknown. For 
the case known, if the first two moments of the original variables 
are preserved by the mask of the data, Kim shows that the estimated 
regression coefficients and intercept are, on the average, identical to 
those based on the original data. Also, standard errors of the 
regression coefficients based on this masking scheme are not different 
from those obtained from regression on the original data. The same is 
true for the standard error of the intercept. Likewise, the residual 
error variance of the regression on the masked data is the same as the 
residual error variance resulting from regression on the original 
data. Kim shows that the same claims about the standard error of the 
intercept and the residual error variance of the regression cannot be 
made for data masked by the standard approach of simply adding random 
noise (X^  - X_ + u^ ) . 
For unknown, Kim investigated the properties of masked data by 
computing correlations and running regressions on the original data, on 
data masked under Kim's scheme and on data masked under the standard 
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random noise approach. The original data were vectors of earnings 
data. Results from correlation computations showed that Kim's scheme 
preserved the correlation structure of the original data to a higher 
degree than did the standard random noise approach. Regressions 
involving masked variables displayed the same general results with 
regard to estimated coefficients, standard errors and residual 
variances. 
In conclusion, Kim states that the amount of disclosure protection 
provided by the transformation scheme is unknown. Kim planned 
reidentification experiments similar to those made by Paass. Kim also 
felt that by lowering the value of "a" in his transformation, data 
records can be shifted toward the mean, thus reducing the possibility of 
identity disclosure. 
The masking scheme proposed by Kim preserves valuable statistical 
properties of the original data, such as moments, correlation structure 
and regression properties. However, McGuckin and Nguyen (1988) point 
out two disadvantages of Kim's scheme. First, by constraining the 
covariance structure of the random errors, the researcher using the 
released data is restricted. Statistical properties of subsets of the 
data are not necessarily preserved. That is, subsets of the data may 
not have the same covariance structure as the entire data set. 
Furthermore, the addition of random noise distorts the original 
variables so that new variables, like first differences or growth rates, 
cannot be created and used in analysis. 
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2, MODEL AND RESULTS FOR THE NORMAL DISTRIBUTION 
In this chapter, we consider the confidentiality problem. We 
assume that the agency releasing microdata has masked the data by adding 
error to the observation. We also assume that the original vector of 
observations is normally distributed. In Section 2.2, we study the 
problem from the standpoint of an intruder wishing to predict the 
confidential variables of a target record. In Section 2.3, we 
investigate the effect of the covariance matrix of the added error 
vector on the accuracy of the predictor derived in Section 2.2. 
2.1 Introduction 
Let S^  - (x^ , Xg 3^ ) represent the N data records 
belonging to a confidential sample. Each data vector x^  consists of 
k variables and is assumed to be a realization of a multivariate normal 
random vector. Assume x^ , Xg  ^are independent 
random vectors, where xj = (x^ ,^ ..., x^ )^ . 
A microdata release is to be formed from the confidential sample 
and will contain m different records (m < N) . Assume that the 
microdata release consists of the set of records {x , x , ..., x ) . 
"l "2 "m 
Before these m data vectors are released to the public, the k values 
from each of the records are masked with normally distributed measure­
ment error. The released microdata file is denoted by 
MD^  - (X , X X )' (2.1.1) 
X n^  "2 % 
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where - (Xji» Xj2' ' ' ' He"ce, 
X_ - x_ + u , j - 1, 2, m (2.1.2) 
j j j 
where u are Independent N, (0, S ) random vectors and u is 
nj k uu' nj 
independent of x for all i,j . It follows that X , X 
"i "l "2 
X are independent N, (u, S +71 ) random vectors, 
n k XX uu 
m 
2.2. A General Approach 
2.2.1. The confidentiality problem 
A confidentiality problem arises when a record from an independent 
private data source, having an identification variable (e.g., name) is 
entirely known by an intruder. Suppose the record has  ^< k non­
confidential variables in common with the records from the confidential 
sample. If the record is known to be contained in the confidential 
sample, the intruder can use statistical techniques in an attempt to 
match the target (i.e., the record from the private data source) to a 
record in the microdata release. Confidential information of the 
individual to whom the target record corresponds may then be exposed. 
From the intruder's perspective, the objective is to predict the 
values of the confidential variables of the target individual. If the 
target record does, in fact, correspond to a record in the microdata 
release, the information contained in the microdata record will provide 
the most information for the prediction of the confidential variables of 
the target record. The intruder's immediate task is to determine the 
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probability that the J-th record in the microdata release corresponds to 
the target record. The intruder has available XQ  - true value of the 
target record and {X , X X ) - set of released records. 
"l "2 "m 
Consider the following as an intruder's approach to this problem. 
The variables in the target record are partitioned into two parts, 
*0 
' =0.1 \ 
*0,2 
( . 2 . 2 . 1 )  
kxl 
where Xq (^Jl x 1) is known and Xq  ^ is unknown. The records in the 









x^xll ^  ^uull 
x^x21 ^  ^uu21 
x^xl2 ^  ^uul2 
\x22 ^  u^u22 
Jl 
Also, 
( 2 . 2 . 2 )  
/ x , \  / *  \  / "  
n. ,1 
\,2j 













are known positive definite matrices. For ease of notation, we assume 
m' - *2) - 0 . 
Assuming that the probability that corresponds to XQ  , prior 
- X  ^to the release of the mlcrodata, is m" for j - 1,2,...,m , the 
conditional density of (X , X , ..., X , x_ )^ given that x 
"1 "2 m j 
corresponds to the target is 
' ^ n_ *n ' *0,1^ '*n " *0^  
1 Z m J 
mk+4 
-  [ (2*)  ^  / 2 ]  
exp(. 4. (1.0,1 - "«n '<-0,1 " "«n ' > ' ,A-1, 
m 
constant x [exp(- ^  2 X' ' 
t-1 "t ^  "t J" 






( 2 . 2 . 7 )  
and 
7jO - 1 - œ )) , ( 2 . 2 . 8 )  
for j - 1,2 m . 
The quantity BX^  is the conditional expectation of XQ   ^
given X , and A is the variance of the conditional distribution of 
"j 
XQ  ^ given . Note that XQ  is treated as random in this 
derivation. 
We now use , . ., , to define the conditional 
probabilities, Pj^ q' ^ 20 m^O ' ^ hat each record in the microdata 
release corresponds to the target record. The larger 7^  ^ is relative 
to the (k j) , the greater the conditional probability, 
conditional in (X X , x-  ^) , that x is the target Ti- n u, i. n • i m J 
record. Let 
« 1 
( S 7^ 0)' 7^ 0 • for j - 1.2 m . 
t=-l J 
( 2 . 2 . 9 )  
Thus, pjQ is the conditional probability that the j-th record in the 
microdata release corresponds to the target record, given that the 
target record is contained in the released file and given 
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(X X , au .) . These probabilities are now used as weights in 
"l 
the construction of a predictor for the confidential variables of the 
target record. 
2.2.2. Prediction of confidential variables 
The ideal situation for the intruder attempting to predict the 
values of the confidential variables of the target record is to have 
Pj^ Q - 1 for some k e (l,2,...,m) and p^  ^- 0 for all other 
j e (1,2 m} . In this case, record x is the target record, 
where 
X - X + u 
"k "k "k 








Since x is the target, the problem of predicting x_ „ is 
equivalent to predicting x „ . Assuming x^  - x , the minimum mean 
"k' *k 
square error predictor of x^  ^ is the mean of the conditional 
distribution, or the conditional expectation of x _ given 
"k' 
(X , x- T) . Hence, the best predictor of x _ when the n^ -th 
"k "k'2 k 
record is the target, is 
33 
%.2 - '0,1) 'O- %' 
- )^,l' ""O - %' 
\.2 • ''\.2l<\' '0,1) "0 - V 
- X 







xxll ^  ^uull x^xl2 \ul2 x^xllYV \ ,1 -
xx21 ^  ^uu21 x^x22 ^  ^uu22 x^x21 
xxll xxl2 xxll 
"k' 
\,2 - I"! 
\*o,i • ^ 1 / 
( 2 . 2 . 1 2 )  
is the best predictor of u „ . While it is well known that the 
conditional expectation is the best predictor, see Anderson (1984), we 
state the result for our problem. 
Theorem 2.2.1. Assume the target record corresponds to data vector 
. Let the normal model hold, where 
X X + u 
"k "k "k 
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.., X are Independent N 
m 
random vectors, 
u , u u are independent N 
"l "2 "m 
/ « \ 
2^ / 
! 
\ 0 ,  
I S 
xxll xxl2 
x^x21 ^ xx22 
"uull uul2 
^uu21 ^ uu22 I 
random vectors, and x is independent of u for all 
n 
i,k £ {l,2,...,m} . Then the minimum mean square error predictor of 
u - based on X and x- . is given by (2.2.12). 
Proof. Define  ^ - [X^, x^^] , g - ECZ^ jz^ ) . 
Let f(Zg) be any other predictor of Z^  . To prove the result, we 
show MSEffCZg)] - MSEfECZ^ jZg)] is non-negative definite: 
MSEffCZg)] - E{[Z^  - f(Z2)][Zj^  . fCZg)]') 
- MSEfECZ^ IZg)] + EttECZ^ IZg) - f(Z2)][E(Z^ |Z2) - fCZg)]') 
+ E[W^ W^ ] + E[W2W^ ] 
where - Z^  - E(Z^ |Z2) and W2 - E(Z^ |Z2) - fCZ^ ) 
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E[W^ W^ ] - E{Zj^ [E(ZJ^ |Z2)]' - Z^ tfCZg)]' - [E(Zi|Z2)][E(Zi|Z2)]' 
+ [E(Zj^ |Z2)][f(Z2)]') 
- E[E{[z^ [E(Z^ |Z2)]' - Zi[f(Z2)]' - [E(Z^ |Z2)][E(Z^ |Z2)]' 
+ [E(Z^ |Z2)][f(Z2)]']|Z2}) 
- E{[E(Zj |^Z2)][E(Z^ |Z2)]' - [E(Z^ |Z2)][f(Z2)]' 
- [E(Zi|Z2)][E(Zi|Z2)]' + [E(Zi|Z2)][f(Z2)]') 
- E{0) - 0 . 
Hence, 
MSE[f(Z2)] - MSE[E(Zj |^Z2)] -E{[E(Z^ |Z2) - f (Z2) ] [E(Zj^  | Z2) - fCZ^ )]') 
MSE[f(Z2)] - MSE[E(Zj^ |Z2)] 
is non-negative definite. • 
For each X in the microdata release, the predictor of x^ . „ 
nj 
assuming x is the target record is 
"j 
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'.j,: - x.j.2 - "'"nj.al'V "o.i» 
- *n.,2 - V,2 
J. j 
Hence, 
- ^)' - ^ "-nj,2 " ''.j.2"'n^ ,2 " -.^ ,21'!'.^  " "o' 
®'t"nj,2 - "nj,2""nj,2 ' "nj.2''l='nj " "o' 
-MSE(»„^  2l''„j -=•0' • 
Therefore, assuming is the target record, g is the minimum 
mean square error predictor of x^  ^  . 
The situation with p^  ^- 1 for some k will rarely occur in a 
real data situation. It will never occur if the agent masking the data 
is proficient. Although some instances may arise when one pjQ 
dominates the others, in most cases a small subset of the Pjo'® will 
dominate all others. For example, if p^  ^  - p^ g q - p^ g q - 0.30 
and PjQ < 0.001 for all other j e {1, 2, ..., m) , a good predictor 
of X- - would be dominated by X , X and X . If the p^ g's 
U,Z "i2 "35 
are nearly equal, information from all records in the microdata release 
should enter into the prediction of *0 2 ' construct such a 
predictor. 
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The knowledge base for prediction of x. „ is S , S , , U, wL V1\X XX U, JL 
and the records in the mlcrodata release. The probability that x^  is 
the target, XQ  , given (X^  , Xg is 
1 m ' 
*n^ ' *0,1^ ' " ^jO ' 
m -1 
- ( 7J Q  , for j-1, 2 m 
where 7jq is defined in (2.2.8). 
Under the assumption that the target record, XQ  , corresponds to 
some record in the mlcrodata release, we know that x_ - x for some 
n^  
Jl € {l,2,...,m) . Hence, XQ  ^ has an unconditional normal 
distribution with mean 0 and variance ^^ 2^2 ' conditional 
distribution of XQ  ^ given (X^  X^  , x^  and x^  - XQ  is 
f[Xo aUx X^  , XQ  ) and x^  - XQ ] 
1 m J 
f[Xo 2l(X„^ . «0,1) and x^ _ - x^ ] 
1/ 
(2*) |S^ J" /2exp{-V2[Xo,2 ' , *0,1^ '!' 






I &X11 1^2 ^  xxll 
2^1 &X22 \x21 
\ ^xxl2 / V ^xxll x^xl2 x^xll I 
-1 
(2.2.15) 
c^c ~ ^ xx22 " ^^ x^xl2' ^ xx22' ^ xxl2^  ( 2 . 2 . 1 6 )  
Hence, the conditional distribution of x. „ given (X , X , . . 
1I2 
X^  , *Q 2^ ) and given that XQ  corresponds to some record in the 
m 
microdata release, is 
f[xQ 2l(%n ' • • • • *n ' *0 1^  n^d Xq - x^  for some j e {1,2 m)] 
- ==0,1' 
m(k-i) m  ^
- (:')  ^ l^ »l ^  z^ Pjo«xpi-'4'1x0,2 - ' *6,1)'I' 
* z;;i'o,2 - *6,1)']' (2.2.17) 
where C and are defined in (2.2.15) and (2.2.16), respectively. 
The best predictor of XQ  ^ is then the mean of the conditional 




*0,2 " E *11 ' *0,l" j-1 Jim
* B'Xo.zICn ' "O,!' 'j - =0» 
- PjqCCAj' '6,i)' • (2 :1:) 
If we let J - (1,2,...,m) , the variance of the predictor error 
can be expressed as 
v((^ o,2 - *0.1^  V • *0 j 6 J) 
- Ej{V[(XQ 2 - *0,2^  ! ••" ^ n^ ' *0,1^  n^^  " *0^  ' 
+ Vj{E[(XQ 2 - *0,2^ I (^n^ ^n^' *0,1^ ^n^ " *0^' 
(2.2.19) 
where Ej(«) denotes the expectation over all possible matches 
conditional on (X^  ' *0 1^  ' Vj is the corresponding 
1 m ' 
variance. We know that 
^^ (*0,2 ' *0,2^  *0,1^  *nj " *0^  " ^ee 
and 
E[(Xo 2 - *n ' *0,1^  *n. " *0^  ° ^^ *n.' *6,1^ ' 
1 m ' J J 
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where and C are defined in (2.2.16) and (2.2.15), 
respectively. Since is a constant, 
m 
-  .  ( 2 . 2 . 2 0 )  
Let 
Wj - (X^  , x^ )^C' (2.2.21) 
J 




Pjq(Wj - W)'(Wj - W) 
m mm 
- S P4«W'W, - ( S p,.«,)'( S p,_W,) (2.2.22) j:i jo j j J 
where W - zÇ_J P^J Q WJ  . Therefore, from (2.2.20) and (2.2.22), we see 
that 
V{(XQ  2 • *0 2^ '^ \ ' • • • ' *n ' *0 1^  *n. " *0 some j e J) 
m mm 
41 
We now derive the mean square error of the best predictor of XQ  g 
using another approach. The error in the predictor (2.2.18) is 
m 
where 
^0,2 ' '0,2 ' ' *0,2 ' 
is the predictor constructed under the assumption that X is the 
"j 
masked value associated with the target record, XQ  . If x^  is the 
record which matches XQ , then the prediction error is 
*^0,2 ' *0,2)4 " *6,1^ ' " *0,2^  
m 
jfi - '0,2' • (2 2 25) 
jp-i 
Under the condition that x- matches x , let 
\,2 " *0,2 " *6,1^ ' \ • 
where c is independent of C(X' , xl ^ )' . Then 
n^  n^  u,i 
m 
(*, 0,2 " *0,2)4 " (P40 " *0,1)' ' ®n^  PjO^ ^^ nj' ^ O.l^ ' 
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m 
- -C(X, h/ - 'n, + -6,1»' • (2 : 2*) 
Note that x- _ - x _ is independent of X for j i . Also, 
' ^Jl ' 
C(X' , x' )' is the best predictor of x_ _ conditional on the match 
UIX V, z 
of X to X- . Then 
n^  0 
E{(Xo 2 - *0,2^ '^ *0,2 • *0,2)' (^ n^  *0,1^  *n^  " *0^  
mm mm 
-  ^% - "i • 
(2.2.27) 
where Wj is defined in (2.2.21), If we weight this quantity by p^  ^, 
the probability that x^  matches XQ , and sum over all possible £ , 
we obtain 
E{(Xo 2 - *0,2)'(*0,2 ' *0,2^ '(\j^  *n^ ' *0,1^ ' 
m mm 
-  ^  •  < 2 . 2 . 2 8 )  
which agrees with (2.2.23). We state the best predictor and the 
associated variance as a result. 
Theorem 2.2.2. Let the normal model hold, where 
X - X + u 
"j j "j 
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/ n \ 
0/ 
\xll 
\ \x21 \x22l 




V ® /  
 ^^ uull \ul2 
u^u21 u^u22 
and X is independent of u for all j ,k e {1,2 m) . Also, 
"j "k 
assume the target reco rd, XQ , corresponds to one of the data vectors 
in the microdata release, {X , X , X ) . Then, the minimum 
"1 "2 "m 
mean square error predictor of XQ  ^ is given by 
m 
0^,2 " ' *6,1^ ' ' 
where PjO is defined in (2.2.9) and C is defined in (2.2.15) 
Furthermore, the mean square error of XQ  ^ conditional on 
(^ n. \ ' *0,1^  ' 
1 m 
E{ (*0,2 ' *0,2)'(*0,2 • *0,2^  ' \ ' *0,1^  ^
m 
m m m 
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where S is the conditional variance of x _ given (X , x- . ) £ € n^ , z n^  V, 1 
\ - *0 ' 6^,1^ ®' • 
2.3. Preserving Confidentiality in Microdata Releases 
Given the model situation and prediction problem of the previous 
section, the best predictor, from an intruder's standpoint, of a target 
record's confidential variables is shown to be (2.2.18). Assuming the 
partial target record, obtained by the intruder from an independent 
source, is contained in the microdata release, the accuracy of the 
intruder's predictor is highly dependent on the match probability 
(2.2.9) assigned to the full target record in the microdata release. If 
a low match probability is associated with the target record in the 
microdata release, the intruder's best predictor will be less 
accurate. From a data provider's standpoint, a low match probability is 
a favorable situation for protecting an individual's confidentiality. 
Hence, the data provider should make every attempt to minimize the 
target record's match probability in the microdata release. An approach 
to this minimization problem in the multivariate case is now presented. 
2.3.1. The multivariate model 
We investigate the problem of selecting an error covariance matrix 
to use in masking normal data. 
Consider the general case of £ non-confidential variables. As 
before, an intruder obtains a data record of non-confidential variables, 
Xq j^ (ixl) , from a private source. The microdata release consists of 
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X X with 
"l "m 
^j,2' - 'Aj.2) + Kj.l' -hj,2> 
for j-1, 2, ..., m . 
Certainly a large error variance will lower the probability of 
matching a record. At the same time, though, adding such error will 
excessively distort the data. The data provider must balance the 
objectives of providing a file that resembles the original data as 
closely as possible and also provides reasonable confidentiality 
protection for the respondents. It is always possible to transform the 
vectors so that 
=nj - 'Ik) 
We then assume, in this section, that the covariance matrix is 51^  and 
that a decision has been made to fix the ratio of error variance to 
total variance at (1 + 5) ^  for all variables. Hence, 



















\flk 2^k 3^k 
If^ jl < 1 for 1 < j , i.j e (1,2 k) , and is positive 
definite. As before, 
-S + S 
XX uu 
(2.3.3) 
where S and S are partitioned as in (2.2.4) and (2.2.5). We 
uu XX ^ 
proceed to determine the optimal structure of from the standpoint 
of the data provider. 
2.3.2. Choice of correlation error 




where and x^   ^ are defined in (2.2.8, 2.2.13). 
Suppose XQ corresponds to the k-th record in the microdata 
release. A high probability for pj^ j^  means a more accurate predictor 
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of the confidential variables. Hence, the data provider would like 
small pjçjç for all k to cause uncertainty in the mind of the 
intruder. Because p^  ^- "Y^ k^^ -^l^ tk^   ^, minimizing pj^ j^  is closely 
related to minimizing the log odds ratio, '^ "(P^ k^ jk^  '  ^randomly 
chosen element j and fixed k , We consider the problem of choosing 
the correlations in to minimize the expected value of the log 
odds ratio, E(4n(p^ )^ - 4n(Pj^ )) . The data dependence is removed by 
considering the expectation. We show that in order to minimize 
E(^ n(p^ )^ - 4n(Pj^ )) , the data provider should add vectors of error 
having a covariance matrix equal to a multiple of , the covariance 
matrix of the unmasked data vectors. That is, in this special case 
where - 61^  , we will show that the optimal is the identity 
matrix, . We first give some results that are used to prove the 
main theorem. 
Theorem 2.3.1. Assume the microdata release consists of 
X , X , X where X satisfies (2.1.2) for j-1, 2 
"l "2 "m "j 
m . Also, for all j , 
:hj - »k(0. Sxx) ' 
V - \u> ' 
where Z - S I .  and S is given by (2.3.2). Assume the target XX i uu ° ° 
record, XQ  , corresponds to the k-th record in the microdata release. 
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Then minimizing E(4n(p^ j^ - in(pj^ )) (j k) , where pjj^  is defined 
in (2.2.7), is equivalent to minimizing tr{A'^ ) , where 
and 
Proof. 
E{in(P]^ ) - in(pjj^ )) 
where 
Hence, 
E(to(expt-l^ <x^  ^   ^
» -
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E{in(Pkk) - -en(Pjiç)) 
- (".,,1 - • «n>l' 
n^ .l Hj n^ .l Hj 
- -^crlEECx^ i - "«n^ X'n^ .l " »  T A ' L )  
+ V2trlE[(x^  J - - >«„^ )'1A-S 
- -V2tr{AA"^) + V2tr{E(x .x/ ,)A'^) 
nfc.x 
- V2tr{E(X X' t)A"^B) - V2tr{E(x X' )B'A'^) 
tij n^ .i n^ .J. Hj 
+ V2tr{E(X X' )B'A'^B) . 
j j 
Since x and X are independent, the cross product terms have 
"j 
expectation 0 . We are left with 
- 'n(Pjk)l - -'/2 + 'A + V2trlS A-1) 
-i/2 + 
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- tr{fiA"^ ) - £ 
-  S t r {A ' l )  -  i  
where S and J i  are fixed constants. 
We have shown that minimizing E(4n(p^ )^ - 4n(Pj^ )) is equivalent 
to minimizing tr{A . Using additional matrix algebra to investigate 
tr{A"^ ) , we now simplify the problem. From (2.3.4), 
 ^" \xll " ^ x^ X^ CX^  ^
where 
Hence, 
\xll - ' 
Sx^ x - *) -
A - g[Ij - 0)S^ («I^ , 0)'g'^  ] 




- [I^ - E'l]'! (2.3.6) 
where 
^ (^11 ' ^12^22^21^ ' (2.3.7) 
To this point, we have shown that minimizing the expectation of the log-
odds ratio of pj^j^ to pj^ with respect to the correlations 
i < j; i,j £ {l,2,...,m}} between elements of each error vector, is 
-1 -1 
equivalent to minimizing tr{[I^ - E ] } where E is defined in 
(2.3.7). Let > Ag ^  ... ^  be the characteristic roots of 
{I - E . Each satisfies the determinantal equation 
(I^ - E'l) - A^Ijl - 0 . (2.3.8) 
We see that 
(I^ - E'l) - Algl - 1(1 - A)Ij - E'l| 
|E" ^  I 1(1 - A)E - IjllE"^ 
IE" ^ /2 I 2 IR . CI . (1 - A) | ' | |e (1 A)-ii I . (2.3.9) 
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By (2.3.8) and (2.3.9), we have 
|K - (1 - A)"4^| - 0 . 
If we define the roots of E to be & Og ^  - « - *4 » then 
- (1 - Aj^) ^ and ^ - 1,2,...,-8 . Note also 
that, because E and (I - E ^ ) are positive definite matrices, 
Aj^ 6 (0, 1) and > 1 for all i . So, minimizing 
tr{[I - E'l]'!) - S A:^ 
i-1 
is the same as minimizing Z^_^(a^ - 1) , where a^, 
are the characteristic roots of E . Furthermore, 
£ 1 -g 1 
S (a. - l)'a. - S (a. - 1) (a. -1+1) 
i-1 ^ i-1 
^ 1 
- ^  + Z (a - 1)'^ . 
i-1 1 
Hence, our problem of minimizing E{4n(p^^) - 4n(Pj^)) reduces to 
minimizing - 1) ^  with respect to the correlations, 
{p.j: i < j , i,j € {1,2 k}) , between the elements of each error 
vector. We proceed to show the minimum of - 1) ^  is attained 
when fUj - 0 for all i < j < i . We begin by demonstrating that the 
roots of E are individually maximized when Syyoi - 0 . 
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TjiMn 2.3.1. Assume S and T are real, symmetric (n x n) 
matrices. Define the characteristic roots of S and T to be 
y^(S) a: ... 2: and y^(T) i ... S , respectively. Then, 
i/j(S) + a yj(S + T) for j-1, 2, ..., n . 
Proof. See Bhatia (1987, p.34). • 
Theorem 2.3.2. Let 
&x-
/ \ 
^11 ^ 12 
^21 ^ 22 
be a real, symmetric (k x k) positive definite matrix, with 
having dimension (£ x £) . Let ^2 " ' ' ' ^  ^1 ~ ^ 2 ~ 
. , . , & be the roots of and ' &xi24ix22&x21^ ' 
respectively. Then 
for i-1, 2, ..., i . 
Proof. In Lemma 2.3.1, let 
^ " ^12^22^21 
® " ^ 11 ' ^ 
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Hence, S + T - . Since S and S + T are positive definite 
matrices, their roots are positive. Also, the roots of T are greater 
than or equal to zero because T is non-negative definite. By Lemma 
2.3.1, we have 
7^ + f , i-1, 2, , .. , S. ,  
where e is the smallest root of T and e S: 0 . Hence, 
, i-1, 2 i . • 
Therefore, by Theorem 2.3.2, the roots of 
E - - ^^i2'^22^!XX21^ are individually maximized when 
%C21 - » "ken E - ' 
We have now reduced the problem to minimizing - 1) ^  
where > ... > > 1 are now the roots of 
- «''(«I, ^  \ull' 
I, ^  ''\ull 
with 5 > 0 and having the structure of a correlation matrix. 
-1 -1 Since the roots of S are equal to the roots of 5 ^uull ^^ch 







where ^ are the roots of Z^^^l * show that the 
minimum is obtained when all correlations are set to zero. 
Theorem 2.3.3. Assume is a symmetric non-singular matrix of the 
form given in (2.3,6). The minimum of tr(Z^^^^) is attained when 
^uull " • 
Proof. There exist matrices Q and $ such that 2^^^^ - Q$Q' where 
QQ' - and $ - diag{0^, <f>^ with > 0 for i-1, 
2 Z . Also, tr(Z^^^^) - - i . Hence, 
^uiii " - Q*"V 
and 
_1 ^ _i 
"'Zuull' - • 
1—1 
We use the Lagrangian multiplier procedure to minimize subject 
0 
to the restrictions that - £ and </)^  > 0 for all i . The 
jl 
restriction - Jl is a weaker restriction than the original 
restriction that the diagonal elements of are equal to one. 
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Therefore, If the minimum under the weaker condition satisfies the 
stronger restriction, we will have bound the minimum under the stronger 
condition. Define - z| (i-1, 2, Z) where 
(z^, Zg z^) e R . Then the Lagrangian equation is 
i , S. 
L - S z:^ . v[( Z z2) . i] 
i-1 ^ i-1 1 
where v is the Lagrange multiplier. Differentiation with respect to 
(i-1, 2, Z) and v yields 
zj - -y'l (i-1, 2 Z) ,  
Z 
S -  Z .  
i-1 
Therefore, 
z| - (-y) ^ 
and 
i J! 1 
Z z2 - Z (-J/)" ^ . 
i-1 ^ i-1 
Hence, 
y - -1 and z? - 1 (or - 1) for all i . 
The point (d^, '^ji^ - (1, 1, 1) in positive 4-space is a 
candidate for the point where f(^^, has a 
57 
minimum or maximum. However, since f(^^, ..., is bounded below by 
zero and is unbounded above, the vector - (1, ..., 1) is 
the point where £ attains its minimum value. 
The result that is minimized when follows 
\uii - - h • 
We state the entire result. 
Theorem 2.3.4. Assume the normal model, 
X - X. + u_ 








lo J 1 
'1 ° ] 
NI 
' 
/ «I, 0 
0 II 
\ull \ul2 
0/ \ ^uu21 ^uu22 / 
where x is independent of u for all i,j e {1,2 m) , 5>0 
"i "j 
and is a symmetric positive definite matrix having the form given 
in (2.3.2). Let 
m ^ 
Pjk - Jtk> Tjk • 
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where is defined in (2.2.8). Then E{in(p^^) - 4n(Pj^)) is 
minimized when Z -, - I. and S , „ - 0 , 
uull X uul2 
We have shown that when the ratio of error variance to total 
variance fixed at (1 + f) ^  , the correct match probability, pj^j^ , is 
minimized on the average when - 61^ . Therefore, when creating a 
microdata file, there is a sense in which a data provider affords 
respondents maximum protection against disclosure by adding error 
vectors which have a covariance matrix equal to a multiple of the 
covariance matrix of the original data vectors. 
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3. DESCRIPTION OF THE MASKING ALGORITHM 
In this chapter, we present an algorithm for creating a masked data 
set from an original data set of vectors comprised of responses to 
continuous, discrete and classification variables. One objective of the 
masking algorithm is to create a data set that is statistically 
representative of the original set of data records in the following 
ways. First of all, each of the variables in the masked data set should 
have the same first and second moments as variables in the original data 
set. For a classification variable, the sample categorical proportions 
should be the same for the two data sets. Secondly, the correlation 
structures of the original and masked data sets should be nearly 
identical. Finally, the corresponding univariate distribution functions 
of the original and masked data sets should also be the same. 
The other major objective of the masking algorithm is to 
sufficiently disguise the data records to afford the respondents 
protection against disclosure. The algorithm is designed to mask the 
data records in such a way that an intruder will have difficulty in 
matching a target record from an outside source to a record in the 
masked data file. Equivalently, the released data set is such that the 
variance of the intruder's prediction of an unknown attribute for a 
target record will be large. 
To mask a data set, the algorithm first transforms the original 
data to normal variates. The normal variates are masked and then back 
transformed to the original scales of the input variables. We now 
outline the procedure. 
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3.1. Transformation of Variables 
The algorithm which we describe masks continuous, discrete and 
classification variables. Responses to continuous and discrete 
variables are assumed to be quantitative, whereas a response to a 
classification variable takes on a nominal categorical value. In order 
to mask the input data set, all data values are first transformed to 
normal variates. The masking algorithm is designed to transform only-
quantitative variables (i.e., continuous or discrete) and Bernoulli 
variables. Hence, we must first transform each classification variable 
into a set of Bernoulli variables. 
3,1.1. Construction of Bernoulli variables from classification 
variables 
We let Xj^, X2, , , , , be the responses to a variable, X , 
having categories {C^, C^) , For each response, Xj. , t-1, 
2, . . . , n , we define the dummy variables ^t r-1 
Zt- - 1 if X; - Cj , 
- 0 otherwise . (3.1.1) 
In addition, we let be the probability that an element is in 
category j given that it is not in the first j-1 categories. Hence, 
we define 
4>^  - PrtC^) , 
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- Pj.{Cj|not C^, Cg Cj , j-2, 3 r-1 . (3.1.2) 
We further define the pseudo Bernoulli variables, 
"tl • • 
if - 0 for i<j (3.1.3) 
1 with probability t f>.  
0 with probability (1 - ^j) 
otherwise 
The W^j variables, j-1, 2, ..., r-1 , are uncorrelated and go into 
the original data set to be masked as Bernoulli variables. 
To mask the quantitative and Bernoulli variables, all observations 
are transformed to standard normal variates using the sample univariate 
distribution functions. The quantitative variables and the Bernoulli 
variables are transformed by two slightly different algorithms. 
3.1.2. Transformation of quantitative variables to normality 
We begin with the algorithm for quantitative variables, describing 
the procedure for a single variable, X . First, the sample 
distribution function, , is formed from the n observations on 
X . The function F^ will be a step function having m jumps, where 
m (< n) is the number of distinct values of the variable X . Using 
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and a linear interpolation technique, a continuous distribution 
function, , is constructed as follows. The values 
. , . , are defined to be the m ordered, distinct values of the 
variable X . Also, Y^^^ are defined by 
Y(j) - F^(X^j^) for j-1, 2, ..., m . The constructed F^ consists 
of m connected line segments where each segment is formed by joining 
the midpoints of the horizontal lines of adjacent "steps" in F^ . See 
Figure 3.1 for an illustration. The points which define the domain of 
each segment of F^ are denoted by , i-0, 1, m . We 
define to be the point equidistant from the i-th and (i+l)-th 























O - 1 ' 1 1 1 ' 1 « 1 1 1 ' 1 ' 1 ' 1 ' 1 ' T 
O 1 2 3 •+ 5 6 7 a 9 1 O 
linearly Interpolated Distribution Function 
Sample Distribution Function 
Figure 3.1. Graphical example of linear interpolation technique 
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*(i) " ^  ^^(i) ^  1' 2' •••. m . (3.1.4) 
where 
X(0) " *(1) " (*(2) " *(!)) ' 
^(m+1) " *(m) (*(m) " ^(m-1)^ * 
Table 3.1 contains the sets of values (X^Q^, , 
Y^2) Y(m)) ' (X(i)' X(2) %(%)) corresponding to 
the illustration in Figure 3.1. Using point-slope algebra, we define 
F^(z) as 
Table 3.1. Values of X(i) , Y(i) and 
used to 1 create the illustration in 
Figure 3.1 
i X(i) ?(i) *(i) 
0 0.3 0 0.85 
1 1.4 0.1 1.95 
2 2.5 0.2 2.7 
3 2.9 0.3 3.2 
4 3.5 0.4 3.9 
5 4.3 0.5 4.9 
6 5.5 0.6 5.85 
7 6.2 0.7 6.55 
8 6.9 0.8 7.65 
9 8.4 0.9 8.8 
10 9.2 1 9.6 
11 10.0 - -
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Fj^(z) - + (X(i+i) - X(i)) (Y(i+i) • Y(i))z 
for z € (*(!)' X(i+i)] , (3.1.5) 
where - 0 and - 1 . 
The function F^(z) is evaluated at , X^g^, .., X^^^ and 
the resultant values are denoted by p^, Pg p^ , where 
Pj^ e (0, 1) for all i-1, 2, ..., m . Standard normal values for 
each X are obtained by applying the inverse of the standard normal 
distribution function to p^ , i-1, 2, ..., m . Hence, we define the 
standard normal values corresponding to X^^^, X^g), •••. as 
- $"^(p^) , for i-1, 2 m , (3.1.6) 
where $(*) is the standard normal distribution function. We define 
(Z^, Zg Z^) to be the vector of standard normal values 
corresponding to the vector of original values, (X^, Xg, ..., X^) , 
where 
Zj. - Z( ) if X^ - X(j) , (3.1.7) 
for i-1, 2, ..., n , and j-1, 2 m . Note that each Xj^ can 
equal only one X^j^ , so is uniquely defined for all i . 
If the original variables are standard normally distributed, the 
transformed variables are very close to the original variables. Also if 
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two variables are jointly normal, the correlation of the transformed 
variables is nearly equal to that of the original variables. 
3.1.3. Transformation of Bernoulli variables to normality 
In transforming Bernoulli variables to normal variables, one 
objective is for the resulting normal variables to have the same 
correlation structure as the original set of Bernoulli variables. In 
addition, we desire the cross correlation structure between the 
transformed Bernoulli variables and the transformed quantitative 
variables to be the same as the cross correlation structure between the 
original Bernoulli variables and original quantitative variables. 
Consider the following construction of normal variables from 
Bernoulli variables. Let each original observation vector be given by 
' where and X^^ denote, respectively, the 
quantitative and Bernoulli subvectors of X^ . Let , the sample 













be the sample correlation matrix of the X^'s . Furthermore, let 
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•dd.cc - "dd - -dc-cc'cd (3.1.10) 
be the estimated conditional covarlance matrix of the Bernoulli 
variables, given the quantitative variables, and let 
»d.o - -;kd <3 111) 
be the matrix of regression coefficients for the regression of the 
Bernoulli variables on the quantitative variables. 
The transformed quantitative observation vectors are denoted by 
^cl' ^ c2' •••' ^cn • original quantitative are 
approximately normal, then the are approximately normal 
(0, . Let 
^d.ct " ®d.c^cc^ct "d^cc®d.ct ' (3.1.12) 
where 1? - dlag(m m ) , e, . Is a N(0, I) random 
cc ° ccll ccss d.ct 
vector, and s is the number of quantitative variables. Then, 
is approximately distributed as a normal random vector with mean 0 and 
variance matrix n,, , Also, the matrix of correlations between f, ^ dd d.ct 
and is approximately . Hence, (Z^^, f ^ is 
approximately normal and has nearly the same correlation structure as 
the original data. However, does not depend on the true values 
of the Bernoulli variables. Only through the cross correlation with the 
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transformed continuous variables does f. ^ contain information about d.ct 
the true Bernoulli values. 
To make the f. ^'s dependent on the X,.'s , we further d.ct dt 
transform the f. .'s . First each f, _ is converted to a vector of d.ct d.ct 
uniform random variables, , using the standard normal 
distribution function. We define the elements of g^ as 
®d.ctj " *(^^Uctj) ' ^ P ' (3.1.13) 
where $(*) is the standard normal distribution function. We let 
be the mean of the j-th Bernoulli variable. For each Bernoulli 
variable, we divide the interval (0, 1) into two parts. The first part 
is the interval (0, 1 - and the second part is the interval [1 -
Fqj, 1) . Let be a uniform random vector with 
Bd.ctj(l ' *0j) *dtj " ° 
h. -< (3.1.14) 
^ ' ®d.ctj^ ^dtj " ^ 
for j-1, 2 p , where is the original Bernoulli variable 
response. The values h^ h^ h^ are then assigned 
the ranks R^, Rg R^ , where h^j is the Rj-th smallest 
value. These ranks are standardized 
Rj - n'^(Rj - 0.5) , (3.1.15) 
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and the standard normal values associated with the responses to the t-th 
Bernoulli variable are defined as 
Performing this transformation on all Bernoulli variables creates a set 
of transformed variables with correlation structure similar to that of 
the original variables. 
The transformed data consist of Z^, Zg, where 
Z^ - (Z^^, Z^^) . Each Z^j is normally distributed with mean zero. 
The covariance matrix of Z^ is , where is "close" to the 
correlation matrix of the original observations." The data are not 
necessarily jointly normal. 
3.2. Masking the Normal Data Vectors 
The masked set of transformed data vectors are computed by adding a 
normally distributed error vector to each transformed vector of normal 
observations. Each error vector has mean zero and a covariance matrix 
approximately equal to a multiple of the covariance matrix of the 
Z^'s . Hence, the masked data are 
- * ^(Rj) , j-1, 2, ..., n . (3.1.16) 
* 
Z ^ - Z^ + , t-1, 2 n (3.2.1) 
where is a vector of random variables with mean 0 and covariance 
matrix approximately equal to a multiple of , where 
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1 " 
B__ - n'^ S Z'Z. . (3.2.2) 
j-1 J : 
Each is a function of , a normal random vector having mean zero 
* 
and an identity covariance matrix. The construction of the from 
the consists of several steps, which we discuss below. 
Suppose we let - (u^^, ..., u^^) - N(0, 1^) and generate 
Ug, ..., . The expected value of the off-diagonal elements in 
the matrix of sums of squares and cross products is zero. When using a 
normal random number generator, the observed covariances are not zero 
due to random variation. We now present an algorithm which reduces the 
random variation and insures nearly zero sample correlations. 
3.2.1. Construction of error vectors 
We wish to construct n normally distributed vectors having mean 
zero and sample covariance matrix equal or "close" to the identity 
matrix. The first [n/2] of the observations are generated with no 
restrictions. For j-1, 2 [n/2] , let Uj be randomly generated 
normal vectors with mean 0 and covariance matrix I . The sum of the 
elements and the sums of squares and products matrix are computed for 
these observations. Thereafter, each observation vector is created as 
follows. A random normal vector is generated and denoted by 
- ("tl' "tp) • initiate the procedure, set i - 1 and 
t - [n/2] + 1 . The signs of the elements of are assigned as 
follows. The sign of u^^ is the negative of the sign of the 4-th 
element in the vector of sums, specifically the negative of the sign 
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o f  Z j ^  .  F o r  k  i  ,  t h e  s i g n  o f  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  s i g n  o f  
t- 1 the k-th element in the i-th row of multiplied by the 
negative of the sign of u . . Thus, if S^'^u..u.. < 0 and u . is 
'j-l-jj-jk 
positive, then u^^ is positive. The value of i is increased by one 
(mod p), t is reset to t+1 and the next observation vector is 
generated. The procedure is repeated until a full set of error vectors 
has been generated. 
3.2.2. The initial data mask and the distance criterion 
Given the transformed observations and a vector of errors 
, we are ready to perform the Initial mask of the transformed data. 
The error vectors, , are approximately independent normally 
distributed random vectors with mean zero and covariance matrix 
approximately equal to the identity. For each , we define as 
where is the correlation matrix of the transformed 
data, and a > 0 . The value of a is specified by the user. Then the 
initially masked data set is 
* 
u (3.2.3) 
t-1, 2, ...,n. (3.2.4) 
To insure that the transformed data vectors are adequately masked, 
we then perform a distance check on the initially masked data. For each 
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Z , let the statistical distance between Z and Z. be denoted by 
t C J 
d^j , for j-1, 2, n . Let be the smallest of the n 
distances and let dt;j(2) the second smallest of the n distances. 
If the distance between Z^ and Z^ , d^^ , is not one of the two 
smallest distances in the set (d^^ : j-1, 2 n) , the vector Z^ 
is assumed to be adequately masked. If d^^ is one of the two smallest 
"k 
of the n distances, the vector, Z^ is declared to be inadequately 
masked. Then, to remask the t-th observation, the magnitude of the 
error vector, , is increased. One of two methods is used, depending 
on the current magnitude of the error vector, . To determine the 
appropriate method, we first compare d^^ to Cq , where 
Vo 
CQ - p - (2p) '' + € , c > 0 , and p is the dimension of the 
vector. The value Cq is approximately one standard deviation less 
than the mean of a chl-square random variable with p degrees of 
freedom. If d^^ exceeds Cq , the associated error vector, , is 
assumed to need a minor increase in magnitude. In such a case, a new 
error vector is created by multiplying by a random multiple such 
* 
that the expected value of the distance between Z^ and Z^ is 
slightly greater than the second largest distance between Z^ and 
* 
Zj , J t . 
If dj.^ < Cq , the distance between Z^ and Z^ is small because 
of the small magnitude of . In this case, a new error vector, , 
is generated. The elements of the new vector must meet certain absolute 
size restrictions. An acceptable randomly generated error vector, 
- (u^ ,^ ..., u^ p) , must satisfy |u^ j| > e for all j , where e 
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is a pre-specifled constant. Also l)^tj exceed ij , for 
1-1, 2, ..., [p/5] , where »? Is also a constant specified in the 
program. Furthermore, if t > [n/2] , the signs of the elements of the 
newly generated are determined by the procedure described in 
* 
Section 3.2.1. A new is computed from the newly generated and 
* 
the masked vector is also recomputed. The distance check is again 
performed, and the process is repeated until the masked vector satisfies 
* 
the distance requirement. The masked vectors are now denoted by Z^ . 
The procedure only makes one remasking pass through the data. It would 
be possible to modify the program to make additional passes. 
3.3. Iterations to Attain Desired Correlations 
After the pass through the data to modify the error for the 
distance criterion, the masked Z-data are back transformed into masked 
X-data. Then an iterative procedure is used to improve the agreement 
between the correlation structure of the transformed variables and the 
correlation structure of the original variables. The error terms are 
adjusted in an attempt to achieve nearly identical correlations between 
the masked and original data. We now provide some details of this 
iterative process. 
3.3.1. Back transforming the data to original scale 
Let Z - (Z^, Zg Zp) be the matrix of masked, transformed 
data, where 
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% " (Z Ij' -2j' (3.3.1) 
is the vector containing the masked observations for the j-th 
transformed variable. To begin the back transformation, consider each 
vector of n observations, Zj , separately. First, we define Rj to 
be the vector of ranks of the n observations of Zj , with the rank 
"n" being assigned to the largest value. We create a normalized version 
of the elements of Uj by multiplying each u^j by 
[ (n-1) ] * ^2 The normalized vector form of is denoted by 
Uj . Further, we let Dj be the vector of normalized and adjusted 
* * 
ranks of Zj . The t-th element of Dj is defined to be 
D^j - n'l[R^j + ) ] , for t-1, 2 n , (3.3.2) 
* 
where is the rank of the t-th observation of the j-th variable and 
^ is a continuous function mapping u^. into (-1, 0). The \&(u^.) 
tj CJ 
values are perturbations to keep the values from being the simple 
ranks multipled by n'^ , After these computations are performed for 
all p variables, we have 
* * * * 
D -  (D^, Dg, . . . ,  Dp) ,  (3.3.3) 
where Dj - (D^j, Dgj, ..., D^j)' and e (0, 1) for t-1, 2, ..., 
n , and j-1, 2, ..., p . 
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The next step in the procedure is the transformation of the 
it 
values to values on the original scale. The final back 
transformation differs depending on whether a variable is quantitative 
or Bernoulli. We begin with the transformation for quantitative 
variables. 
We consider the j-th quantitative variable, Xj , recalling the 
method of transforming the original data values of the j-th variable to 
normal values (see Section 3.1.2). The transformation of D . to X . 
tj CJ 
is performed by applying the inverse of to D . . Thus, X . is 
*tj " *(i-l) (^(i) " ^(i-1)^ (^tj • Y(i_i))(X(i) - X(i.l)) 
Y(,j] (3.3.4) 
where X(i) and are defined in Section 3.1.2. 
To convert the transformed normal-Bernoulli variables back to 
original scale, the procedure is more straightforward. Let Pqj^ be the 
mean of the k-th original Bernoulli variable. The masked Bernoulli 
value for X^^^ is 
. 0 if 6;% « (0. 1 - Pok) 
X^^ - < for t-1, 2, ..., n . (3.3.5) 
I 1 if e [1 - Pok, 1) 
Once all variables have been transformed, masked, and back-
transformed to original scale, the original and masked data matrices are 
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concatenated to form the n x 2p matrix 
X - (X, X) - (X^ X , X^ X ) , (3.3.6) 
where 
' *2j' " • ' ^ ' ' 
*j - (*ij' *2j *hj)' 
for j-1, 2, p . The sample correlation matrix of X is computed 
and denoted by . This matrix consists of the correlation matrix of 
the original data, , the correlation matrix of the masked data, 
E** , and the cross correlation matrix between the original and masked 
data, Hence, we have 
/ 
XX ^xx 
\ % *xx / 
(3.3.7) 
At this point, two groups of iterations are performed. The purpose 
of the first group of iterations is to bring all of the diagonal 
elements of close to a robust average of the initial cross 
correlations, p^*.. , j-1, 2, ..., p . The second group of iterations 
aaj J 
concentrates on adjusting the error vectors to make P** nearly 
identical to P, 
XX • 
XX 
We begin by discussing the initial group of 
iterations. 
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3.3.2. The iterations for cross correlations 
The target correlation for each . is 
aajj 
P - (p-2) [( S Py&jj) - ( max p + mln Pyy..)] 
j-1 l^j^p l^j^p 
(3.3.8) 
The target, p , is computed and permanently defined using the cross 
correlations between corresponding variables in the initial mask of the 
data. We discuss the general idea behind reducing or Increasing a cross 
correlation. 
The correlation between the j-th original and j-th masked variable 
is 
^xxjj " (3.3.9) 
where 
- (n-l)'! Z (X^ - X)' (X^ t X) , 
* * 
- (n-l)'l (X^ X)'(X^ - X) , 
* 
t X) . (3.3.10) 
We can write 
*tj " ^xxjj^tj ''tj ' (3.3.11) 
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where X^j and have variances and , respectively 
and the covariance between X^j and is zero. Hence, 
(3.3.12) 
If a .. is decreased, an increase in , will result. Increasing 
?%jj •^JJ 
the variance of the error has the opposite effect. Hence, depending on 
whether a cross-correlation is less than or greater than p , we can 
decrease or increase the variance component of the corresponding element 
in the error. The amount by which we adjust each variance component is 
determined by a simple approximation technique. The adjustment is made 
* 
to the error in the and then the variables are transformed to the 
X-scale. 
We define to be a diagonal transformation matrix, with 
®aajj ' j-th diagonal element of B^^ , defined by 
(3.3.13) 
"k 
for j-1, 2 p . The new error vectors are u^B^^ , for t-1, 
2 n , and the new masked transformed vectors are 
(3.3.14) 
Finally, the new vectors are transformed back to the original 
scale. This iterative process is repeated a prespecified number of 
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times or until the observed cross correlations differ from the desired 
cross correlations by less than a specified amount. 
3.3.3. Iterations to adjust correlation structure of masked variables 
After the iterative procedure to adjust the cross correlations is 
completed, a second iterative process is performed in an attempt to make 
the off-diagonal correlations in nearly identical to the 
corresponding correlations in . The idea, again, is to modify the 
error vectors to obtain the desired correlations. The error is modified 
for one variable at a time. The variable Xj for which the difference 
4kml(^XXjk " the largest is chosen for modification. We 
denote the chosen variable by and define k to be the average 
'fc 
correlation between X^ and the remaining (p-1) Xj variables, j-2, 
..., p . Though we base the choice of the variable to be modified on 
correlations computed for data on the original scale, it is the 
* 
transformed normal data, Z , that is modified. The objective is to 
create a linear combination of the variables Z^, Z^, Zg, ..., Z^ that, 
* 
when back transformed to X^ , give the correct correlation with X^ 
* * * 
and correct correlations with X^. X^ X^ . 
The new transformed variable is 
H. ™ b_Z. + b-Z- + b_Z_ + ... + b Z (3.3.15) 1 U 1 ii z z p p 
where b^ - 1 - b^ . The system of equations defining the desired 
properties is 
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Corr(G^, X^) - K 
Corr(G^, Xj) - . j-2, 3 p , (3.3.16) 
where Is the back transformed variable corresponding to 
Therefore, the system is 
/ ' 'xxii fxxi2 
f&21 fxx21 1 
fxx31 ^#X31 fxx32 
\^&pl ^Hpl ^Mp2 






^XXll 1 '°XX12 
^Ë21 - fxx21 1 
%1 - fxx31 ^^32 













If we write the system as Ab - c , we solve by computing b - A c 
where is the Moore-Penrose inverse of A . The vector b is then 
used to create the linear combination 
Hi - (Z^ , Z^ , Zg Zp)(l-bi, b^ , bp)' , (3.3.19) 
* 
where the variances of Z^  and of Zj , j-1, 2, ..., p , are unity. 
ie * 
The is then standardized and back transformed into or, 
equivalently, the new . 
The iterative procedure to adjust the correlations is performed a 
pre-determined number of times or until a convergence criterion for the 
off-diagonal correlations is satisfied. 
3.4. Back Transforming Classification Variables 
At this point, the only remaining computation is to convert the 
sets of Bernoulli variables, created for the purpose of masking the 
classification variables, back to their categorical ranges. To mask the 
classification variable X having r categories, the Bernoulli 
variables ..., Wj. are created for each response, X^  (see 
Section 3.1.1). These responses to the Bernoulli varibles are masked 
and denoted by  ^^  . To determine masked categorical 
* * * * 








for j-2, 3, 
(3.4.1) 
.., r-1 
Then is defined as 
- Cj if Z^ j - 1 , t-1, 2, ..., n , (3.4.2) 
where Cj is the j-th category of the variable X . 
Upon obtaining the masked values for all categorical variables, the 
masking is complete. 
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4. RESULTS OF MASKING TEST DATA 
In this chapter, we use the algorithm described in chapter 3 to 
mask two computer generated data sets. We begin by reviewing some of 
the previous work on the analytic usefulness and confidentiality aspects 
of masked data records. We then briefly discuss the implementation of 
our masking algorithm and describe the steps a user must follow in 
executing the programmed routine. We conclude by discussing the masking 
of the two data sets. For the first data set, we investigate the 
statistical usefulness of the masked data set by comparing statistical 
analyses performed on the original and masked data sets. We also 
examine the effectiveness of the mask with regard to protection against 
disclosure. For the second data set, we concentrate on evaluating the 
mask of discrete and classification variables, investigating statistical 
similarities and differences between the original and masked data sets 
within subgroups of the classification variable. Finally, we examine 
the joint distributions of the variables before and after the mask. 
4.1. Introduction 
4.1.1. Other data masking experiments involving adding error 
Some work has been done investigating the effects of masking data 
records by adding random error. The articles discussed here are also 
summarized in the literature review of chapter one. In this section we 
provide more detail of the portion of each article which concentrated on 
the effectiveness of masking data by adding random error. 
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Spruill (1982) proposed measures of confidentiality based on a 
minimum distance matching criterion. In quantifying the amount of 
protection provided by a data mask, Spruill proposed attempting to match 
masked records to their true analogues in the original data file. This 
involved computing a distance between a target record in the microdata 
file and each record in the original file. The target is then matched 
to the record in the original file associated with the smallest 
distance. The proposed measure of confidentiality is the percentage of 
masked records with an incorrect link. A "correct link" is made if the 
masked record with the minimum distance to an original record is the 
masked record created from that original record. A "correct link" can 
alternatively be defined as occurring if the original record used to 
create the masked target record is associated with one of the three 
smallest distances to the masked record. The sum of absolute deviations 
between standardized variables and the sum of squared differences 
between standardized variables were proposed as distances. The 
standardized variables were such that all had the same variance. 
Spruill investigated the four combinations of distances and definitions 
of a link for the masking techniques of adding random error, multiplying 
by random error, grouping, random rounding, and data swapping. 
In masking data by adding error, Spruill generated an independent 
normal error term for each variable of each data record. The errors 
were normally distributed with mean zero and variance equal to a 
multiple of the variance of the variable. The multiples considered were 
0.1, 0.5, 1 and 2. Masked data records from an original file of 1000 
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records were used. Spruill concluded that adding random error In this 
manner only produced a high measure of confidentiality when the number 
of variables was small or the multiple of the variance was large. 
Spruill (1983) also investigated the analytic usefulness of data 
sets masked under various techniques, including data swapping, 
multiplying by random error and adding random error. Two data sets were 
masked by various techniques and then analyzed. The first data set 
consisted of 36 variables and was constructed by applying normal 
deviates to means and coefficients of variation listed in an 1RS 
publication. The second data set was an actual data set consisting of 
27 variables of tax return data from 1979. Each data set contained 1000 
records. 
In masking by adding random error, Spruill used the same method as 
in the 1982 paper, but the added error term always had variance equal to 
one-half the variance of the variable. In evaluating data usefulness, 
Spruill computed, for the masked data records, the sample means, sample 
standard deviations and correlations between variables, as well as 
parameter estimates of regression models. The sample means of the 
masked variables were found to be equal to the means of the 
corresponding original variables. The direct estimates of regression 
and correlation parameters were judged inadequate for the technique of 
adding random error. Two avenues exist for improving the results of 
such analyses. First, alternative methods could have been used in 
masking the data. The analyses of the next section show that the 
correlation structure of the data can be preserved if correlated error 
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Is added. Spruill added error which did not share the correlation 
structure of the original data. Second, because the variance of the 
added error Is known, measurement error techniques (see Fuller (1987)) 
can be used to obtain consistent estimates of regression coefficients 
for data masked with error. 
Paass (1985) conducted a matching experiment on data collected from 
the Federal Republic of Germany 1978 income and consumption sample (EVS) 
and the Federal Republic of Germany 1978 microcensus (MZ). The sampling 
fractions of the EVS sample and the MZ microcensus were 0.2% and 1% of 
the population, respectively. The EVS data set contained about 50,000 
records on private households with about 370 household variables. The 
MZ data set consisted of 230,000 records on private households with 
about 50 variables. Match attempts were carried out for several 
scenerios, where the intruder had anywhere from seven to 68 variables to 
make use of in attempts to Identify target records. Two different 
searches were conducted for each scenario. The directed search 
consisted of an intruder attempting to match the target to a microdata 
record when the intruder did not know whether the target record was 
included in the sample (i.e., the EVS or MZ file). The alternative 
search assumed the target was contained in the EVS or MZ file. The 
second procedure was used in the case where a 50% subsample of EVS 
records and a 20% subsample of MZ records had been released. It was 
unknown whether the target was included in the released subsamples. 
Target records were generated by taking original records and adding 
error. The amount of error added to the variables to form the masked 
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records ranged from 1% for sex to 90% for some Income variables. The 
typical error rates were 5-10% for categorical variables and 50-90% for 
quantitative variables. 
Given a target record, the probability of correct association, 
p(k|x} in Paass' notation (see Section 1.2), was computed for each 
record in the released sample. The target was Identified as the record 
in the release having the highest probability of correct association. 
The directed search produced very unsuccessful results from the 
intruder's standpoint. For those scenarios having 45 and 68 variables, 
approximately 0.11% of the Identification attempts were successful. For 
fewer variables the success rate was approximately zero. 
The alternative search provided results that would be more 
encouraging to an intruder. Again, probabilities of correct association 
were computed using Paass' methods, and the target record was identified 
as the record in the subsample having the highest probability. If the 
target was known to be included in the released subsample, over 80% of 
the targets could be identified in the cases of 45 or 68 variables. 
Even when the target was not known to be in the subsample, over 55% of 
the targets could be correctly linked. Only for seven variables was the 
percentage of identifiable records equal to zero for both cases in the 
alternative search. 
Paass concludes that microdata files containing few variables can 
be released. However, Paass believes that the information contained in 
records having many variables is so great that only excessive masking 
can secure confidentiality. 
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Kim (1986) developed a masking procedure which attempted to 
maintain the covarlance structure of the data. He used three variations 
of his scheme to mask and analyze earnings data. The data were masked 
by adding error with variance equal to 25%, 50% and 100% of the variance 
of the unmasked variable. Also investigated was a standard masking 
technique, in which normal Independent error terms with mean zero and 
variance equal to one-half the variance of the unmasked variables were 
added to each data value. The comparison of the masking methods 
Involved the computation of means, correlations, regressions and 
analyses of variance. 
Kim found the sample means of the masked variables to be different 
from the unmasked variables due to the sample variability of the mean of 
the added random noise. However, correlation coefficients between 
variables masked under Kim's scheme were the same as correlations 
between the unmasked variables. Correlations between variables masked 
by the standard technique of adding error were different from the true 
correlations. The same results were found to be true In the regression 
analyses. The estimated coefficients obtained from analyzing the data 
masked under Kim's scheme were nearly equal to the coefficients found 
from the true data. Much disparity existed between the coefficients 
estimated from the data masked by the standard technique and the true 
coefficients. In the analyses of variance based on the regressions, the 
mean square for error, the calculated F value, and the value 
exhibited the same pattern. Kim's masking scheme was clearly superior 
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to the standard technique with regard to maintaining statistical 
properties of the data. 
4.1.2. Use of the masking algorithm 
The masking algorithm described in Chapter 3 was implemented with 
the Interactive Matrix Language (XML) procedure of SAS. The documented 
code of the IML program is given in Chapter 6. In employing the program 
to mask a data set, the user must clearly define the input data set and 
also must specify a number of constants which determine how the data set 
will be masked. 
To define the input data set, the user must first give the total 
number of input variables and the type of each variable. The three 
variable types are continuous, discrete and classlcatory. Since parts 
of the masking procedure differ depending on the nature of the input 
variable, these specifications must be accurate. The distinction 
between discrete and classiflcatory variables deserves special 
mention. The difference lies in the meaning of the values of the 
variable. For a discrete variable, the integer response represents a 
quantity, while the response to a classification variable defines an 
Individual category. Total family members is an example of a discrete 
variable, whereas race is a classification variable. For classiflcatory 
variables, the user must also specify the number of possible categories. 
Once the variable types are specified, the user must indicate 
whether any variables have restricted response ranges. For example, a 
continuous variable may only take on non-negative values. The user must 
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define any such restrictions. After all variable values are masked, the 
routine will insure that these range restrictions are satisfied. 
With regard to masking specifications, the user must first specify 
the magnitude of the error to be added in masking the transformed, 
standard normal values. With reference to Chapter 3, the relative 
variance of the error is represented by the value a in (3.2.4). If 
the value of a provided by the user is not large enough to satisfy the 
distance criterion discussed in Section 3.2.2, the magnitude of a is 
increased through the generation of larger errors. 
In addition, the user must specify the number of iterations the 
program is to perform in attempting to attain the desired correlations 
between Che original and masked data set and between the variables 
within the masked data set. If the correlations satisfy a closeness 
criterion before the specified number of iterations is exhausted, the 
program will omit the remaining iterations. 
We now discuss the masking of the first computer generated data 
set. 
4.2. Mask of the First Data Set 
In using the IML program to mask a data set, we wanted to determine 
how well the algorithm performed in meeting the two primary masking 
objectives. These objectives are to create a new data set which is 
statistically representative of the original data and which provides 
respondents ample protection against disclosure. We chose to generate a 
data set made up of four continuous variables and four Bernoulli 
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variables. The four continuous variables consisted of three standard 
normal variables and a standard exponential variable. The generated 
Bernoulli variables had success probabilities of, approximately, 0.15, 
0.30, 0.40 and 0.50. Because masking Bernoulli variables Is an 
Important special case of masking classification variables, we felt the 
mix of the standard continuous variables and the four Bernoulli 
variables would provide a good Initial test for the program. 
The generated data set consisted of 300 observations, each having a 
response to all eight variables. The data were generated so that high 
positive correlations existed between each possible pair of variables. 
The correlations of the masked data provide one indication of how 
representative the new data set is of the original data set. 
To mask the data, the variance of the generated error term added to 
each transformed, standard normal value was set at 0,3. The maximum 
number of iterations permitted in attaining the desired cross 
correlations between masked and original variables and correlations 
between masked variables was set to fifteen in both cases. 
After masking, in addition to comparing correlation structures, we 
constructed plots of the continuous variables and two-way tables of the 
Bernoulli variables, and we performed various regression analyses to 
determine whether the original and masked data sets were statistically 
similar. Furthermore, univariate distribution functions of original and 
masked variables were constructed to demonstrate their equivalence. To 
Investigate the amount of protection the masking program affords, an 
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attempt was made to match each record in the masked data set to its 
corresponding record in the original data set. 
Before discussing the analyses, we define the following notation. 
For the original data set, we denote the three normal variables by , 
X2 , and X3 , and denote to the exponential variable by X^  . The 
Bernoulli variables will be denoted by Xg , Xg , Xy and Xg , having 
success probabilities of, approximately, 0.15, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5, 
* 
respectively. The masked variables will be denoted by X^  , for 
* j - 1,2 8 , where X^  is the masked analogue of X^  , and so on. 
4.2.1. Plots and two-way tables 
The initial analyses consisted of plots of the continuous variables 
and two-way tables of the Bernoulli variables. These plots and tables 
were constructed to illustrate the extent to which the original 
responses of each variable were altered in creating the new data set. 
Plots were constructed for each continuous original variable 
against its masked counterpart. Because the plots of the normal 
variables have the same general shape, we only present the plot of X^  
* 
vs. X^  in Figure 4.1(a). The points fall around the 45° line of the 
graph and the conditional variances of X^  given a specific value of 
Xj^  tend to be similar. The sample correlation between X^  and X^  is 
approximately 0.75, which indicates moderate, but not extreme, 
differences between each true and masked value. 
Figure 4.1(b) contains the plot of the true and masked exponential 
values. As in the case of normal variables, the points tend to lie near 
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Figure 4.1. Original values vs. masked values for (a) the first normal 
variable, , and (b) the exponential variable, 
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the 45' line, although there is an abundance of points near the origin 
due to the skewness of the exponential distribution. The variance of 
conditional on depends on X^  . The sample correlation 
* 
between X^  and X^  is again approximately 0.75. 
In Table 4.1, we give the means and standard deviations of the 
continuous original and masked variables. We observe that all means and 
all corresponding standard deviations are essentially equal. 





Xl 0.0038 0.9671 
-1 0.0040 0.9708 
X2 -0.0067 0.9920 
-0.0063 0.9957 
*3 0.0146 0.9647 
% 0.0155 0.9704 
X4 0.8693 0.8542 
X. 0.8716 0.8613 4 
We now focus our attention on the two-way tables of the original 
and masked Bernoulli variables. In interpreting these tables, we 
* * 
concentrate on the tables of Xg by Xg and Xg by Xg . The success 
probabilities in these two cases are approximately 0.3 and 0.5, 
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respectively. Again, we are looking for preliminary indications of the 
effectiveness of the program in masking Bernoulli variables. 
Table 4.2 contains the cell totals and marginal totals for the 
if 
table of Xg by Xg . In examining this table, we first note that the 
if 
sample mean of Xg is the same as the sample mean of Xg . This is a 
special feature of the masking algorithm and will always result when a 
Bernoulli variable is masked. Also, we see that a total of 32 of the 
300 observations were changed when the values of Xg were masked. We 
shall refer back to this point after our discussion of the table of 
Xg by Xg . The sample correlation between Xg and Xg is 0.74, 
which is similar to the sample correlations between the true and masked 
continuous variables. 
"k 
Table 4.2. Crosstabulation of Xg by Xg 
6^ 
6^ 0 1 Total 
0 199 16 215 
1 16 69 85 
Total 215 85 300 
ic 
The two-way table of Xg by Xg is illustrated in Table 4.3. We 
observe again that the sample means or success probabilities are 
equal. The mask of Xg resulted in 21 values each changing from zero 
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Table 4.3. Crosstabulation of Xg by Xg 
^8 
Xg 0 1 Total 
0 138 21 159 
1 21 120 141 
Total 159 141 300 
to one and an equal number changing from one to zero. This gives a 
"k 
sample correlation between Xg and Xg of approximately 0.72. 
We make one final observation in reference to the masking of any 
Bernoulli variable. Under the condition that the mean of Xj is equal 
to the mean of Xj , the sample correlation between Xj and X^  is 
Corr(Xj , Xj) - [(n^  ^+ nj^ 2^ "^l2 "22^  ^ *^ '^^ 11^ 22 " "l2^  ' (4 2 1) 
where nj^ j is the number of observations falling in the (i,j)-th cell 
of the table. Clearly, as n-^ 2 increases, the sample correlation 
* 
between Xj and Xj decreases. 
Now, let pj be the mean of the original and masked Bernoulli 
variable, Xj . As n-^ 2 increases, we observe that the greater the 
absolute difference [p^  - 0.5| , the sharper the drop in the sample 
* 
correlation between Xj and X^  . For example, consider the 
variables Xg and Xg with sample means pg - 0.47 and pg - 0.283, 
respectively. In the case of Xg , if only sixteen observations each 
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* 
changed from zero for Xg to one for Xg and vice versa, the sample 
* 
correlation between Xg and Xg would be 0.786. This value is clearly 
greater than the 0.74 correlation between Xg and Xg when, in fact, 
the number of observations masked from zero to one and one to zero was 
sixteen. Hence, in masking the Bernoulli variables Xg , Xg , Xy and 
* 
Xg , and anticipating the correlation between Xj and Xj to be around 
0.75 for j - 5, 6, ,7 and 8, we would expect more values to change in 
the masking of Xj^  than in the masking of , for k - 6, 7 and 8. 
The results from these initial graphical and tabular analyses 
indicate that the algorithm is adequately, but not excessively, 
disguising the data. We now look more closely at the covariance 
structure of each data set through some regression analyses. 
4.2.2. Regression analyses of original and masked data sets 
Two linear models containing a subset of the eight variables were 
chosen and each was fit using ordinary least squares regression. Each 
regression was run separately on the original data set and on the masked 
data set. In addition to parameter estimates, we looked at standard 
A 
errors of these estimates, R values and diagnostic plots of residuals 
against predicted values. We now present results and interpretations 
for these models. 
We first fit the model 
*1 - fo + ^ 2*2 + % + + error (4.2.2) 
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for both the original data and the masked data. Ordinary least squares 
gives the following estimates of the parameters, with standard errors in 
parentheses : 
- -0.237 + 0.671 X, + 0.257 X, + 0.077 X. (4.2,3) 
(0.052) (0.041) ^  (0.050) ^  (0.077) 
1 - -0.285 + 0,627 X_ + 0.296 X, + 0.102 L , (4,2,4) 
 ^ (0.053) (0.042) (0.051) ^  (0.075) 
The values are 0,8194 for (4,2.3) and 0,8123 for (4,2.4), 
In investigating these results, we first notice that the estimates 
for the corresponding parameters do not differ by very much. Only the 
two estimates of )9g differ by more than 0,05, We also observe that 
the standard errors of the corresponding estimates are nearly identical, 
as are the R values from the two fitted models. 
An important consideration in any regression analysis is the 
plotting of residuals. We constructed plots of the residuals against 
the predicted values for the equations estimated from fitting the model 
in (4,2.2) on the original and masked data sets (see Figure 4.2). We 
observe that the two plots are very similar in that each contains a 
scattering of points with all residuals falling in the interval (-1,2, 
1.2) in each plot. In comparing the parameter estimates, their standard 
errors, the R values and the residual plots, we conclude that the 
regression of the masked data for the model (4,2,2) is very 
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Figure 4.2. Residuals (E-HAT) vs. predicted values (X-HAT) for (a) the 
original data model, and (b) the masked data model 
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As a second model, we chose 
- 7Q + + 72*2 + 7gXg + 7yXy + error (4.2.5) 
and fit the model to both the original and masked data sets using 
ordinary least squares. We give the estimated equations with standard 
errors accompanying the parameter estimates: 
X, - 0.748 + 0.303 X^  + 0.231 X- + 0.455 X, + 0.156 X^  (4.2.6) 
 ^(0.045) (0.062) ^  (0.062) ^  (0.087) (0.087) ' 
X, - 0.791 + 0.332 £ + 0.260 L + 0.416 L + 0.095 X . (4.2.7) 
(0.042) (0.060) ^  (0.058) ^  (0.085) " (0.081) 
The values are 0.718 for the original data and 0.727 for the masked 
data. As in the first model, we observe that the estimates of the 
corresponding parameters are quite close. All fall within 0.06 of one 
another. Again the standard errors of the corresponding parameter 
2 
estimates are nearly equal, as are the R values. Finally, the plots 
of residuals against predicted values (Figure 4.3) constructed for each 
data set demonstrate exactly the same pattern. This identical residual 
pattern, along with the similarities between parameter estimates, 
2 
standard errors, and R values, further strengthens our claim that, 
with regard to regression analyses, the masked data set is 
representative of the original data set. 
100 
2  .  O  
1 . 5 -
1 . O -
O  .  a  
I o . o -
M 
— o . o 
— 1 . o -






m # # 
(a) 








2  .  O  
1 . 5 -
1 . O -
O  .  5  -
O . O 
—  O  .  5  -
1 . O -





" .s " 
? '.xv-
(b) 
—I ' 1 ' r 




Figure 4.3. Residuals (E-HAT) vs. predicted values (X4-HAT) for (a) the 
original data model, and (b) the masked data model 
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4.2.3. Examination of correlation structures and cross correlations 
We continue our statistical comparison of the original and masked 
data sets by investigating the correlations within each data set, as 







be the sample correlation matrix of the original data, where Kjjxil 
the correlation submatrix of the continuous variables, ®3jx22 the 
correlation submatrix of the Bernoulli variables, and is the 
submatrix of correlations between the continuous and Bernoulli 
variables. We exhibit these subcorrelation matrices below and point out 




1 0.8927 0.8921 0.8005 
0.8927 1 0.8923 0.7967 
0.8921 0.8923 1 0.8059 
0.8005 0.7967 0.8059 1 
0.5897 0.6513 0.6967 0.6868 
0.5891 0.6623 0.7133 0.7013 
0.6057 0.6828 0.6881 0.7172 
0.7168 0.7031 0.6864 0.6529 
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®XX22 " 
1 0.6041 0.5624 0.4393 
0.6041 1 0.6979 0.6084 
0.5624 0.6979 1 0.6616 
0.4393 0.6084 0.6616 1 






where the partitioning of is analogous to that of . To 
assess the extent to which the correlation structure of the original 
data agrees with the correlation structure of the masked data, we look 







- «Ë (4.2.10) 
be the difference between the original and masked correlation 
matrices. We investigate each submatrix of D * separately. 
First, consider the difference between the correlation structures 
of the continuous variables of the two data sets. By definition, 
®XX11 " ®XX11 ' ®Mll 
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where is a symmetric, 4x4 matrix. The (i,j)-th element of 
Mil 
Mll(i,j) " " '^ X^ Xj (4.2.11) 
X^Xll(j,i) 
where r„ ^  is the sample correlation between X^  and X^  , and X.x. i J 
J> J * * 



















indicating that all corresponding correlations for continuous variables 
in the original and masked data sets differ by less than 0.0125 in 
absolute value. 
We now turn our attention to the correlations between Bernoulli 
variables, where, by definition 
®XX22 " ®XX22 ' ^22 ' 
The (i,j)-th element of 0^ 22 
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(4.2.12) 
" ^ j.i) 
where k - 1+4 , i - j+4 and r^  ^  , r* * are sample correlations 
Vji VJI 
between the subscripted variables. We find to be 
°XX22 " 
0 0.0407 0.0380 0.0184 
0.0407 0 0.0153 0 
0.0380 0.0153 0 0 
0.0184 0 0 0 
Hence, we conclude that „ - r* * and r„ „ - r* * , and we 
•^ 6 8 6 8 7 8 7 8 
observe that all differences between corresponding Bernoulli variable 
correlations are less than 0.05 in absolute value. 
To investigate differences between the corresponding sample 
correlations of continuous variables with Bernoulli variables, we 
compute 
®XX12 " ®XX12 ' *XX12 
where ®xxi2  ^4x4 matrix, but is not symmetric. The 
(i,j)-th element of is 
X^X12( * - i,j) - - rSiS, (4.2.13) 
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where i - J+4 , r. _ _ is the sample correlation between and X. , A . A .  i  X ,  
^ * * 




0 .0627 0 .0197 0 .0523 0.0140 
0. ,0904 0 .0319 0 .0670 0.0380 
0. ,0815 0 .0495 0, .0473 0.0368 
0. 0854 0 .0231 0. ,0492 0.0393 
We observe that all correlations between continuous and Bernoulli 
variables in the masked data set are somewhat lower than the same 
correlations in the original data set. In particular, correlations 
between X^  and all other masked variables declined by the largest 
amount. We conclude that it is difficult to retain the high 
correlations between continuous and Bernoulli variables during the mask. 
The difficulty with Xg lies in the fact that only 15.67% of the 
original responses of Xg are one, while the rest are zero. To 
adequately mask Xg , the algorithm changed a relatively high percentage 
of the ones to zeros. Consequently, the "new" zeros, which are 
associated with large values of other variables, decreased the 
ic 
correlation between X^  and these other variables. The correlated 
error added to mask each data vector helped a moderate amount to retain 
the high correlations between X^  and the other variables, but the all-
or-nothing nature of the Bernoulli variable and the low success 
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probability of Xg made the high positive correlations difficult to 
completely retain. 
We now examine correlations between corresponding variables from 
the two data sets. Some of these cross correlations were briefly 
mentioned in our discussion of plots and two-way tables of original and 
masked values. Regarding cross correlations, the objective is to have 
each cross correlation approximately equal to a target correlation. 
This target correlation is a robust average of all the cross 
correlations at the point of the initial mask of the data. In this 
example, the target correlation was computed to be 0.75. A correlation 
of 0.75 produces values of the masked variables which are not too 
different from the values of the original variables from which they were 
created. This is consistent with our masking objective of not 
excessively distorting the data. At the same time, the target cross 
correlation of 0.75 creates enough distortion in the data to serve as 
considerable confidentiality protection, which is our second primary 
objective. The fact that this target correlation provides considerable 
protection in a sample of this size will be substantiated later. 
The sample correlations between the corresponding original and 
masked continuous variables are 
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r„ * 0.7448 
*2*2 
r, $ 0.7449 
*3*3 
[\îj \»-W • 
All are just below our target correlation of 0.75. For the Bernoulli 
variables, we have 
Again, all fall just below the 0.75 target. 
In the masking algorithm, an iterative procedure is performed which 
adjusts the error terms until the cross correlations between 
corresponding original and masked variables is within one one-hundredth 
of the target correlation (see Section 3.2.2). This is followed by a 
second iterative procedure, which further adjusts the data to equate 
correlations within the masked data set to corresponding correlations 
within the original data set. The computations in the second iterative 
procedure, in some instances, cause a decrease in one or more of the 




* - have dropped, the decrease is only a slight one and is not 
*8 8 
cause for concern. We believe that all cross correlations are close 
enough to the target correlation of 0.75. 
4.2.4. Comparison of univariate distribution functions 
We conclude our statistical comparison of the original and masked 
data sets by demonstrating that the univariate distribution functions 
for corresponding original and masked variables are identical. For the 
continuous varibles, we concentrate on the normal variable, Xg , and 
its masked analogue, along with the original and masked exponential 
* 
variable. The sample distribution functions of Xg and X^  are 
pictured in Figure 4.4. The two graphs are nearly identical. When 
overlayed on the same pair of axes, the two sample distribution 
functions appear as one. We found the same equivalence between the 
sample distribution functions of the original and masked exponential 
variables, X^  and X^  , respectively. The near equality of these two 
distribution functions is illustrated in Figure 4.5, 
For Bernoulli variables, the sample distribution function is a step 
function. Since our masking algorithm guarantees that the mean of a 
masked Bernoulli variable is equal to the mean of the original Bernoulli 
variable, then the univariate distribution functions of the original and 
masked Bernoulli variables will be identical. 
4.2.5. Assessment of protection against disclosure 
Based on the analyses discussed above, the masked data set has 
retained important statistical properties of the original data set. As 
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Figure 4.4. Sample cumulative distribution function of X3 for (a) the 
original data, and (b) the masked data 
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o . a 
o 1 2 3 4- 5 
(®) X4 (Original) 
o 1 2 3 5 
(b) X4 (Masked) 
Figure 4.5. Sample cumulative distribution function of for (a) the 
original data, and (b) the masked data 
Ill 
far as protection against disclosure, the cross correlations given in 
section 4.2.4 indicate that the masked data values are close, but not 
identical to the original values. We now investigate the amount of 
confidentiality protection the mask has afforded the respondents of the 
original data set. 
Disclosure occurs when an intruder obtains an identifiable target 
record from a private source and matches it to a record from a public 
use microdata file. The number of private data sources from which a 
target record may arise is not known. Hence, before releasing a masked 
file, a data agency cannot assure absolute protection from disclosure 
simply because the agency cannot account for every record in the private 
domain that corresponds to a record in their microdata file. Despite 
this, a data agency must determine whether a data file has been 
adequately masked against disclosure. A conservative method of 
assessing the amount of confidentiality protection is to attempt to 
match each record in the original data file to its corresponding record 
in the masked file using all variables. We call this a self-contained 
match attempt. If such a match attempt is unsuccessful, the data agency 
can claim that their mask of the data affords respondents a reasonable 
amount of protection. For this type of data releasing process to be 
successful, definitions of an "unsuccessful match attempt" and a 
"reasonable amount of protection" must be formulated by the data 
releasing agency or by the statistical community. 
In order to assess the amount of protection afforded by our masking 
algorithm, we carried out such a self-contained match attempt. For each 
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record in the original data file, which we refer to as the target 
record, we first computed the probabilities that the target record 
corresponded to each record in the masked data file. These were 
computed as if the added error is independent of the original data. 
This is not a correct assumption because the algorithm modifies the 
error on the basis of adjacent observations. We refer to these 
probabilities as (p^^^ Pg^ P^qq , where the k-th original 
record is the target. 
The values of pj^ for j,k c K , where K - {1,2,...,300} , were 
computed as follows. Let the original data set be defined by 
X - (X{, 3% ]%oo)' 
where Xj - Xjg) , for j-1, 2, ..., 300 . Let the 
masked data set be defined by 
X - (3{, 3% %oo)' 
where Xj - (X^^^, X^g. . Xjg) for j-1, 2 300 . Note that 
Xj^ is a function of Xj^ for j-1, 2, ..., 300 and i-1, 2 
8 . The function involves transforming X.. to normality, adding an 
J ^  
error term, standardizing the sum and back transforming to the original 
scale of the j-th variable. We define 
Hjjjj - (299)"^(D'D - 300 D'D) 
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where 
D - Z - Z , 
1 300 * 
D - (300)"^ S (Z - Z ) 
j-1 J J 
To compute the pjj^ values we first define 
-1,* 
Vjk - exp{-V2(Xj - * V (4.2.14) 
for j,k e K . Finally, we define 
300 . 
Pjk - 7ik)" Tjk (4 2 15) 
for j,k £ K . 
If the k-th record in the original file is the target record, we 
are particularly interested in the magnitude of pj^j^ . While not 
probabilities for general X , we treat these values as the posterior 
probability of matching the target record to its masked analogue. We 
also call these values match probabilities. We are interested in the 
largest probability among all values of Pj^ , for k fixed. We refer 
to this as Pmax(k) ' define 
Pmax(k) - ^  'Pjk' • (4.2.16) 
j'k 
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We use these values In various ways to Investigate and quantify the 
amount of protection provided by our masking algorithm. 
First, we use the match probabilities to determine how many of the 
original records are closely associated to their corresponding masked 
records in a self-contained matching experiment. That is, for all three 
hundred original records, we determine the number of times the masked 
record created from the original had the highest match probability, one 
of the three highest match probabilities, and one of the five highest 
match probabilities. In mathematical terms, we first define 
P(l),k ^  P(2),k - ••• - P(300),k (4.2.17) 
as the 300 ordered match probabilities for k (k fixed). We then 
define the proportion of original records, k e K , for 
which pjj^ is one of the i-largest match probabilities tPj^' j ^  K) , 
in a self contained match. Hence, 
1 300 
"(i),300 " (300) I(Pkk - P(j),k) (4.2.18) 
for £-1, 3 and 5 where 
- '• " Pkk P(j),k 
(4.2.19) 
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In this example, we found 
"(1),300 " ' 
"(3),300 • °-2267 , 
"(5),300 " °-2800 . 
A quick interpretation of these results is that, in attempting to match 
an original record to its masked analogue using the highest probability, 
over 90% of the match attempts were unsuccessful and approximately 3/4 
of the time the proper record was not among the five masked records with 
highest match probabilities. 
We further illustrate the difficulty an intruder would have in 
matching a target record to the proper record in the microdata 
release. In the self-contained match, we constructed histograms of 
the pjçjj values and Pmax(k) values for all k . Figure 4,6 
illustrates that the highest incorrect match probabilities tend to 
exceed the correct match probabilities, misleading an intruder 
interested in predicting confidential attributes or properly linking a 
masked record to a target. 
As a final indicator that the masking algorithm introduced in 
Chapter 3 provides protection against disclosure, we show that in the 
self contained match, even apparently obvious matches are typically 
incorrect. In looking at match probabilities, an intruder will feel 
positive about linking a released record to the target if the associated 
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Figure 4.6. Histograms of (a) the correct match probabilities, and (b) 
the highest incorrect match probabilities 
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probability is both large and dominant over the others. One criterion 
developed from this idea may be to make a link between a target record 
and a released microdata record if the associated match probability is 
both greater than 0.5 and at least twice as large as the second highest 
probability of matching another record to the target. In linking the k-
th original record to a record in the masked data set, the criterion is 
satisfied if 
P(l),k ^  0 5 
(4.2.20) 
P(l),k ^  2P(2),k 
where P(i) and P(2) k defined in (4.2.17). 
In our example, the attempted self-contained match of each original 
record to a masked record results in a total of nineteen original 
records having match probabilities satisfying the conditions of 
(4.2.20). Of these nineteen situations where an Intruder may feel that 
a positive link between target and released record can be made, only 
four of the nineteen cases would result in correct matches. Therefore, 
in cases where an intruder may feel that a correct match can be made, 
only about 20% of the record links would be correct. 
4.3. Mask of the Second Data Set 
In the mask of the first data set in section 4.2, we demonstrated 
that the algorithm did well in meeting the two primary masking 
118 
objectives. For a data set composed of normal, exponential and 
Bernoulli variables, the masking program created a data set which was 
statistically representative of the original data set and provided 
considerable protection against disclosure. In masking a second data 
set, we wanted to demonstrate some additional capabilities of the 
algorithm. These include the ability to sufficiently mask discrete and 
classification variables. Hence, we created a data set including a 
Poisson variable with parameter A - 1.8 and a classification variable 
having a categorical range of {1, 2, 3, 4) . We also created a 
standard normal variable which was highly correlated with the Poisson 
variable. Additionally, we correlated large values of the Poisson and 
normal variables with the first category of the classification variable, 
and small values of the normal and Poisson variables with the fourth 
category of the classification variable. We could then determine 
whether the descriptive statistics of the normal and Poisson variables 
within the categorical groups of the classification variable are similar 
for the original and masked data sets. 
In the mask of the first data set, we showed that the masking 
algorithm preserved the univariate distribution function of each 
variable. We cannot make the same claim about the joint distribution 
function of two or more of the variables. To demonstrate this, we 
included as a variable in the data set, the square of the standard 
normal variable. Naturally, if one knew that two variables were 
perfectly related, one would mask only one and create the other using 
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the functional relationship. Our purpose is to take an extreme case to 
demonstrate how the joint relationship can be modified by the masking. 
In addition, we will study the correlation structure of the data 
sets within subgroups of the classification variable. The normal and 
Poisson variables are positively correlated with each other and nearly 
uncorrelated with the chi-square variable. However, within subgroups of 
the classification variable, the correlation structure is very 
different. We will demonstrate that in such cases the correlation 
structures within categories of the classification variable are not 
retained through the mask. 
The second computer generated data set consisted of 300 observation 
vectors. Each vector consisted of a value for the normal, chi-square, 
Poisson and classification variables. In the masking algorithm, the 
variance of the error term added to each transformed standard normal 
value was set to 0.3. The maximum number of iterations permitted to 
attain the desired correlation structure in the masked data set and the 
cross correlations between original and masked variables was chosen to 
be ten in both cases. Although the data set has four variables, the 
algorithm had to mask six variables, because the classification variable 
was transformed into three Bernoulli variables. 
In analyzing the new data set, we concentrated on the masked 
Poisson and classification variables. We began by constructing two-way 
tables of the Poisson and categorical variables against their masked 
counterparts. We also fit the same linear model to the original and 
masked data sets and compared the results. For both data sets, we 
120 
computed descriptive statistics of the normal, chl-square and Poisson 
variables within subgroups of the classification variable. We also 
computed the overall correlation structure of each data set and 
correlation structures of each data set within subgroups of the 
classification variable. To demonstrate that the masking algorithm does 
not preserve Joint distribution functions, we plotted the chl-square 
variable against the normal variable in each data set and derived 
certain components of the sample joint distribution functions. 
In discussing the results of the mask, we denote the variables 
, X2 , X3 and X^ as corresponding to the standard normal, chl-
square, Poisson and classification variables, respectively. Also, we 
refer to the corresponding masked analogues of these variables as X^ , 
* * * 
Xg , Xj and X^ . 
4.3.1. Cross tabulations of the discrete and classification variables 
* 
We begin with the cross tabulation of Xg by X^ in Table 4.4. 
We point out two Important features of the procedure to mask discrete 
variables, which are illustrated in the table. First of all, we notice 
that the masked values are not too distant from their original values. 
Only for Xg - 0 do we find a corresponding value of X^ such that 
(Xj - X^l >2 . Secondly, let us define (X^^: t - 1,2 300) and 
"k (Xg^: t - 1, 2 , . . . , 300) as the original and masked sets of responses for 
the Poisson variable. If we further define 
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Table 4.4. Frequencies for the original and masked Poisson variables 
X3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
0 26 19 5 2 0 0 0 52 
1 21 39 22 4 0 0 0 86 
2 5 20 30 18 3 0 0 76 
3 0 8 15 18 7 3 0 51 
4 0 0 4 5 10 5 0 24 
5 0 0 0 4 3 1 1 9 
6 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Total 52 86 76 51 24 9 2 300 
300 
n - S I{X - j) 
J t»l 
(4.3.1) 
* 300 * 
n - S I{X - j) 
J t-1 
where 
I{X3^- j) -0 if M j 
(4.3.2) 
- 1 if Xgt - j , 
"k 
then we see that n. -> n. , for j - 1, 2 max {X_ ) . That is, 
J J ^ 
the masked Poisson variable has the same mean and variance as the 
original Poisson variable. This will be true when a discrete variable 
having a range of values which form a consecutive sequence of integers, 
122 
like (0, 1 6) , is masked. We also note that 175 of the 300 
original Poisson values, or 58.3%, were changed in the mask of the data 
set. Thus, a very different set of responses was created. 
We turn our attention to Table 4.5 which contains cross tabulations 
'fc 
for the original and masked classification variables, and . In 
masking a classification variable, we cannot guarantee that the 
frequencies for the categorical values of the original variable will be 
the same as those of the masked variable. However, we see from the 
Table 4.5. Frequencies for the original and masked classification 
X4 1 2 3 4 Total 
1 64 4 4 9 81 
2 4 19 3 4 30 
3 5 3 37 8 53 
4 8 7 6 115 136 
Total 81 33 53 136 300 
table that the corresponding marginal 
within 0.01 of one another. That is, 
n^j - # observations 
row and column proportions are all 
if we define 
in cell (i,j) , 
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and 
"•J - • 
then Ipj^ - p a 0.01 for k - 1,2,3,4 where 
4 4 , 
p - ( S S n )" 
1-1 j-1 J 
4 4 
p - ( S Z n ) n . . 
• 1-1 j-1 J 
We also note that, of the 300 categorical values that were masked, 65 or 
21.67% actually switched categories In the mask. Again, the algorithm 
is creating a new set of responses which differs substantially from the 
original set. 
4.3.2. Regression analysis with classificatory predictor 
To Investigate the effects of masking discrete and classification 
variables on fitting a linear model, we used ordinary least squares to 
fit 
4 
X- - S a.Z. + + error (4.3.3) 
j-1 ^ J 
where for j - 1,2,3,4, 
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Zj - 0 if M j 
(4.3.4) 
- 1 if - j . 
We obtain the following estimates of the parameters for the original and 
masked data sets, with standard errors in parentheses: 
X. - -0.86 Z. - 0.79 Z„ - 0.91 Z- - 1.14 Z, + 0.54 X- (4.3.5) 
^ (0.12) ^  (0.12) ^  (0.11) (0.06) ^  (0.03) 
X, - -0.73 Z. - 0.84 L - 0.81 Z_ - 1.13 Z, - 0.51 L . (4.3.6) 
^ (0.12) ^  (0.13) ^  (0.12) (0.06) ^  (0.03) ^  
The respective R-squared values for the original and masked models are 
0.6743 and 0.6496. We observe that, although the standard errors of the 
corresponding estimates are nearly identical, the estimates of 
and more than slightly differ in the two models. Differences in 
the three pairs of parameter estimates result from the small numbers of 
observations in the three categories within each data set (see Table 
4.4). The estimates for are surprisingly close even though the 
numbers of observations falling in the second category are 30 and 33, 
respectively, for the original and masked data sets. We point out that, 
with a frequency count of 136 observations for the fourth category in 
each data set, the parameter estimates of are within one one-
hundredth of one another. For all parameter estimates, we obtain nearly 
equal standard errors due to the similarity of the sums of squares and 
cross products matrices and the closeness of the error mean squares, 
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which are 0.3357 and 0.3687 for the original and masked models. There 
exist no extremely visible differences between the residual plots in 
Figure 4.7 for the original and masked data sets. We conclude there is 
little difference between the two regressions. 
4.3.3. Examination of overall correlation structure and cross 
correlations 
We continue our analysis of the mask of the second data set by 
examining the correlations within the original and masked data set, as 
well as correlations between corresponding variables of the two data 
sets. In discussing correlations, we focus on the quantitative 
variables, , Xg » arid X3 . Let 
®xx • 
^ ®xx ®xx ^ 
% "Ë 
where is the sample correlation matrix of the original 
quantitative variables, is the sample correlation matrix of the 
masked variables and is the sample cross correlation matrix 
between the original and masked quantitative variables. We give the 
correlation matrices of the original and masked data sets, and 






























































Figure 4.7. Residuals (E-HAT) vs. predicted values (XI-HAT) for (a) the 










1 -0.0895 0.7941 
-0.0895 1 0.0468 
0.7941 0.0468 1 
To demonstrate the similarity between the correlation matrices of 
the original and masked data sets, we form the matrix of correlation 
differences, 
°XX " ^  
where is a sjnmnetric 3x3 matrix. The (i,j)-th element of 
°XX 1= 
*S(X( ij) • ' ""xl. • 
" %j,i) 
where r^ „ is the sample correlation between Xj and , and 
'J * * ' 
r* * is the sample correlation between X. and X. . In masking the 
1 J 
second data set, we find 
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0 -0.0069 0.0196 
- -0.0069 0 -0.0006 
0.0196 -0.0006 0 
We see that the correlation structures of the original and masked data 
sets are nearly identical. 
The sample correlations between corresponding variables in the 
original and masked data sets are the diagonal elements of . These 
are computed to be 
The target correlation in this example was computed to be 0.74. The 
iterative procedure in the routine which has the purpose of equating the 
correlation matrices of the original and masked data sets has caused the 
correlation between the original and masked Poisson variable to fall 
slightly below the target correlation of 0.74, but a cross correlation 
of 0.7222 is still satisfactory. 
With regard to the analyses and other statistical computations 
discussed above, we have found that the masked data set is statistically 
representative of the original data set. Only in the regression 
analysis, when the estimates of the categorical means were compared, did 
0.7576 
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we find noteworthy differences between the original and masked data 
sets. We further pursue these potential differences by looking at 
descriptive statistics and correlation structures of the quantitative 
variables within subgroups of the classification variable. 
4.3.4. Comparisons within subgroups of the classification variable 
We begin by considering the means and standard deviations of the 
normal, chi-square and Poisson variables within the four subgroups of 
the classification variable. The subgroup means and standard deviations 
for both the original and masked data sets are found in Table 4.6. The 
Table 4.6. Category means and standard deviations for the normal, 
chi-square and Poisson variables 
Category 
Variable 
Xi 0 .764 0 .261 0 .369 -0 .658 
(0 ,810)  (0 .628)  (0 .725)  (0 .848)  
0 .728 0 .321 0 .398 -0 .661 
(0 .833)  (0 .776)  (0 .718)  (0 .846)  
Xo 1 .232 0 .450 0 .652 1 .148 
(1 .489)  (0 .694)  (0 .794)  (1 .483)  
X 1 .163 0 .646 0 .659 1 .168 
(1 .466)  (0 .834)  (0 .863)  (1 .569)  
X3 2 .975 1 .933 2 .358 0 .882 
(1 .193)  (0 .980)  (1 .039)  (0 .870)  
X 2 .827 2 .242 2 .340 0 .912 
(1 .212)  (1 .061)  (1 .287)  (0 .839)  
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frequency counts for each category, given in Table 4.7, provide the 
population sizes from which the descriptive statistics were computed. 
To visually aid the comparison of subgroup means and standard deviations 
for the original and masked data sets, plots of the tabled values are 
Included in Figure 4.8. 
Table 4.7. Frequency counts for categories of the original 
and masked classification variables 
Category 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
X4 81 30 53 136 
K 81 33 50 136 
From the tables and the graphs, we observe more disparity between 
corresponding variable means and standard deviations of the two data 
sets for subgroups having smaller frequency counts. For example, the 
subgroup means and standard deviations for the fourth category are very 
similar for the chl-square and Poisson variables, and nearly identical 
for the original and masked normal variables. The corresponding 
original and masked variable means and standard deviations for the 
second category differ much more than those of the fourth category. We 
also notice that the respective original and masked variable means for 
the third subgroup are nearly equal, though their respective standard 
deviations tend to differ. Finally, we observe that, over all 
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Figure 4.8. Original and masked sample (a) means and (b) standard 
deviations by classification subgroups of 
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categories, the means and standard deviations for the original and 
masked normal variables agree the most, while the means and standard 
deviations of the original and masked Poisson variable differ the 
most. All differences are small relative to the standard errors. 
Let us now investigate the correlation structure of the 
quantitative variables. Before giving the four correlation matrices 
corresponding to original data values within the subgroups of the 
classification variable, we explain why these matrices will differ. 
The chi-square variable, which is the square of the normal 
variable, is nearly uncorrelated with the normal and Poisson 
variables. Within subgroups of the classification variable, however, 
the chi-square variable is correlated with the normal and Poisson 
variables. Within the first category, the chi-square variable is 
positively correlated with the other two variables. This follows from 
the fact that records belonging to the first category have large 
positive Poisson and normal values and, hence, large chi-square 
values. Contrarily, records in the fourth category are associated with 
small values of the normal and Poisson variables. Hence, the chi-square 
variable is negatively correlated with the normal and Poisson variables 
in the category "4" subgroup of the classification variable. Though not 
interpreted easily, the correlation structures for the second and third 
categories also differ from the correlation structure of the entire data 
set. The four correlation matrices corresponding to data vectors 
belonging to the four categories of the classification variable are 
exhibited below, where ^ denotes the correlation matrix of data 
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vectors for which - j 
®XX(1) " 
(^3) " 
1.00 0.88 0.70 
0.88 1.00 0.64 
0.70 0.64 1.00 
1.00 0.74 0.70 
0.70 1.00 0.58 





















We proceed to compare the correlation structures of the original 
and masked data sets within their respective subgroups of the 
classification variable. We anticipate that the correlation matrix for 
the j-th subgroup of the original data set will differ from the 
correlation matrix for the j-th subgroup of the masked data set for the 
following reason. In masking a data set, the algorithm adds error 
vectors to the transformed data vectors. The error vectors have a 
covariance matrix which is a multiple of the covariance matrix of all 
the transformed data. That is, a transformed data vector which belongs 
to the first subgroup of the classification variable has an error vector 
added which has the same covariance as an error vector added to a 
transformed data vector belonging to the fourth subgroup. Hence, the 
correlation matrix for original data in the j-th subgroup will differ 
from the correlation matrix of the masked data belonging to the j-th 
subgroup. 
Analogous to ®xx(j) ' define to be the correlation 
* * * * 
matrix of X^ , X^ and X^ for masked observations with X^ - j . Let 
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®X3C(j) " ®XX(j) " ®H(j) 
be the difference of the original and masked correlation matrices for 
the j-th subgroup, where is a symmetric (3x3) matrix. The 
(i,k)-th element of is 
"SaikCj) • ' %Xk(j) 
^XXki(j) 
where is the sample correlation between values of and 
within the j-th category of X^ . We give the matrices of 
differences, D for j-1, 2, 3 and 4 and note that the correlation 
•^vj ) 
structures within subgroups of the classification variable are quite 
different for the original and masked data sets. 
°XX(1) 
°XX(3) 
0 0.57. -0.14 
0.57 0 0.32 
-0.14 0.32 0 
0 0.65 -0.27 
0.65 0 0.63 
•0.27 0.63 0 
®XX(2) 
®XX(4) 
0 -0.32 -0.08 
-0.32 0 -0.55 
-0.08 -0.55 0 
0 -0.45 0.18 
-0.45 0 -0.41 
0.18 -0.41 0 
In such cases, the sophisticated user can recover the correct covariance 
matrix using measurement error techniques. See Fuller (1987). We do 
not pursue that approach further. 
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In this discussion of subgroup correlation matrices, we have 
demonstrated that a user of a mlcrodata release masked by our algorithm 
cannot be guaranteed that a non-random subset of the masked data will be 
statistically representative of the same non-random subset of the 
original data. Specifically, we focused on subsets defined by 
categories of a classification variable in the data set. We also saw 
that if the frequency count of the subgroup is relatively large, the 
subgroup mean and standard deviation of the masked data set tend to be 
similar to the original subgroup mean and standard deviation. However, 
we cannot expect the same agreement from the subgroup correlation 
matrices of the original and masked data sets. In general, when a data 
set is masked by our algorithm, statistical relationships between 
variables within a non-random subset are not preserved. On the other 
hand, our example was extreme in that we constructed it to have very 
different correlation structures in different subsets. 
4.3.5. Disparity of joint distribution functions 
To conclude the summary of masking the second data set, we 
demonstrate that the masking algorithm does not necessarily preserve the 
joint distribution function of two or more of the variables in the 
original data set. In the original data set, the values of X2 are 
equal to the square of the standard normal values of . This exact 
relationship between two variables (i.e., Xg - ) will rarely occur 
in a data set. We created such a relationship for the sake of 
illustration. If an exact relationship like Xj - f(X^) does exist in 
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a data set which is to be masked, the proper procedure is to only mask 
the variable and define Xj - f(X^) before releasing the masked 
data set. 
We illustrate the differences between the Joint distribution of 
(Xj^, X2) and the joint distribution of (X^, by plotting X2 
against Xj and Xg against X^ . Figure 4.9 contains the plot of 
X2 versus X^ , which is a graph of Xg - Xj for a sample of 300 
randomly generated standard normal values. Figure 4.10 contains the 
plot of Xg against Xj^ , Visually, the distributional relationship 
between X^ and X2 has been destroyed by the mask. 
Mathematically, the joint distribution of Xj^ and X2 is given by 
^X^,X2^*1' *2^ " ^^ ^1 - *1' *2 ^  *2^ 
- P(X^ 3 X| < Xg) 
- P(X^ ^  x^, 3 X^ < Yxg ) , 
where x^ e IR and Xg ^  0 . Hence, the joint distribution of X^ 
and X2 is 
if Xj^ < -Vxg 
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Figure 4.10. X2 vs. for masked data 
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It follows that the sample joint distribution functions of (X^ , X^ ) 
 ^ 'it 
and (X^ , Xg) are 
X^^ .Xg^ l^' *2^  " \ 300 
if < -Yxg 
(300) S I(X^  3 x^ , Xg 3 Xg) o.w. 
1 300 * * 
F* «^ (x^ , Xg) - (300)'^  I(Xi < x^ , Xg < Xg) . 
We demonstrate that major differences exist between the two sample 
distribution functions. 
The first major difference lies in the evaluation of 
a a 
X^ X (*1' *2^  and F* * (x^ , x^ ) for -« < < 0 . Unless there is 
1 ' 2 1 2 A 
a value of Xj^  equal to x^  , X (*!' *1^  " ® ' whereas 
a 12 
F* * (x- , X?) may be quite different from zero. For example, if 
1 * O 1 z a a 
Xn - -1 , then Fy  ^(-1, 1) - 0 , but F* * (-1, 1) - 0.0967 . 
1 * 2 1 ' 2 
To illustrate the second major difference, consider any rectangle 
which lies inside the parabolic curve Xg - X^  . Let the points 
(x^ , xp , (x^ , x| + c) , (-x^ , x2 + c) and (-x^ , x=) define a 
rectangle inside the curve. The sample probability that a point 
(X^ , Xg) falls inside the rectangle given any sample distribution 
function, F , is 
P(x^ , c) - F(x^ , x| + c) - F(x^ , xp - F(-x^ , x| + c) + F(-x^ , x|) 
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which is equal to zero for F - F_ _ . However, the sample 
l'*2 . 
probability is not necessarily zero for F* * Suppose - 1 
*1'*2 
and c - 3 , which defines the rectangle with verticles (1, 1), (1, 4), 
(-1, 4) and (-1, 1). We know that P_ (1, 3) - 0 , but 
1 '2 
P* * (1, 3) - 0.173 . 
*1'*2 
As a final major difference, consider lower right-hand quadrants 
containing ordered pairs (X^ , X2) such that > 0 and 
Xg 3 Xg " *1 . The sample probability that a point falls in this 
quadrant given some F is 
P(Xj^ ) - F(*, xp - F(x^ , x|) , 
which is equal to zero for F = F. » , but may be non-zero for 
1' 2 
F* * . For example, if x-, - 0.75 then P^  » (0.75) - 0 , but 
P* * (0.75) - 0.0867 . 
*1' 2 
Thus, we have demonstrated through plots of variables, expressions 
of sample distribution functions, and in specific instances that the 
masking algorithm may not preserve joint distribution functions. 
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7. APPENDIX 
7.1. An Alternative Prediction Approach 
Consider again the confidentiality problem discussed in Section 







where  ^(4 x 1) is known and Xg 2 is unknown. We define 
{X , X X ) to be the microdata release where 























and X is independent of u for all j,i e {1, 2 , . . . ,m) . 
"j "i 
Assuming that the target record corresponds to the j-th record in 
the microdata release, the values of the non-confidential variables of 
the target record may differ from the same variable values in x 
"j 
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j € {1,2 m) by the error introduced to mask the released data 
record. That error is assumed to be described completely by what Paass 
(1985) calls the error distribution. Under our model, the error 
distribution is a multivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and 
covariance matrix . The intruder has knowledge of the true values 
of the first Z non-confidential variables, and of the corresponding 
marginal error distribution. Assuming xq  corresponds to , the 
marginal error distribution of u^  . - u  ^ is multivariate normal 
u, 1 nj , L 
with mean 0 and covariance matrix . The density of the masked 
vector given the known portion of the target record is 
(7.1.2) 
for j-1, 2 m . In this expression x_ . is fixed and X  ^ is 
u, 1 nj , 1 
the random vector. 
We assume that the records contained in the microdata release were 
selected from the confidential sample by simple random sampling. Hence, 
P(j) "• N m^ where p(j) is the probability that x^  was included in 
the microdata release. Let 
147 
7jo - exp{-V2(*o,l " \j,l^ '\ull^ *0,l " r^ij.l^  ^ (7.1.3) 
for j-1, 2 m . Since p(j) is equal for all j , we ignore 
p(j) in this definition and we suppress other constant multipliers from 
the multivariate density. 
Though not a probability, is a measure of the likelihood that 
record x corresponds to the target record. The larger 7.- is 
"j j 
relative to the values of 7^  ^(k j) , the greater the estimated 
probability that x is the target record. 
"j 
The intruder may then use the values of 7^ ,^ 7^ ,^ ..., 7^  ^ to 
obtain probabilities, p^ g, p^  ^ p^ g , that the target record 
corresponds to each record in the microdata release. As in Section 2.2, 
let 
m _ 
PjO - ( j^O '  ^ ® • (7.1.4) 
Thus, PjQ is the probability that the record in the microdata 
j 
release corresponds to the target record, given that the target record 
is in the released file. The probability in (7.1.4) is constructed 
treating xq ^  as fixed. The probability in Section 2.2 was 
constructed under the assumption that xq  ^ is random. 
In using the match probabilities, p^ ,^ p^  ^ p^ g , to form a 
predictor for the unknown component of the target record, we again 
follow the ideas used in Section 2.2. In the ideal prediction situation 
where p^  ^- 1 for some k e {l,2,...,m} and - 0 for all 
148 
j M k , record is the target record. Since 
X o " *  +  u _ , we predict u _ from the knowledge base of 
nk.2 n^ .2 n^ .2 n^ ,2 
S , S , X . , X „ and x_ . . The minimum mean square error 
XX uu n^ ,l n^ ,2 0,1  ^
predictor of *q 2 this case, given - xq , is 
0,2 ' \ , 2  
- \,2 - \,2 (7.1.5) 
where û _ - E{u _|(X , x_ ,)) . We see that 
nj^,z "k' \ ' 
u 
V2 ^(%,2l(\,l' \,2' *0,1)) 
/ZuulS. \ 
u^u22 
\ " / 
[ S + S + s 
xxll uull xxl2 uul2 xxll V^/ X 
x^x21 ^  ^uu21 x^x22 ^  ^uu22 x^x21 
xxll xxl2 xxll / 
•n,,l - "1^  
\ ,2 - "2 
\*0,1 " 4*1/ 
(7.1.6) 
which is equivalent to the predictor of u „ given in (2.2.12). 
"k' 
In the general data situation, where the Pjo'® nearly equal, 
the predictor of xq  ^ takes the same form as the predictor given in 
(2.2.14), namely. 
m 
0,2 : PkO=nk,2 (7.1.7) k-1 
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where x _ - X « - û „ and û „ is defined in (7.1.6). 
nfc.a n^ ,2 n^ .2 n^ ,2 
7.2. Preserving Confidentiality in the Alternative Approach 
We now investigate the problem of selecting an error covariance 
matrix to use in masking normal data for the prediction approach given 
in 7.1. As in Section 2.3.1, we fix the ratio of error variance to 
total variance at (1 + 5) ^ for all variables. We assume then that, 
under the model of (7.1.1), 
"nj.l " • 
"„j,l - u^ull> • 
where 5 > 0 and 
uull 
/ 1 1^2 1^3 
12 23 
13 2^3 
U 2^^  '^ 3i 
2i 
34 (7.2.1) 
with l^ ijl < 1 for all i < j . The data provider chooses />_ 
(i < j) to minimize p kk • From (7.1.4), 
150 
m _ 
Pfck • k^k 
t-1 
. " —1- .-1 
- ' t—1 
- Wtk:"' t—1 
tifk 
where is defined in (7.1.3). Therefore, minimizing is 
equivalent to maximizing t^ k^ kk^ tk ' Further, 
~-l~ ,~-l— ,-l 
Vtk " [T^ tk-^ kk] 
r ~-1— ,-1 
P^tk^ kk^  
so maximizing each t k is equivalent to minimizing 
t^k^ kk each t ^  k . Finally, if we take the natural log of this 
ratio and take the expectation to remove the data dependence, we see 
that minimizing p^  ^ is closely related to minimizing the expectation 
of the log-odds ratio of p^  ^ to p^  ^, 
E{<en(pj^ )^ - jn(p^ )^) , (7.2.2) 
for randomly chosen t k . 
We further simplify the problem by demonstrating that minimizing 
the expectation of the log-odds ratio of p^  ^ to p^  ^ is equivalent to 
-1 
minimizing tr{S^ ^^ )^ . 
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Theorem 7.2.1. Assume the microdata release consists of X 
m 
where each Xj satisfies (7.1.1) for J-1, 2 m . Also, for all 
j , 
*j,l ~ ' 
"j,l ~ u^ull) ' 
where S > 0 and is defined in (7.2.1). Assume the target 
record, xq , corresponds to the k-th record in the microdata release. 
Then minimizing E(4n(p^ )^ - in(pjj^ )} , where p^  ^ is defined in 
(7.1.4), is equivalent to minimizing tr{Z^ ^^ ^^ ) . 
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that /i- - 0 . 
E{in(Pki^ ) - in(pjk)) 
• =k,l) ' 
-1/2^  + V2tr(E[X.^ X^j^ l^5:;i^  ^4. 
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"l^ xxlAill' 
« "l\iu' • 0 
From Theorem 2.3.3, we know is minimized when 
S^ uii " . Therefore, as was the case in the totally random approach 
of Chapter 2, the correct match probability, p^  ^, is minimized when 
error vectors having a covariance structure equal to a multiple of the 
covariance structure of the true data vectors are added to the true data 
vectors to form the records in the microdata release. 
7.3, Differences in the Predictors 
In predicting the confidential component of the target values, we 
have derived the predictors 
A in A 
*0,2 " • V,2^  (7.3.1) 
m 
*0,2 " j^ P^jo(*hj,2 ' "hj,2^  (7.3.2) 
where 2 ' "h 2 defined in (2.2.12, 7.1.6), and pjQ , 
PjQ are defined in (2.2.9, 7.1.4), respectively. Notice that the 
difference between the two predictors lies in the way the statistical 
distances are computed in 7^  ^ and 7^  ^, which are used to define the 
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match probabilities. Specifically, the difference between the 
predictors lies in the way xq ^  is treated in each of the approaches 
to the problem. In the totally random approach of chapter two, 7. ,  is 
JK 
constructed from the conditional distribution of (X X , x- . ) 
"1 "m 
given " *0 ' (^3^  , ..., X^  , x^  x^  ^ - Xg) . In this 
J 1 ® j 
distribution, we treat *q 2^  as a random quantity. In the approach 
presented in this appendix, is constructed from the conditional 
distribution of X -, given x- ^  and given that x - x_ . In 
Tij y J. u IX nj V 
f(X^  ll*0 1 *n " *0^  defined in (7,1.2), xq  ^ is treated as a 
fixed, known quantity. 
With regard to the difference from a mathematical standpoint, in 
the totally random approach, 
7^ 0 " exp{-V2(Xo,l - Xn^ B)A'^ (xQ^  - X^ B) ' ) (7.3.3) 
where 
 ^" ^xxll ' 
• 
In the approach presented above. 
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k^O " ®*P{-V2<*o,l • *nj^ ,l^ \ull^ *0,l • ^ ,l)'^  • (7.3.4) 
Simulations demonstrate that, in attempting to match a target from a 
sample back to the same masked sample, the match probabilities in the 
totally random approach tended to be higher for Xq close to the center 
of the distribution. That is, when attempting to match 
, k € (1,2,....m) , to one of , pj^ j^  tends to be 
higher than p^  . We cannot make this claim for target records that 
are not close to the center of the distribution. 
7.4. The Masking Program 
We present the computer program based on the masking algorithm 
discussed in Chapter 3. The program is written in the Interactive 
Matrix Language (XML) of SAS (1985). The job control language to input 
and output data is appropriate for the NAS AS/9160 mainframe computer at 
Iowa State University. The source code consists of fourteen subroutines 
followed by a main driver routine. Though the entire program Is 
documented, many references are made to the description of the masking 
algorithm in Chapter 3. An understanding of SAS, especially the IML 
procedure, would also be helpful in deciphering the source code. 
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//MASK JOB 
/ /s i  EXEC SAS,TIME=(10,0)  
//LMASK DD DSN=MATRIX.IML.LIB,UNIT=DISK,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
// SPACE=(TRK,(100,25)),VOL=SER=UCC00A 
//INI DD DSN-G.16722.NCPC.DAT4,UNIT=DISK,DISP=SHR 
//OUTl DD DSN=G.16722.NCPC.MASK4,DISP=(NEW,CATLG),UNIT=DISK, 
// SPACE=(TRK,(5,2)),DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=128,BLKSIZE=6400) 
//SYSIN DD * 
A 
A Input the data: the INPUT statement must be adjusted 




INPUT XI - X4; 
A 
* 
* MASKING PROGRAM; This program will take a file of records, 
* transform and mask each by adding an independent normal 
A vector of measurement error to each vector observation 
* in the transformed data set. Afterwards, the data are 
* transformed back to their original scale. The objectives 
* of the procedure are as follows: 
is 
* (1) Mask the data in such a way that if all possible 
* distances between true and masked data vectors are 
* computed, no masked vector is closest to its true 
* data vector. 
* (2) After the data are masked, the means and the covari-
* ance structure of the masked variables are nearly 
* the same as the means an the covariance structure 
* of the original variables. 
* (3) The univariate distribution function of each masked 
* variable is nearly the same as the univariate dis-
* tribution function of the corresponding original 
* variable. 
I'C 
'< To attain these goals, we first compute the sample cumu-
lative distribution function of each variable. We then 
* compute a linearly interpolated continuous distribution. 
'> We take the points that the actual values map to on this 
function (Note: F(X) is distributed as U(0,l).) and 
transform them to standard normal values using the inverse 
of the standard normal distribution function. After the 
variables are transformed, error vectors with correla­
tion structure nearly equal to the correlation structure 














data. The program is iterative in that the correlation 
structure of the error vector is adjusted after each 
mask in an attempt to attain a certain correlation struc­
ture for the masked variables. The first iteration is 
different from other iterations in that adjustments are 
made to insure the distance requirement. After the data 
vectors are masked, the values are transformed back to 
original scale using the linearly interpolated distribu­
tion function. Additional iterations are performed which 
should result in originally scaled masked variables with 
nearly the same correlation structure and univariate 




SUBROUTINES: FINDCELL, PROPORTN, CONDTNAL, PSEUDO, ROUND, 
CDF, DISTINCT, LINTERP, ERRVEC, UNCORR, 
DISTANCE, FTILDA, PSPACE, ZTRANS. 
(See each routine for its purpose and use.) 
ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft s UBROUTI NE CODE * * ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ; 
SUBROUTINE FINDCELL: Stores and/or determines the position 
of storage of a categorical value of a variable that is 
to be masked. 
START FINDCELLCMAXCAT,CAT,J,ICELL,CLASS); 
* Given a categorical value, CAT, of the J-th classification 
* variable, store the value in the next available cell in the J-th 
ft row of class and return the column number of storage in ICELL. 
* If the value is already present, simply return its position in 
ICELL.; 
DO K=1 TO MAXCAT; 
IF CLASSCIJ,K|)=-l THEN DO; 




GO TO CFOUND; 
END; 
ELSE DO; 
Value present in CLASS - return ICELL=K; 
IF CLASSCIJ,K|)=CAT THEN DO; 
ICELL-K; 






A END FINDCELL 
SUBROUTINE PROPORTN: Compute the sample proportions for 
each of the categories of the classification variables 
that will be masked. 
START PROPORTN(N,NC,TYPE,C,CLASS,PHAT); 
* For each record and for each classification variable, determine 
* where the categorical value is stored and increment the cor-
* responding count in PHAT. After all records are investigated, 
* compute the sample proportions by dividing PHAT by N.; 
DO 1=1 TO N; 
JCAT=0; 
DO J=1 TO NC; 
NEXTVAR: 
* Determine if the variable is a classification variable. If 
* not, go on to next variable.; 
JCAT=JCAT+1; 
IF TYPE(IJCAT,2|)=0 THEN GO TO NEXTVAR; 












I SUBROUTINE CONDTNAL: Assign 0-1 values to the pseudo vari-
I ables created for the j-th variable of the i-th record. 
START CONDTNAL(I,J,ICELL,JCOL,JCAT,XP,PHAT,TYPE); 
* This routine is called if the category does NOT correspond to 
* one of the last two values stored in J-th row of CLASS. That 
* is, ICELL is equal to one of the first (NCX-1) categories, where 
* NCX is one less than the total number of categories of the J-th 
* classification variable. (See Section 3.1.1 of thesis.) 
* Hence, we assign 0-1 values to the pseudo variables of 
* categories (ICELL+I) to (NCX-1) based on conditional 
* probabilities.; 
* PHIDEN is the denominator value used to compute the conditional 
* probability PHI. NCON is the number of pseudo variables which 
* must be assigned values and UNFM is an array (NCON x 1) of 
* uniform values which will determine whether each pseudo variable 





* Cornpute the denominator for PHI for the first pseudo variable.; 




* For each pseudo variable, compute PHI where 
* PHI = Prob{ cell L | Not cells 1,2,...,L-1}. 
* NN defines the Uniform(0,l) cell to investigate: If the value 
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A in this cell of UNFM is less than PHI, assign 1 to the pseudo 
A variable, XP(l,L+JC0L). Then subtract PHAT(J,L) to determine 
* the denominator for PHI for pseudo variable L+1.; 
DO L-ICELL+1 TO NCX; 
PHI=PHAT(IJ,L|)/PHIDEN; 
NN=L-ICELL; 




,v END CONDTNAL ; 
A A 
I ! 
I SUBROUTINE PSEUDO: Create pseudo variables for each cate- | 
I gorical value of each classification variable as described | 
in Section 3.1.1 of thesis. I 
START PSEUDO(C,XP,PHAT,N,NPSEUD,NC,CLASS,TYPE); 
DO 1=1 TO N; 
* Given record I, create pseudo variables for one less than the 
* the total number of categories of each classification variable. 
'> JCOL determines the starting column for the pseudo variables 
* of class variable J in the XP (X-Pseudo) matrix. JCAT indexes 
* the TYPE array so the total number of categories for 
* classification variable J is known.; 
JCOL=0; 
JCAT=1; 
DO J=1 TO NC; 
CATNO; 
IF TYPE(|JCAT,2|)=0 THEN DO; 
JCAT=JCAT+1; 
GO TO CATNO; 
END; 
•< Determine the location of the category in the J-th row of CLASS. 
* If ICELL corresponds to the last category, then all pseudo vars 
* are zero - go to the next classification variable.; 
MAXCAT=TYPE(|JCAT,2 |) ; 
RUN FINDCELLCMAXCAT,C(|I,J|),J,ICELL, CLASS) ; 
IF ICELL=TYPE(IJCAT,2|) THEN GO TO NEXTCX; 
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* Otherwise, compute JCELL, the column in XP whose value will 
* be unity by definition. Then, every category up to (and 
* including) the penultimate category has a 0-1 pseudo variable 
* assigned it. (See SUBROUTINE CONDTNAL for details.); 
JCELL=JCOL+ICELL; 
xp(1i,jcell|)=1; 
IF ICELL < TYPE(|JCAT,2|)-1 THEN RUN CONDTNAL(I,J,ICELL, 
JCOL,JCAT,XP,PHAT,TYPE); 
* When all pseudo variables for the J-th classification variable 
* have been assigned, adjust JCOL and increment JCAT to prepare 









I  SUBROUTINE ROUND: Rounds a real number to the nearest 





IF XUNIF >=0.5 THEN IADD=1; 





* END ROUND 
it 
I  SUBROUTINE CDF: Given N scalar observations (responses to 
I variable l), find the sample Cumulative Distribu­
tion Function of the data. 
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START CDF(II,N,XI,X,R,F); 
* Rank the values of the Il-th variable in ascending order. 
* Assign probability 1/N to each value, then compute the 





* The values are ordered. Traverse through the values assigning 
* distribution function values at each distinct point. (The 
* value of the sample CDF at, say, x(i) is the number of values 
* <= x(i) divided by N.); 
DO K=2 TO N; 
IF XLAST < XI(|K,|) THEN DO; 







* Assign unity to the sample CDF at the highest value(s).; 





I  SUBROUTINE DISTINCT: Eliminate duplicate values from the 
I i-th column of X and its corresponding column in F. 
î'c ' 
START DISTINCT(N,II,M,XS,FS,XI,F); 
* Create a subsample (of the original values) consisting of only 
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* distinct values. Store the values in XS and their correspon-





DO L=2 TO N; 






* M counts the total number of distinct values plus 
* two: Define XS(l) as the smallest distinct value less 
* the difference of the two smallest distinct values. 
* Define XS(m) as the largest distinct value plus the 
* difference between the two largest distinct values. 
* Assign 0 as the value for the distribution function for XS(l). 
* XS(m) need not have a corresponding value for the distribution 
* function. (The reason for defining XS(l), XS(m) and FS(l) 
* becomes apparent in the formula for computing a continuous 





••c END DISTINCT 
SUBROUTINE LINTERP; Use linear interpolation to estimate 
a continuous cumulative distribution function. Upon 
evaluating the responses on this continuous CDF, the 
the resultant values can be treated as Uniform(0,l) 
random variables. (See Section 3.1.2 of thesis for 
mathematical details on the estimation of the 
continuous CDF.) 
The sample CDF corresponding to the I-th variable is a step 
function. A continuous function is formed from this step 
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* function if the midpoints of all the "steps" are connected. 
* FX stores the values obtained when the N observations for the 
* I-th variable are evaluated on this continuous function.; 
START LINTERP(N,II,M,XS,FS,XI,FX); 
L=1 ; 
* Compute FHAT for each of the M distinct value responses to 
* variable I. FHAT = F(x(k)) + (Slope) * (Delta x) where 
)V  slope is ( I F(x(k+1))-F(x(k)) I )/{0.5'^( |x(k+2)-x(k) I )} and 
* Delta-x is 0.5''f( |x(k+l)-x(k) | ). The equation reduces to 
it FHAT (below) in matrix code.; 
DO K=1 TO M-2; 
A Notice for K=1 how XS(l) & FS(l) enter into the formula. Also 
* for k=m-2, XS(m) is used to compute FHAT but FS(m) is not 
* necessary. (This relates back to the defining of XS and FS 
* in DISTINCT.); 
FHAT=FS(|K,I)+((FS(|K+1,|)-FS(|K,|))*(XS(|K+1,|)-XS(|K,|))/ 
(XS(|K+2,I)-XS(|K,I))); 





IF L < N THEN DO; 
IF XI(|L+1,I)=XI(|L,I) THEN GOTO LOOP; 
END; 




A END LINTERP 
A 
I 
I  SUBROUTINE ERRVEC: Generates a P x I vector of standard 
I  normal error whose components satisfy a vector length or 
I  dot product restriction. 
START ERRVEC(UT,LIM,ENDLIM,ILOW,lUPP,F,ITRY,ABSLIM,SSQLIM); 
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* UT is a Pxl vector initially set to zero. This routine will 
* assign randomly generated standard normal observations to UT 
* five cells at a time. However, the five values (forming a 5 x 1 
* vector) must have a dot product of SSQLIM or more. Also, the 
* absolute value of each individual error term must exceed ABSLIM. 
* Otherwise, a new set of five values is generated until the 
* restrictions are satisfied.; 
* LIM is the number of variables divided by five with the remain-
* der truncated. If LIM is 0, the number of variables is < 5. 
* This case is handled at the end of the routine.; 
IF LIM=0 THEN GOTO LESS5; 
do 1=1 to lim; 
* Generate sets of 5 normal observations. If they do not satisfy 
* the length requirement, repeat the process.; 
REGEN: 
uti=rannor(j(5,i,o)); 
DO K=1 TO 5; 
ABSCHK: 






IF DXI <= SSQLIM THEN GOTO REGEN; 
* LIX & UIX are the lower and upper indices in UT to which the 
* current set of five numbers correspond. Store the generated 





* If P is not a multiple of five, the last P-ENDLIM number of 
* cells need only satisfy the individual absolute value not meet 
* requirement (> ABSLIM). So, generate the four or less 
* standard normal observations and store in the last cells of UT.; 
LESS5: 





DO K=1 TO NREM; 
ABSREM: 








,v END ERRVEC 
îV — — — 
I  SUBROUTINE UNCORR: Insures nearly uncorrelated error 
I  vectors by adjusting the signs of the terms of the t-th 
I  generated error vector depending on the mean vector and 
I  covariance matrix of the previous (t-1) error vectors. 
I  (See Section 3.2.1 of thesis for details.) 
START UNCORR(UT,MUU11,U1SUM,LO,P); 
" MUUll stores the sums of squares & cross products and UlSUM 
•' stores the sum of the previously generated error vectors. Set 
* the sign of the LO-th term based on the sum of the LO-th terms 
'• of the previous vectors. Set the signs of the other terms based 
* on sign of the LO-th term and the signs of the terms in the 
* LO-th row of the sums of squares & cross products matrix.; 
IF U1SUM( I  ,L0| ) -1= 0 THEN UT( |LO, | )=-1.0* 
(U1SUM(I,L0|)/ABS(U1SUM(|,L0|)))*ABS(UT(|L0,|)); 
ISIGN=1.0; 
IF UT(|L0,|) < 0 THEN ISIGN=-1.0; 
DO 1=1 TO P; 
IF I = LO THEN GOTO NEXTUTI; 
IF MUUIK |L0,I I  ) -.= 0 & UT( |L0, I  ) --=0 THEN UT( |l, | )=-1.0* 







I  SUBROUTINE DISTANCE: Determine whether or not the L-th | 
I  masked observation satisfies the distance requirement. | 
START DISTANCECINDIC,L,N,SIGMA,Y.YSTAR,MINDXl,MINIXl,MINDX2,MINIX2, 
DLL,P,ITRY); 
* This routine is called for each observation in the sample, one 
* after another. For observation L, the statistical distance be-
* tween the masked and original observation is computed and stored 
* in DLL. To satisfy the masking requirement, when the distances 
* between the L-th original observation and all other masked 
* observations is computed, at least one distance must be exceeded 






DLL=(Y( |L, I  )-YSTAR( |L, |))*INV(SIGMA)*(Y(|L, | )-YSTAR( |L, | ))(?; 
* DKL is the statistical distance between the L-th original 
* observation vector and the K-th masked observation vector. 
* The second smallest distance is stored in MINDX (and the number 
* record corresponding to it in MINIX). This information is 
* needed if masking with random error is unsuccessful in 
* maintaining distance between original records and their 
" masked counterparts.; 
DO K=1 TO N; 
IF K=L THEN GOTO SKIP; 
* Compute the distance between the unmasked L-th record and the 
* masked K-th record. If the distance is less than DLL, then 
* the distance requirement is satisfied.; 
DKL=(Y(|L,I)-YSTAR(|K,|))*INV(SIGMA)*(Y(|L,|)-YSTAR(|K,|))C; 
IF DKL < DLL THEN INDIC=INDIC+1; 
'• If the current DKL is smaller than MINDX, reset MINDX & MINIX. ; 


















* END DISTANCE ;  
î'f — — — — — — — îV 
I I 
I SUBROUTINE FTILDA: Transform the u(0 , l )  values  ( i .e .  the |  
I probabi l i t ies  associated with the masked s tandardized j  
I  values)  for  the I - th  var iable  back to  or iginal ly  scaled |  
I X-values  by using the inverse of  the l inear ly  interpolated |  
I cont inuous dis t r ibut ion funct ion.  I 
S TART FTILDA(11,N,XS,FS,FI ,XS TAR);  
*  FI  contains  the u(0 , l )  values  that  are  to  be mapped back to  the 
*  x-values .  FS(L,)  contains  the resul tant  funct ion values  
*  obtained by evaluat ing the unique observed values  for  the I - th  
* var iable  on the sample cumulat ive cont inuous dis t r ibut ion 
* funct ion.  XS contains  the (ordered)  dis t inct  values  for  the 
"  I - th  var iable .  L indexes the dis t inct  values  in  XS.;  
L=1 ;  
DO K=1 TO N; 
ADDONE: 
"  I f  FS(L) <= FI(K) < FS(L+1),  then,  using s imple "point-s lope" 
*  ar i thmetic ,  given two points  -  (XS(L),FS(L)) & (XS(L+1),FS(L+1)) 
* -  determine the value of  x  -  namely,  XSTAR -  that  maps to  FI(K) 
* on the l ine formed by the above pair  of  points .  XSTAR i s  then 
*  the or iginal ly  scaled,  masked value. ;  
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IF FI(|K,|) >= FS(|L,|) & FI(|K,|) < FS(|L+I,|) THEN 
XSTARC |K,II| ) = o.5'Kxs( |L, I )+xs( |L+I, I ))+ 
(0 .5 'KFI(  |K,  I ) -FS(  |L,  I ) ) ' "  







*  END FTILDA ;  
A j'c 
I SUBROUTINE PSPACE; (Cal l  only for  TYPE = 1  & 2  var iables . )  |  
I Take each masked,  properly scaled value for  var iable  I  and j  
I  verify that  i t  fa l ls  in  the res t r ic ted range.  I f  not ,  |  
I adjust  the value so i t  meets  the specif ied res t r ic t ions.  j  
START PSPACECN,11,NRI,TYPE,XSTAR,XBARII,RESTRICT);  
*  For  each value,  se t  XTEM -  the value current ly  in  quest ion -  to  
*  the proper  var iable  type:  (0 ,1)  for  Bernoul l i  (TYPE=3),  
*  integer  for  discrete  (TYPE=2),  or  real  for  cont inuous (TYPE=1).  
*  Then,  check the res t r ic t ion ( i f  one exis ts)  for  the var iable  of  
*  the value. ;  
*  I I  is  the var iable  whose masked values  are  being checked for  
*  restr ic t ions,  NRI i s  the number of  the  res t r ic t ion current ly  
*  being considered,  and XBARII i s  the mean of  the  or iginal  
*  var iable  i f  i t  happens to  be a  Bernoul l i  var iable . ;  
DO K=1 TO N; 
IND=0;  
IF TYPE( | I I ,1 | )=3 THEN DO; 
XTEM=XSTAR(|K,II | ) ;  
IF XTEM < (1 .0-XBARIl)  THEN XTEM=0; 
ELSE XTEM=1.0;  
END; 
IF TYPE(111,11)=2 THEN RUN R0UND(XSTAR(|K,II | ) ,XTEM);  
IF TYPE(111,11)  = 1  THEN XTEM=XSTAR(|K,II | ) ;  
CHECK: 
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* IND indicates  whether  the current  value meets  the res t r ic t ion.  
*  Different  inequal i t ies  must  be checked depending on the type 
*  of  res t r ic t ion (RESTRICTC.,2)) .  I f  the value is  okay,  se t  IND 
*  to  one.  Then go to  the adjustment  par t  of  the  rout ine (INCR). ;  
IF RESTRICTC|NRI,2 | ) - l  THEN DO; 
IF XTEM >= RESTRICTC|NRI,3 | )  & XTEM <= RESTRICTC|NRI,4 | )  
THEN IND=1; 
GO TO INCR; 
END; 
IF RESTRICTCINRI,21)=2 THEN DO; 
IF XTEM >= RESTRICTCINRI,3I)  THEN IND=1;  
GOTO INCR; 
END; 
IF RESTRICTCINRI,21)=3 THEN DO; 




*  If  IND i s  uni ty ,  se t  XSTAR and consider  the next  value. ;  
IF IND=1 THEN GOTO NEXTOB; 
*  The current  value does not  fa l l  in  the res t r ic ted range.  Set  
*  XTEM to  the c losest  endpoint  of  the  res t r ic t ion interval . ;  
IF RESTRICTCINRI,2 I)=1 THEN DO; 
IF XTEM < RESTRICTCINRI,3I) THEN 
XTEM=RESTRICTCINRI,3 I ) ;  
IF XTEM > RESTRICTCINRI,4I)  THEN 
XTEM=RESTRICTCINRI,4 I ) ;  
END; 
IF RESTRICTCINRI,2 I )=2 THEN 
XTEM=RESTRICTCINRI,3 I ) ;  
IF RESTRICTCINRI,21)=3 THEN 
XTEM=RESTRICTCINRI,4 I ) ;  
*  Final ly ,  se t  XSTARCK,I)  -  the released,  masked k- th  value for  






A END PSPACE 
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* ______ ____ Ye 
! I 
I  SUBROUTINE ZTRANS: Converts  the  set  of  pseudo var iables  |  
I created to  mask the I l - th  var iable  (or  the INC-th c lass i -  |  
I f icat ion var iable)  back to  a  categorical  value in  the |  
I variable 's  or iginal  range ( for  a l l  N responses) .  |  
START ZTRANS(N,II ,JCOL,INC,TYPEl,CLASS,XSTAR.CSTAR);  
DO 1=1 TO N; 
*  For  the I - th  record,  take the values  of  the pseudo var iables  to  
*  determine the masked value of  the response to  I l - th  var iable .  
*  JCOL+1 i s  the f i rs t  pseudo var iable  in  the set  created for  the 
*  INC-th c lass i f icat ion var iable . ;  
DO K=JCOL+1 TO JCOL+TYPEKIII ,2 | ) - l ;  
'•< Determine the f i rs t  pseudo var iable  in  the set  that  has  a  value 
*  of  one.  Subtract ing JCOL from the number of  th is  var iable  gives  
*  the column in  CLASS ( the row is  INC) whose cel l  contains  the 
*  categorical  value that  wil l  be the masked value for  the or iginal  
'•  response value.  (See Sect ion 3 .4  of  thesis . ) ;  
IF XSTAR(II ,K|)=1 THEN DO; 




*  If  none of  the  pseudo var iables  has  the value uni ty ,  then the 
*  las t  categorical  value of  the c lass i f icat ion var iable  (which 
'> has  no corresponding pseudo var iable)  wil l  be the masked value 
*  for  the or iginal  response value. ;  




END ZTRANS ;  
it is it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it % f j  ROUT I  NE "  *  *  '' ''' ''' * •' * '•  *  it it it it it it it it it it it it is ; 
START; 
*  Read var iables  into the matr ix  X.  ;  
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USE SETl;  
READ ALL VAR {Xl X2 X3 X4} INTO X; 
*  Set  the current  l ibrary so large matr ices  can be s tored 




* KEY VARIABLES 
A 
* N —> Number of  observat ions 
A p  —> Number of  var iables  per  observat ion 
*  ICORR —> The counter  of  masking i terat ions to  equate  
*  the cross  correlat ions.  
•>'< NCORR —> The counter  of  masking i terat ions to  equate  
*  the correlat ion matr ices  of  the  or iginal  and masked 
A data  sets .  
*  LIMICORR —> Maximum number of  i terat ions permit ted in  
"  a t ta ining the desired cross  correlat ions.  
•>'< LIMNCORR —> Maximum number of  i terat ions permit ted in  
*  at tempting to  equate  correlat ion matr ices .  
A TYPE —> Specif ies  ( l )  the var iable  type — cont inuous,  
*  discrete ,  c lass i f icat ion,  and (2)  the number of  
*  categories  for  c lass i f icat ion var iables .  (See below) 
A RESTRICT —> Specif ied by user ,  contains  any res t r ic t ions 
* that  must  be met  by cont inuous or  discrete  var iables  
*  that  are  being masked.  (See below) 
*  NR —> The total  number of  res t r ic t ions specif ied by the 
A user  in  RESTRICT. 
*  NBER —> The number of  Bernoul l i  var iables  being masked.  
A 
* X —> Matr ix  in  which observat ion vectors  are  ini t ia l ly  
* s tored.  
*  Z —> Matr ix  of  t ransformed observat ion vectors  (NXP). 
* (See documented code below for  descr ipt ion of  
*  t ransformation.)  
*  XALL —> Matr ix  of  or iginal  data  and masked data  used in  
'•  ca lculat ion of  correlat ion matr ices  before  each 
'< i terat ion to  equate  correlat ions.  XALL i s  the 
* concatenat ion of  the or iginal  data  matr ix  an the 
* masked data  matr ix .  
*  XSTAR —> Matr ix  of  masked or iginal  observat ion vectors .  
*  ZSTAR —> Matr ix  of  masked t ransformed observat ion vectors .  
A F —> The j - th  column contains  the sample cumulat ive dis-
t r ibut ion funct ion of  the  j - th  var iable  in  the data  
*  set .  So,  F( i , j )=F(z)  where z=X(i , j ) .  
A R —> The j - th  column s tores  the ranking or  order ing of  
a l l  values  in  the j - th  column of  X.  So,  i f  R(i , j )  = l  
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* then X(i , j )  i s  the smallest  value in  column j .  R i s  
*  used to  order  and re-order  the or iginal  observat ions 
*  F can be computed.  Hence,  a l lowing Z,  ZSTAR, and 
*  XSATR, to  be determined.  
*  NOTE: The fol lowing var iables  are  re levant  only i f  
*  c lassi f icat ion var iables  (c-vars)  are  present  in  
*  the input  data .  
A 
* XO —> Stores  data  column vectors  corresponding to  con-
* t inuous or  discrete  var iables .  
*  C —> Stores  data  column vectors  corresponding to  c lass i -
*  f icat ion var iables .  
*  XP —> Matr ix  of  column vectors  represent ing pseudo var i -
*  ables  created to  mask c lass i f icat ion var iables .  
*  Later  combined with XO to  form a  new X matr ix .  
*  POSIT —> Array which s tores  the or iginal  order ing of  the 
*  columns (or  var iables)  as  opposed to  their  order ing 
*  the new X matr ix .  POSIT i s  used to  then re-order  
*  the masked var iables  before  they are  output .  
*  NC —> Total  number of  c lass i f icat ion var iables .  
*  NPSEUD —> Total  number of  pseudo var iables  created to  
*  mask the c lass i f icat ion var iables .  
*  PO —> Stores  the or iginal  number of  var iables  to  be 
*  masked,  while  P i s  reset  to  the number of  d iscrete  
*  and cont inuous var iables  plus  the number of  pseudo 
*  var iables .  
*  CLASS —> Two dimensional  array,  row j  s tores  the categor-
*  ical  values  of  the j - th  c lass i f icat ion var iable  as  
*  the categories  are  encountered in  t ravers ing through 
*  the records,  (e .g .  I f  values  3 ,  1 ,  and 2 are  values  
of  1s t  3  records for  var iable  j ,  then CLASS(j , l )=3,  
CLASS(j ,2)=l ,  and CLASS(j ,3)-2.)  
*  PHAT —> Two dimensional  array (same as  CLASS),  row j  
*  s tores  the sample proport ions of  the categories  of  
*  the j - th  c lassi f icat ion var iable .  The cel ls  in  PHAT 
*  correspond direct ly  to  the cel ls  in  CLASS,  which 
*  contain the categorical  values .  
A TYPEl —> Same s t ructure  and purpose as  TYPE appl ied to  
*  the new X matr ix  ( i .e .  the one with pseudo var iables  
*  in  place of  c lass-var iables . )  
A 
* NOTE: Other  KEY VARIABLES are  documented within the 
*  subrout ines .  
A 
A 









*  Define TYPE for  each var iable  (1 , . . . ,?)  as  fol lows:  
*  TYPE(j , l )  = 1  —> Mask as  a  cont inuous var iable  
*  = 2 —> Mask as  a  discrete  var iable  (e .g .  Number 
*  of  chi ldren in  a  family can be 0 ,1 , 2 , . . .  
* The numbers  represent  quant i t ies . )  
*  = 3  —> Mask as  a  c lass i f icat ion var iable  (The 
*  numbers  represent  categories . )  
*  TYPE(j ,2)  = 0  > Set  to  zero i f  TYPE(j , l )  i s  1  or  2 
*  = K —> K>1 i s  the number of  categories  which the 
A c lass i f icat ion var iable  can take on. ;  
T Y P E -  { 1 0 , 1 0 , 2 0 , 3 4 } ;  
A Enter  res t r ic t ions on any var iables  coded as  "1" or  "2" in  
*  column one of  the TYPE array.  
*  NR —> The total  number of  res t r ic t ions 
*  RESTRICT —> NR X 4  matr ix  with columns def ined as  fol lows:  
•>'< 1 ;  Variable  number to  which the res t r ic t ion appl ies  
A 2 :  Restr ic t ion Code:  
*  1  —> "Fini te"  interval  [a ,b]  
A 2  —> Right  " inf ini te"  interval  [a ,  inf ini ty)  
A 3  —> Left  " inf ini te"  interval  ( - inf ini ty ,  b]  
*  3:  Left  endpoint  of  the  interval  (see above)  
*  4:  Right  endpoint  of  the  interval  (see above)  
* 
A NOTE; For  TYPE 1  var iables ,  only one interval  res t r ic t ion is  
A permit ted.  For  TYPE 2 var iables ,  one and only interval  
A i s  required.  I f  the interval  i s  inf ini te ,  enter  "99999" 
A for  inf ini ty .  All  intervals  are  assumed to  be c losed.  
A To specify the open interval  (a , inf ini ty) ,  enter  
A "a  + l .OE-8" as  the lef t  endpoint .  
A 
A Example:  Variable  whose values  are  nonnegat ive (see below). ;  




Set  ALPHA, the  f ract ion of  error  to  be added to  the t ransformed 
normal  values  in  the mask.  (See Sect ion 3 .2 .2  of  thesis . )  
ALPHA=0.3;  
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* NOTE: Al l  pseudo var iables  created to  mask c lass i f icat ion 
*  var iables  are  0-1 var iables .  Hence,  no res t r ic t ions 
* are  entered for  type "3" var iables . ;  
*  Program Ini t ia l izat ions — DO NOT ALTER!!;  
A 
* II .  Transforming Categorical  Variables  to  
*  Sets  of  0-1 Pseudo Variables  
* 
* In the case of  no c lass-var iables ,  se t  XALL to  X and 
*  bypass  code def ining POSIT,  TYPHI,  CLASS and PHAT.;  
IF NC = 0  THEN GOTO NOMULT; 
*  Ini t ia l ize  POSIT & TYPEl,  and set  NPSEUD. ICOLC 
*  and ICOLX serve as  column indices  for  def ining C 
*  and XO. JTYPEC indexes the current  row of  TYPEl 
*  and JTYPEX indexes the current  row of  XO.;  
XO=J(N,P-NC,0);  
C=J(N,NC,0);  
POSIT=J(P,1,0) ;  
NPSEUD=TYPE(I  + ,2  I)~NC; 
TYPE1=J(P-NC+NPSEUD,2,0) ;  
RSTRICT1=J(NR+NPSEUD,4,0) ;  





*  For  each var iable ,  s tore  the column responses  in  C or  
*  XO, and def ine the current  row of  TYPEl and POSIT.;  
DO 1=1 TO P;  
*  For  c lass-var iables ,  take the column of  responses  and s tore  in  
*  C and s tore  the posi t ion of  that  var iable  in  the or iginal  X 
*  matr ix .  Also,  se t  the JTYPE row of  TYPEl as  corresponding to  
*  a  c lass  var iable  with two categories  (0  and 1) . ;  
IF TYPE( | l , l I )=3 THEN DO; 
C(I , ICOLC|)=X(I , l | ) ;  
POSITCIICOLC+P-NC,I)=I;  
IC0LC=IC0LC+1;  
DO J=1 TO TYPE( | l ,2 | ) - l ;  
TYPE1( |JTYPEC,1|)=3;  
TYPEK I JTYPEC,2|  )=2;  
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RSTRICTl(INR+1,1 | )=JTYPEC; 





*  For  d iscrete  or  cont inuous var iables ,  s tore  the column of  
*  responses  in  XO, the  posi t ion of  the var iable  in  POSIT and 
*  set  TYPEl for  the current  column.;  
ELSE DO; 
XO(| , ICOLX|)=X( | , l | ) ;  
POSITCllCOLX,I)=I;  
IC0LX=IC0LX+1;  




Ini t ia l ize  PHAT and CLASS as  2-dim arrays,  NC x  MAXCAT (MAXCAT 
*  is  the max number of  categories  of  any c lass-var . ) .  The cel ls  
*  of  CLASS are  ini t ia l ized a t  "-1" s ince "0" may be a  category 
*  for  some var iable . ;  
MAXCAT=MAX(TYPE(I ,2  I ) ) ;  
PHAT=J(NC,MAXCAT,0);  
CLASS=J(NC,MAXCAT,-1);  
"  Compute sample proport ions;  
RUN PROPORTNCN,NC,TYPE,C,CLASS,PHAT);  
*  Ini t ia l ize  XP,  the  array of  pseudo values ,  and cal l  PSEUDO 
*  to  def ine the pseudo var iables  of  the c lass-var iables . ;  
XP=J(N,NPSEUD,0);  
RUN PSEUD0(C,XP,PHAT,N,NPSEUD,NC,CLASS,TYPE);  
FREE C;  
Since la ter  code always recognizes  TYPE as  s tor ing types of  
*  var iables ,  switch the locat ions of  s torage.  Also,  for  the 















*  The values  which are  to  be masked can now be s tored in  X.;  
X=XO| |XP;  
FREE XO XP;  
XOLD=X; 
STORE XOLD; 
*  I f  there  are  no c lass i f icat ion var iables ,  the program 
* skips  to  the "NOMULT" label  and computat ions cont inue. ;  
NOMULT: 
it 
* 111. Transforming Data  to  Standard Normali ty  
*  Ini t ia l ize  F,  R and Z. ;  
STORE X;  
I I I .  A.  Transformation of  Cont inuous Variables  
F=J(N,P,0); 
R=J(N,P,0); 







* Transform the data  values  to  s tandard normal  values  -  f i rs t ,  
*  the quant i ta t ive var iables . ;  
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DO 11=1 TO P;  
LOAD X;  
*  If  the current  var iable  is  of  the Bernoul l i  or  pseudo type,  
*  i t  wil l  be t ransformed af ter  the quant i ta t ive var iables . ;  
IF TYPE( | l l , l I ) -3  THEN GOTO NEXTCDF; 
*  For  each var iable  ( l l ) ,  cal l  CDF to  compute the sample d is t r i -
*  but ion funct ion and s tore  in  F.  Then,  cal l  the subrout ines  
*  DISTINCT and LINTERP. These rout ines  wil l  essent ia l ly  evaluate  
*  the values  of  var iable  I I  on the l inear ly  interpolated cont inu-
* ous dis t r ibut ion funct ion.  The resul t ing values  (which fa l l  
*  between 0  and 1 ,  NOT inclusive)  are  s tored in  FX. They are  
*  f inal ly  t ransformed to  normal  values  by using the inverse of  
*  the s tandard normal  d is t r ibut ion funct ion (PROBIT). ;  
LOAD R F;  
RUN CDF(II ,N,XI,X,R,F);  
STORE X R;  
RUN DISTINCT(N,II,M,XS,FS,XI,F); 
STORE F;  
RUN LINTERP(N,II,M,XS,FS,XI,FX); 
LOAD R Z;  
z ( I,II|)=PROBIT(FX(|R(I,111), I  )); 
STORE R Z; 
NEXTCDF; 
END; 
IF NBER=0 THEN GOTO GENERR; 
LOAD X Z; 
I I I .  B.  Transformation of  0-1 Variables  
Transform a l l  0-1 var iables  into s tandard normal  values .  
This  t ransformation wil l  re ta in  the correlat ion s t ructure  
of  the or iginal  var iables . ;  
Firs t ,  compute the sample covariance matr ix  of  the or iginal  
data .  Then,  par t i t ion this  matr ix  into submatr ices  based on 





RH0X=IVX12AMXX^IVXl2 ;  
PRINT XBAR ,  MXX ,  RHOX; 
MXX11=MXX( 1:P-NBER,1:P-NBER|) ;  
MXX12=MXX( 1:P-NBER,P-NBER+1:P|) ;  
MXX21-MXX( P-NBER+1:P,1:P-NBER|) ;  
MXX22=MXX( P-NBER+1:P,P-NBER+1:P|) ;  
*  Regress  the O-l  var iables  on the quant i ta t ive var iables  (BDC) 
*  and compute the condi t ional  var iance of  the 0-1 var iables  given 
*  the quant i ta t ive var iables  (MDDCC). ;  
BDC=MXX21AINVCMXXI1) ;  
MDDCC-MXX22-MXX21AINVCMXXI1)*MXX12 ;  
*  Generate  N independent  (NBER X 1)  vectors  of  s tandard normal  
*  values  with ident i ty  covariance matr ix . ;  
EDC1=RANNOR(J(N,NBER,0)); 




*  Compute FDCl which has  an approximate normal  d is t r ibut ion with 
*  mean zero and var iance MXX22 (same as  or iginal  covariance 
*  between the 0-1 var iables) .  Standardize FDC and determine the 
*  associated s tandard normal  probabi l i t ies  (s tore  in  GDC). ;  
MDDCC12=R00T(MDDCC);  
LCC12=DIAG(SQRT(VECDIAG(MXX11))) ;  
FDC1=Z(I ,1:P-NBER|)ALCC12*BDCC+EDC*MDDCC12;  
FDBAR=FDC1( |+,1) /N;  
MFF=(FDC1C AFDC1-N*FDBARC*FDBAR)/(N-1);  
FDC=FDC1' ' ' INV(DIAG(SQRT(VECDIAG(MFF) ) ) ) ;  
GDC=PROBNORM(FDC); 
* Now, t ransform the 0-1 values  to  cont inuous values  on the 
*  interval  (0 ,1)  in  the fol lowing way (Note that  the values  
*  of  GDC are  dis t r ibuted uniform (0,1)) :  
*  (1)  I f  the or iginal  value is  a  zero,  map the correspon-
* ding U(0,1)  value in  GDC into the interval  (0 ,1-P0) ,  
*  where PC i s  the mean of  the Bernoul l i  var iable .  
*  (2)  I f  the or iginal  value is  a  one,  map the corresponding 
*  GDC value into the interval  ( l -PO,l) .  
*  These values  are  s tored in  the matr ix  XX.; 
XX=J(N,NBER,O); 
DO L=1 TO NBER; 
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PO=XBAR(| ,L+P-NBER|) ;  
DO 1=1 TO N;  




A Rank the new values  s tored in  XX, then s tandardize the ranks 
*  so they fa l l  between zero and one.  Final ly ,  t reat ing these 
*  standardized ranks as  probabi l i t ies ,  use the PROBIT funct ion 
*  to  determine the s tandard normal  value associated with each 
*  rank.  These are  the s tandard normal  (z) values  for  the 
*  Bernoul l i  var iables  and are  s tored with the other  t ransformed 
*  values  in  Z. ;  
RBER=J(N,NBER,0);  
DO 1=1 TO NBER; 
RBER(1,11)=RANK(XX(| ,11)) ;  
END; 
UBER=(RBER-J(N,NBER,0.5)) 'K1/N);  
ZBER=PR0BIT(UBER);  
Z(I ,P-NBER+1:P|)=ZBER; 
FREE GDC XX ZBER; 
GENERR: 
IV.  Masking the Transformed Data  
*  Compute the  mean vector  (ZBAR) and the sample covariance matr ix  
*  (MZZ) of  Z,  the matr ix  of  t ransformed vector  observat ions. ;  
FREE FX; 
ZBAR=Z(|+,I) /N;  
MZZ=( ZCAZ -  N*ZBAR**ZBAR ) / (  N-1 ) ;  
IVZ12=INV(DIAG(SQRT(VECDIAG(MZZ)))) ;  
RHOZ=IVZ12*MZZAIVZ12 ;  
PRINT ZBAR ,  MZZ ,  RHOZ; 
FREE MZZ; 
IV.  A.  Generat ing the Error  Vectors  
*  Generate  N error  vectors  to  be added to  the matr ix  of  Z-values .  
*  The error  vectors  wil l  be t ransformed to  have a  correlat ion 
*  s t ructure  closely resembling the correlat ion s t ructure  of  the  
*  Z 's .  In  order  to  give the errors  the desired correlat ion,  we 
*  ini t ia l ly  need the error  vectors  to  have a  near  ident i ty  co-
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* variance matr ix .  I f  we s imply randomly generate  s tandard normal  
*  error  vectors ,  we get  some correlat ion between the elements  of  
*  the vector .  To prevent  th is ,  we generate  half  the error  vectors  
*  randomly and then use an algori thm when generat ing the other  
*  half  that  near ly  guarantees  no correlat ion between elements  of  
*  each error  vector . ;  
*  Ini t ia l ize  the error  matr ix  (u) and observat ion counter  (lOBS).; 
U=J(N,P,0) ;  
IOBS=0;  
*  When generated,  each error  vector  must  meet  two res t r ic t ions:  
*  ( l )  Each element  of  the vector  must  be absolutely greater  
*  than a  specif ied bound,  which may change depending on the 
*  number of  a t tempts  made a t  generat ing an error  vector . ;  
*  (2)  The sum of  squares  of  each segment  of  f ive elements  in  the 
*  error  vector  must  a lso exceed a  specif ied bound.  
•it 
* The fol lowing var iables  must  be created so these condi t ions can 
*  be checked :  
A 
* LIM —> The number of  segments  of  length f ive in  each vector  
*  ENDLIM —> The las t  vector  element  belonging to  a  segment  
*  ILOW, lUPP —> Define the las t  group of  res idual  e lements  
*  of  each vector  not  belonging to  a  segment  of  f ive 
*  NHALF —> The cutoff  point  a t  which generated error  vectors  go 




IUPP=ENDLIM+M0D(P,5)  ;  
NHALF=INT((N-l) /2)+l ;  
*  Generate  NHALF-1 error  vectors  by cal l ing ERRVEC. There i s  no 
*  requirement  on the absolute  magnitude of  the  errors ,  but  the sum 
*  of  squares  of  each group of  f ive elements  must  exceed one. ;  
RANERR; 
UT=J(P,1,0) ;  
I0BS=I0BS+1;  
RUN ERRVECCUT,LIM,ENDLIM,ILOW,lUPP,P,0,0,1.0) ;  
U(I lOBS,I)=UTC; 
IF lOBS < NHALF THEN GOTO RANERR; 
*  The remaining error  vectors  wil l  be adjusted in  the UNCORR 
*  rout ine so the sample covariance matr ix  of  the  error  vectors  
*  is  near ly  equal  to  the ident i ty . ;  
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* Ini t ia l ize  LO a t  one.  LO i s  a  value which runs between 1  and 
*  P.  For  each new error  vector  the LO-th e lement  of  the vector  
*  is  adjusted to  give a  zero mean for  a l l  vectors  and zero 
*  correlat ions between elements  of  each error  vector . ;  
LO-1 ;  
*  Compute UlSUM and MUUll ,  the  cumulat ive sum and matr ix  of  sums 
*  of  squares  and cross  products  of  a l l  error  vectors  thus far  
*  generated.  These are  passed to  the UNCORR rout ine for  s ign 
*  and magnitude adjustment  a long with UT, the  generated error  
*  vector  for  the lOBS-th Z vector .  After  UT i s  adjusted,  i t  
*  is  s tored in  U,  LO i s  incremented,  and the procedure cont inues. ;  
NEXTVEC: 
MUU11=UC*U/(N-1);  
U1SUM=U(|+,I) /N;  
UT=J(P,1,0) ;  
I0BS=I0BS+1;  
RUN ERRVECCUT,LIM,ENDLIM,ILOW,lUPP,P,0,0,1.0) ;  
RUN UNCORR(UT,MUUll ,UlSUM,LO,P);  
U(l lOBS,I)=UT$;  
L0=L0+1;  
IF LO > P THEN L0=1;  
IF lOBS < N THEN GOTO NEXTVEC; 
UBAR=U(|+,I) /N;  
MUU=(UC *U-N*UBARC^UBAR)/(N-1);  
* ic 
* V. Masking the Data  Suff ic ient ly  *  
* We compute the  Cholesky decomposi t ion of  the  correlat ion of  
*  the Z 's .  Using this ,  we add an error  vector  to  each Z that  
*  is  approximately normally dis t r ibuted with mean zero and 
*  var iance matr ix  equal  to  the correlat ion matr ix  of  the Z 's . ;  
TZZ=ROOT(RHOZ);  
ZSTAR=Z+SQRT(ALPHA)*U*TZZ; 
On th is  (and only this)  ini t ia l  mask,  a  dis tance check is  made 
*  to  insure that  each masked vector  i s  NOT one of  the two 
*  s ta t is t ical ly  closest  vectors  to  i ts  or iginal  counterpar t . ;  
CLIM is  approximately one s tandard deviat ion less  than the 
mean of  a  Chi-square random var iable  with P degrees  of  f reedom. 
I t  is  used as  a  cutoff  point  in  determining i f  a  new error  
vector  should be generated for  a  Z-value or  i f  the current  
error  vector  need only be adjusted. ;  
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CLIM=P-SQRT(2*P)+0.6 ;  
L0=0;  
DO L=1 TO N;  
*  For  each masked observat ion:  
*  (1)  I f  the observat ion has  a  corresponding error  vector  
*  which was adjusted in  UNCORK, compute the cumulat ive 
*  sura and matr ix  of  cross  products  for  those vectors  
*  generated before  i t .  
*  (2)  Compute the  dis tances  between the masked observat ion 
*  vector  and a l l  or iginal  observat ion vectors  by cal l ing 
*  DISTANCE. The var iable  INDIC wil l  indicate  whether  
*  the or iginal  vector  corresponding to  the masked vector  
*  is  one of  the two c losest  vectors  to  i t . ;  
* (3)  I f  the above i s  in  fact  t rue,  one of  two avenues i s  
*  taken to  correct  the problem: 
*  a .  I f  the dis tance between or iginal  and masked i s  
*  less  than CLIM, generate  a  new error  vector  (cal l  
"  ERRVEC) wi th  elements  of  higher  magnitude.  
"  b .  I f  the dis tance between or iginal  and masked i s  
"  greater  than CLIM, the  magnitude of  the or iginal  
'< e r ror  vector  i s  increased to  insure that  the 
*  dis tance between the masked and or iginal  i s  not  
"  one of  the smallest  two dis tances;  
ITRY=1;  
IF L > NHALF THEN DO; 
L0=L0+1 ;  
IF LO > P THEN L0=1;  
U1=U(|1:L-1,  I ) ;  
MUU11=U1**U1/(N-1);  
U1SUM=U1( |+,I) ;  
END; 
RETRY: 
I f  ITRY > 1 ,  a  new error  vector  has  been generated and the 








The dis tance requirement  has  not  been sat isf ied -  ei ther  
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generate  a  new error  vector  or  adjust  the magnitude of  
the  current  error  vector . ;  
IF INDIC < 1  THEN DO; 
ITRY=ITRY+1; 
IF DXL < CLIM THEN DO; 
Depending on the at tempt  (ITRY),  increase the bounds for  ( l )  
absolute  magnitude of  each error  vector  element  and (2)  sum 
of  squares  of  each group of  f ive elements . ;  
IF ITRY = 2 THEN RUN ERRVECCUT,LIM.ENDLIM,ILOW,lUPP,  
P , ITRY,0.0,1.0) ;  
IF ITRY = 3  I  ITRY = 4  THEN RUN ERRVEC(UT,LIM,ENDLIM, 
ILOW,IUPP,P,ITRY,0.178,2.67);  
IF ITRY = 5  I ITRY = 6  THEN RUN ERRVEC(UT,LIM,ENDLIM, 
ILOW,lUPP,P,ITRY,0.356,3.18);  
I f  the current  observat ion is  in  the second half  of  the data ,  
cal l  UNCORR to  adjust  s igns and magnitudes to  insure 
uncorrelated error  vector  e lements . ;  
IF L > NHALF THEN RUN UNC0RR(UT,MUU11,U1SUM,L0,P);  
U( |L,I)=UTC; 
ZSTARC |L,  I  )=z(  |L,  I  )+SQRT(ALPHA)' ' -U( |L ,  |  )*TZZ; 
IF ITRY=7 THEN GOTO NEXTL; 
GOTO RETRY; 
END; 
Adjust  the  error  vector  so that  the dis tance between masked and 
or iginal  i s  not  the smallest  dis tance.  Generate  a  U(ULOW,UUPP) 
number (SRAN )  and mult iply the error  vector  by 
AMULT=sqrt(SRAN/DXL). 
This  makes DXL equal  to  (AMULT**2)*DXL, which i s  greater  than 
MINDXl,  the  smallest  dis tance.  Hence,  the  dis tance requirement  
i s  now sat isf ied. ;  
ULOW=(2 AMINDXl+MINDX)/3 ; 
UUPP=1.232' ' 'MINDX; 
SRAN=( RANUNI (  J  (  1 ,1 ,0  )  )  )  '• '  (  UUP P -ULOW )  +ULOW ;  
AMULT=SQRT(SRAN/DXL);  






*  Make the.  error  vectors  have mean zero.  In  addi t ion,  compute 
*  TAU, which es t imates  the mult iple  of  RHOZ ass igned to  be the 
*  var iance matr ix  of  each error  vector . ;  
UBAR=U(|+,I) /N;  




FREE U MUU; 
*  Define U to  have the desired covariance s t ructure ,  recompute 
*  ZSTAR and set  UNEW to  U.;  
U=SQRT (  ALPHA ) ' ' fUNEWATZZ ;  
ZSTAR=(Z+U);  
UNEW=U; 
FREE U;  
* — — — Vf 
* VI.  I terat ing to  Obtain the Desired Correlat ions *  
ADDZ: 
*  This  marks the s tar t  of  the  i terat ion loop.  We have a  matr ix  
*  s tor ing the masked t ransformed data .  Begin the process  of  
*  t ransforming the data  back to  the or iginal  scale  . ;  
A 
* VI.  A.  Transforming the Data  Back to  Original  Scale  
Ini t ia l ize  XSTAR; 
XSTAR=J(N,P,0) ;  
STORE XSTAR; 
*  Compute and output  the sample covariance of  the error  vectors .  
*  The var iances  of  the  elements  of  the UNEW vectors  wil l  be 
*  used below in  a  s tandardizat ion. ;  
UBAR=UNEW(|+,I) /N;  
MUU=(UNEWC *UNEW-NAUBARC*UBAR)/(N-1);  
*  Begin the retransformation procedure: ;  
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* For each var iable ,  determine the rank of  each masked 
*  observat ion and s tore  the ranks in  RZSTAR.;  
RZSTAR=J(N,P,0) ;  
DO K=1 TO P;  
RZSTARCI,Ki)=RANK(ZSTAR(| ,K|)) ;  
END; 
*  Ini t ia l ize  DSTAR to  s tore  s tandardized ranks.  Standardize 
*  each element  of  each error  vector  and s tandardize the ranks 
*  using the DSTAR equat ion below.;  
DSTAR-J(N,P,0) ;  
UTILDA=UNEW'VINV(DIAG(SQRT(VECDIAG(MUU) ) ) ) ;  
DSTAR=(1/N)*((RZSTAR-J(N,P,0.97)  )+0.94 '" 'PR0BN0RM(UTILDA) )  ;  
*  For  each var iable ,  t ransform i ts  data  values  back to  the 
*  or iginal  scale  in  an unrestr ic ted form ( i .e .  the values  
*  may not  fa l l  in  the parameter  space.) .  Ini t ia l ize  M in  
*  preparat ion for  the cal l  to  DISTINCT.;  
M=0;  
DO 11=1 TO P;  
*  Omit  the  0-1 var iables .  They wil l  be 
*  t ransformed back la ter  as  a  group. ;  
IF TYPE( | I I ,11)=3 THEN GOTO SKIPBE; 
*  For  var iable  I I ,  set  FI  to  the I l - th  column of  DSTAR. Proceed 
*  to  sor t  the values  of  FI  in  increasing order . ;  
FI=DSTAR(1,111);  
FX=FI; 
R2=RANK(FI) ;  
FI( |R2, | )=FX; 
LOAD X R;  
XI=J(N,1,0) ;  
*  Store  the or iginal  x-values  of  var iable  in  XI then 
*  arrange them in  increasing order . ;  
XII=X(I,III); 
XI(|R(|,II|),1)=X(1,II|); 
STORE R X;  
LOAD F;  
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XS=J(N+2,1,0) ;  
FS-J(N+2,1,0) ;  
*  Find the dis t inct  values  of  XI and s tore  them in  XS.  
*  Store  the corresponding values  of  FI  in  FS. ;  
RUN DISTINCT(N,II ,M,XS,FS,XI,F);  
STORE F; 
LOAD XSTAR; 
*  Form the l inear  interpolated cont inuous dis t r ibut ion funct ion 
*  (LICDF)for  the  x values  of  var iable  I I .  Using the values  
*  s tored in  FI  (a l l  on the uni t  in terval) ,  determine the x values  
*  which would be mapped by the LICDF to  the values  in  FI .  These x  
*  values  const i tute  the unrestr ic ted values  for  XSTAR.;  
RUN FTILDACII,N,XS,FS,FI ,XSTAR);  
XI=XSTAR(|,111); 




* NOTE; An a l ternat ive to  using a  funct ion of  the ranks for  FI  
*  is  to  apply the s tandard normal  d is t r ibut ion funct ion 
*  to  the values  in  ZSTAR. This  gives  a  set  of  probabi l i -
*  t ies  which can be used as  the values  in  FI .  The advan-
* tage of  using the rankings is  that  we get  values  for  
*  XSTAR that  have near ly  the same var iance as  the or iginal  
*  X values .  This  i s  not  t rue i f  we use probabi l i t ies  
*  obtained from the values  in  ZSTAR.;  
LOAD XSTAR; 
* The unrestr ic ted values  of  XSTAR for  a l l  0-1 var iables  are  
*  simply the values  in  DSTAR for  these var iables .  These values  
*  on the uni t  interval  wil l  be mapped to  0 or  1  in  PSPACE.;  
IF NBER 1= 0 THEN XSTARC|,P-NBER+1:P|)=DSTAR(| ,P-NBER+1:P|) ;  
*  Insure that  a l l  masked values  meet  their  res t r ic t ions. ;  
NRI=1; 
DO 11=1 TO P;  
*  If  the I l - th  var iable  has  a  res t r ic t ion associated with i t ,  
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* set  XBARII to  the mean of  the  or iginal  var iable  values  (used 
*  only in  the case of  Bernoul l i  var iables)  then cal l  PSPACE 
*  to  insure the values  of  XSTAR are  in  their  parameter  spaces . ;  
IF NRI > NR THEN GOTO FINRES; 
XBARII-0;  
IF TYPE(j l l . l I )=3 THEN XBARII=XBAR(| , I I | ) ;  




*  Standardize ZSTAR by mult iplying by the inverse of  the diagonal  
*  matr ix  of  s tandard deviat ions of  the masked var iables .  
ZBAR=»ZSTAR( |  + ,  I ) /N;  
MZZ=(ZSTARCAZSTAR-N*ZBARCAZBAR)/(N-1);  
ZSTAR=ZSTARAINV(DIAG(SQRT(VECDIAG(MZZ)))) ;  
*  Combine the two data  matr ices  and compute the sample covariance 
*  and correlat ion matr ices . ;  
ZALL=Z|IZSTAR; 
STORE Z ZSTAR; 
ZBAR=ZALL(|+,J)/N; 
MZZALL=(ZALLC *ZALL-N*ZBARC*ZBAR)/(N-1);  




MZZ21=MZZALL( |  P+1 ;  2 ' ' 'P ,  1  :  P |  )  ;  
MZZ22=MZZALL( I P+1:2 'Vp,  p+1:  2*P |  )  ;  
RHOl1=RH0ZALL(11 :P ,1  ;PI) ;  
RH012»RH0ZALL(11 :P,P+1:2*PI); 
RH021=RH0ZALL(|P+1:2*P,1:P | ) ;  
RH022=RH0ZALL(|P+1:2AP,P+1:2*P|) ;  
PRINT RHOll  ,  RHOl2 ,  RH022;  
FREE ZBAR MZZALL MZZ12 MZZ21 RHOll  RHOl2 RH021 RH022;  
*  Load the matr ix  of  or iginal  values .  This  i s  the matr ix  X i f  
*  there  are  no c lass i f icat ion var iables  and the matr ix  XOLD i f  
"  c lass i f icat ion var iables  are  present  in  the or iginal  data . ;  
IF NC=0 THEN DO; 




IF NC--0 THEN LOAD XOLD; 
*  Concatenate  the matr ices  of  or iginal  and masked values .  Compute 
*  and output  the sample covariance and correlat ion matr ices  to  
*  give the user  an idea of  how the matr ix  of  masked correlat ions 




IVX12=INV(DIAG(SQRT(VECDIAG(MXX)))) ;  
RHOX=IVXL2*MXX*IVX12 ; 
MXX11=MXX(I1:P,1:P|); 
MXX12=MXX(il :p ,p+l :2*p|) ;  
MXX21=MXX(IP+1:2AP,1 :PI) ;  





PRINT ICORR ,  XBAR ,  RHOll  ,  RHOl2 ,  RH022;  
IF NC=0 THEN STORE X;  
IF NC--=0 THEN STORE XOLD; 
jV — —  — ________ Vf 
* VI.  B.  Equat ing the Cross  Correlat ions to  a  target  
*  If  ICORR, the  i terat ion counter  for  set t ing cross  correlat ions,  
*  is  equal  to  LIMCORR go to  the second i terat ive procedure. ;  
IF ICORR=LIMICORR THEN GOTO FIXCORR; 
"  The purpose of  i terat ing is  to  obtain the desired correlat ions 
*  within the masked se t  of  var iables  and between masked and or i -
* ginal  var iables .  Here,  we are  concerned with correlat ions 
'•  between the var iables  X(i)  and XSTAR(i) ,  for  i=l ,2 , . . .P .  After  
'•  the  f i rs t  mask,  we compute the average of  these correlat ions,  
*  excluding the highest  and lowest  cross  correlat ions,  and s tore  
this  robust  mean in  PBAR. We then adjust  the elements  of  the  
*  error  vectors  a t  each i terat ion depending on whether  the 
*  correlat ion between the corresponding or iginal  and masked 




IF ICORR-0 THEN DO; 
SUMCOR=0; 
* Compute the  sum of  the correlat ions. ;  
DO K=1 TO P;  
IF RH012( |K,K|)  < MINCOR THEN MINC0R=RH012( |K,K|) ;  
IF RH012( |K,K|)  > MAXCOR THEN MAXC0R=RH012( |K,Ki) ;  
SUMCOR=SUMCOR+RHOl2(IK,KI);  
END; 
*  Subtract  the largest  and smallest  correlat ions and compute the 




* Determine i f  the cross  correlat ions between corresponding 
*  or iginal  and masked x-var iables  are  near ly  equal  to  the target  
*  cross  correlat ion.  I f  so,  go to  the second i terat ion procedure.  
*  If  not ,  reset  BAA, the  error  t ransformation matr ix . ;  
ELSE DO; 
DO K=1 TO P;  






* BAA12 i s  the vector  of  mult ipl iers  corresponding to  each element  
• '  of  the  error  vectors .  BAA12 i s  re- ini t ia l ized to  the uni t  
*  vector  a t  every i terat ion.  Then,  i f  a  cross  correlat ion is  
*  close to  the target ,  the error  elements  corresponding to  that  
*  correlat ion wil l  not  be changed. ;  
BAA12=J(P,1,1); 
•> ' '  The diagonal  e lements  of  RH012 are  the correlat ions between 
*  each or iginal  and masked var iable .  Linear  interpolat ion is  
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* used to  set  the mult ipl ier  of  the  K-th element  of  the  error  
*  vector ,  which wil l  adjust  the magnitude of  the  error  to  give 
*  the desired correlat ion,  PBAR.;  
DO K=1 TO P;  
*  If  the cross  correlat ion is  within 0.01 of  the target ,  the 
*  corresponding error  terms are  not  adjusted.  Otherwise,  
*  the error  terms are  increased i f  the target  i s  less  than the 
*  cross  correlat ion,  and the error  terms are  decreased i f  the 
*  opposi te  i s  t rue. ;  
PDIFF=PBAR-RH012( |K,K|) ;  
IF ABS(PDIFF) <= 0 .0I  THEN GOTO NEXTBA; 
PSTAR=0.5 'KPBAR+RH012( |K,K|)) ;  
BAA12( |K,I)=(1.0-PSTAR)/(1.0-RH012( |K,K|)) ;  
NEXTBA: 
END; 
* Multiply each error vector by the diagonal matrix of 
* multipliers. These new error vectors will be added to the 




* Recompute ZSTAR with the new set of error vectors and increment 
* the iteration counter. Go to label "ADDZ" where the retransfor-
* mation of the ZSTAR values is made continuing the iteration 
* procedure.; 




VI. C. Equating Original & Masked Correlation Matrices 
FIXCORR: 
* If NCORR has exceeded LIMNCORR, the maximum number of iterations 
* has been made. Proceed to make final transformations and output 
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* the masked data . ;  
NC0RR=NC0RR+1;  
IF NCORR > LIMNCORR THEN GOTO SETXOUT; 
*  For  NCORR-th i terat ion,  set  SQCORR to  zero.  The sum of  squared 
*  differences between corresponding correlat ions in  the or iginal  
*  and masked correlat ion matr ices ,  i s  computed and s tored in  
*  SQCORR. This  value is  then output  to  give the user  an idea 
*  of  how wel l  the  masked correlat ion matr ix  i s  converging to  the 
*  or iginal  correlat ion matr ix . ;  
SQCORR=0; 
DO 1=1 TO P-1;  




'< Determine the var iable  whose or iginal  correlat ions with other  
*  var iables  are  most  d i f ferent  with those same masked 
*  correlat ions.  (See Sect ion 3 .3 .3  for  detai ls  of  th is  select ion 
* cr i ter ion.)  That  i s ,  compute the sum of  squared differences 
*  between corresponding rows in  the or iginal  and masked 
"  correlat ion matr ices .  The row (or  var iable)  with the highest  
*  sum of  squares  i s  the var iable  to  be modif ied. ;  
*  Set  IVARX to  zero.  Ini t ia l ize  DXCORR, the  maximum of  the sum 
"  of  squares ,  a t  zero.  Also,  se t  KAPPA, the  average of  the cross  




DO 1=1 TO P;  
KAPPA=KAPPA+(RH012( | I , I | ) /P) ;  
END; 
DO 1=1 TO P;  
DXRHO=0; 
DO L=l  TO P;  
DXRH0=DXRH0+(RH011( | I ,L | ) -RH022( | I ,L | ) )**2;  
END; 






* Output  the i terat ion number,  the  squared differences between a l l  
*  correlat ions,  the average cross  correlat ion and the var iable  to  
*  be modif ied. ;  
PRINT NCORR SQCORR KAPPA IVARX; 
*  To obtain the desired masked correlat ions between the masked 
*  var iable  of  IVARX and the other  masked var iables ,  we work 
*  with the t ransformed masked Z-values  of  var iable  IVARX. We 
*  reset  these t ransformed masked values  to  a  l inear  combinat ion 
*  of  the t ransformed masked values  of  the  other  var iables  and 
*  the or iginal  t ransformed values  of  the  IVARX var iable .  The 
*  l inear  combinat ion is  determined by f i t t ing a  model  based on 
*  the correlat ions between the masked and or iginal  IVARX, and 
*  between the other  masked var iables .  See Sect ion 3 .3 .3  for  
*  the exact  model .  I t  is  too complicated to  reproduce here . ;  
*  XRHO repesents  the design matr ix  and YRHO the vector  of  
*  responses  in  the model  XRHO^B^YRHO. B i s  the vector  which i s  
*  predicted and def ines  the l inear  combinat ion discussed above. ;  
XRHO=J(P,P,0) ;  
YRHO=J(P,1,0) ;  
*  Set  the XRHO matr ix  and the YHO vector  based on model  
*  (3.3.19)  of  Sect ion 3 .3 .3  of  the thesis . ;  
XRHO(11,11)=RH012(IIVARX,IVARX|)-1;  
YRHO(11,1 I)=KAPPA-1;  
*  The j - th  element  of  YRHO i s  the correlat ion between IVARX 
*  and the j - th  var iable  not  equal  to  IVARX minus the correlat ion 
*  between IVARX and the j - th  masked var iable  not  equal  to  IVARX. 
*  The i - th  element  of  row one of  XRHO i s  the correlat ion between 
*  var iable  IVARX and the i - th  masked var iable  not  equal  to  IVARX. 
*  The j - th  element  of  column one of  XRHO i s  the correlat ion 
*  between the j - th  masked var iable  not  equal  to  IVARX and the 
*  masked IVARX var iable  minus the correlat ion between the j - th  
*  masked var iable  not  equal  to  IVARX and the or iginal  var iable  
*  IVAR. The ( j , i ) - th  element  i s  uni ty  i f  i  equals  j .  Otherwise,  
*  the ( j , i ) - th  element  i s  equal  to  the correlat ion between the 
*  j - th  masked var iable  not  equal  to  IVARX and the i - th  masked 
*  var iable  not  equal  to  IVARX. In  the set t ings descr ibed above,  
* 2 <= i,j <= P.; 
VDUM=0; 
DO 1=1 TO P-1;  
IF IVARX <= I  THEN VDUM=1; 
XRHO(I 1 ,1+1 I)=RH012(IIVARX,I+VDUM|);  
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DO I - l  TO P-1;  
IF IVARX <= I THEN VDUM1=0; 
VDUM2=0; 
DO L=1 TO P-1; 
IF IVARX <=• L THEN VDUM2=1; 
IF I=L THEN XRHO(| l+l ,L+l | ) - l ;  
IF I->-L THEN XRH0( | l  + l ,L+l | )=RH022( | l+VDUMl,L+VDUM2|) ;  
END; 
END; 
*  Solve the system by mult iplying YRHO by the general ized inverse 
of  XRHO.;  
BTILDA=GINV(XRHO)AYRHO; 
BHAT=J(P,1,0); 
* Reset  the  values  of  BTILDA in  BHAT so a  new masked,  t ransformed 
*  vector  of  values  for  the IVARX-th var iable  can be computed by 
*  mult iplying BHAT by the (P- l )  t ransformed,  masked vectors  
*  not  corresponding to  IVARX and the unmasked,  t ransformed 
*  vector  of  responses  corresponding to  IVARX.;  
IDUM=0; 
IBHAT=1;  
BHAT(I IVARX,|)=BTILDA(| l , | ) ;  
DO 1=1 TO P-1; 
IF IVARX <= I  THEN IDUM=1; 
BHAT(II+IDUM,I)=BTILDA(|I+l , | ) ;  
END; 
PRINT XRHO YRHO BHAT; 
LOAD Z ZSTAR; 
* Compute a  new vector  of  masked,  t ransformed responses  for  the 
*  IVARX-th var iable  and cont inue the i terat ive procedure. ;  
ZTILDA=Z(I , IVARX|)A(1-BHAT(|IVARX,| ) )+ZSTAR*BHAT; 
ZSTARCI,IVARXI)=ZTILDA; 
GOTO ADDZ; 
*  The i terat ive process  i s  complete .  Transform any sets  of  
*  Bernoul l i  var iables  created to  mask c lass i f icat ion var iables  
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* back to masked classification variables.; 
SETXOUT: , . 
* If classification variables do not exist, XOUT is already set to 
* XSTAR. Go to the section where the masked data is output.; 




* Classification variables are present. Initialize CSTAR, which 
* will store the masked values of the classification variables. 
* JCOL is the column in XSTAR before the pseudo variables for 
* the next classification variable begin. INC indexes the 
* columns of CSTAR so the actual categorical values can be 




DO 11=1 TO PO; 
* If variable II is not a classification variable, go on to the 
* next variable. Otherwise, call ZTRANS. This will, for each 
* record, take the values of the pseudo variables for that record 
* and determine the appropriate masked categorical value to be 
* reported. See ZTRANS for details of this back transformation.; 






FREE XS FS FX FI F R Z; 
* Use the POSIT array to determine the original ordering of the 
* the variables. Store the columns of variable responses in this 
* order in XOUT.; 
XOUT=J(N,PO,0); . 
DO 1=1 TO PO; 
IF I <= PO-NC THEN XOUT( | ,P0SIT(11,|)|)=XSTAR(|,11); 
IF I > PO-NC THEN X0UT(|,P0SIT(|I,J)|)=CSTAR(1,I-PO+NC|); 
END; 
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* Output the masked data vectors to the SAS data set MDATA. Then, 
* read the data set MDATA into SAS variables so the masked values 




VARNAMES={X1 X2 X3 X4}; 
CREATE MDATA FROM X0UT(|COLNAME=VARNAMES|); 
APPEND FROM XOUT; 
CLOSE MDATA; 
FINISH; 
************************ END MAIN ROUTINE ************************* ; 
RUN; 
* SAS Data step: Set SETl to MDATA (the masked variables) 
* and output to the file named in OUTl of the JCL. Delete 
* the IML library used to temporary store matrices.; 
DATA SETl; SET MDATA; 
FILE OUTl; 
PUT (XI X2 X3 X4)(2*9.4 1*5.0 1*4.0); 
//LMASK DD DSN=MATRIX.IML.LIB,UNIT=DISK,DISP=(OLD,DELETE), 
// VOL=SER=UCC004 
// 
